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Theoretical Contentions and Analytical Approaches
The debate over the effects of trade liberalization and foreign direct investment
(FDI), or economic “globalization,” on environmental protection has generated
intense scrutiny from environmentalists, policymakers, and academics alike.
On the one hand, many economists and globalization proponents contend that
the economic gains captured from free trade and FDI offset environmental
damage by increasing host-country wealth. In their view, increased wealth em-
powers citizens and enables higher levels of domestic investment in environ-
mental protection.1 On the other hand, environmentalists and trade critics ar-
gue that a reduction of trade barriers and an increase in FDI should increase
environmental pollution, especially in less-developed countries (LDCs) that
lack the willingness or capacity to maintain stringent environmental regula-
tion.2 They argue that in order to remain competitive in a global environment,
developing-country governments have incentive to reduce environmental reg-
ulatory standards to attract increased levels of foreign investment and maintain
competitiveness in export markets. This process generates a “race to the bot-
tom” (RTB) among political jurisdictions competing for investment and low-
cost export production. Investors motivated by cost savings seek out these “pol-
lution havens” (PH) to establish production operations, creating a vicious
circle of diminishing regulation and increasing pollution.
China is a key front in this debate. Yet, analysts have generated surprisingly
little empirical evidence from China to inform it. It’s even more surprising
given China’s phenomenal economic growth, its increasing integration into the
global economy, and its ability to affect both the global ecology and global en-
vironmental negotiations.3 This project seeks to ‹ll this lacuna through an ex-
tensive, multimethod empirical examination of the effects of increasing trade
and investment on the Chinese environment.
Our results challenge both the pollution-haven and the race-to-the-bottom
hypotheses. We ‹nd that foreign ‹rms do not seek out pollution havens in
China. Nor do Chinese provinces lower environmental standards to attract for-
eign investment. We ‹nd that trade can actually increase the ‹nancial incen-
tives of export-oriented ‹rms to self-regulate environmental performance to
developed-world regulatory standards in the mode of the California Effect.4
Further, we ‹nd that FDI from the developed world conveys superior regula-
tory standards from parent company to subsidiary and facilitates the interna-
tional diffusion and spillover of environmentally cleaner technology.5 Ulti-
mately, we expect increasing trade and investment to lead to an overall
improvement in Chinese environmental health. However, as our book elabo-
rates, it matters whom the trade is with, and where the FDI originates. The fol-
lowing sections provide an overview of our project and detail our key theoret-
ical contentions.
background and overview of the project
Unfortunately, China’s remarkable economic growth in recent decades has
been accompanied by considerable environmental externalities. China is cur-
rently experiencing environmental degradation on a monumental scale. Indus-
trial, agricultural, and municipal pollution is at or exceeding catastrophic levels
for much of the Chinese population. In its rush toward economic moderniza-
tion, China absorbed the products and processes that fueled similar industrial-
izations in the United States and Europe, but in a world more vulnerable to
their costs. The costs, both ‹nancial and human, have been high. Recent reports
from China’s State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) claim
that environmental pollution costs the Chinese economy approximately 10 per-
cent of annual gross domestic product (GDP), though some estimates measure
the actual cost, in terms of human life and livelihood, to be much higher.6
Environmental pollution is manifested in different forms, with the most se-
rious threats arising from industrial, agricultural, and municipal air and water
pollution. These threats are both local and global in nature. According to the
Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, China is the largest overall
emitter of greenhouse gases in the world and emits roughly twice the amount
of sulfur dioxide and particulate matter as does the United States.7 This has se-
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rious health consequences for Chinese people, but the problem ›oats well be-
yond China’s borders. With the right wind directions, air pollution can easily
blow across international boundaries and into the atmosphere, driving up
global temperatures, fueling acid rain, and affecting the respiratory health of
people everywhere.
Putrid water undermines the health and prosperity of the Chinese and
those downstream that rely on Chinese rivers for drinking and ‹shing. For Chi-
nese people, water pollution is catastrophic, as China supports a ‹fth of the
world population with access to only 7 percent of the global water supply. Some
90 percent of Chinese cities and 75 percent of Chinese lakes suffer from some
degree of water contamination from ef›uent discharge. As an example, a Chi-
nese newspaper recently described the pollution in the Yangtze River, the pri-
mary water supply for 186 cities and hundreds of millions of people, as “can-
cerous” and provided warning from Chinese environmental experts that the
Yangtze could be dead within ‹ve years if it remains untreated.8 Similar condi-
tions imperil riparian environments across the country. For those downstream
that rely on Chinese water, the problem is equally acute. An explosion in 2005
at a petrochemical plant in Jilin province dumped hundreds of tons of benzene,
a potent carcinogen, into the Songhua River. The Songhua ›ows directly into
the Heilong River and is the primary water source for the 700,000 people in the
Russian city of Khabarovsk. The spill severely contaminated the water supply
and is expected to affect ‹sh quality long into the future.9
The severity of China’s environmental problems raises important questions
about sources and potential solutions. While previous studies have focused on
the domestic politics of Chinese environmental management,10 much less
scholarly attention has been devoted to the environmental impact of China’s
growing international economic integration.11 Nevertheless, given that integra-
tion constitutes an important engine of China’s economic dynamism, it is im-
perative to understand how these forces affect Chinese environmental protec-
tion. The purpose of this study, therefore, is to seek to understand the ways in
which the international market in›uences both provincial-level environmental
policy outcomes and the behavior of ‹rms operating in China.
This book links two related conceptual frameworks that have hitherto been
treated separately: the pollution-haven hypothesis and the race-to-the-bottom
hypothesis. As a common public critique of economic globalization, the race-
to-the-bottom hypothesis implies that states or regions compete to attract for-
eign investment by disregarding environmental standards (or engaging in a
race to the bottom). Because the types of industrial investment that ‹nd these
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sites ‹nancially attractive are primarily pollution-intensive, locales that sup-
port this behavior become known as pollution havens. Based on this distinc-
tion, the RTB and PH arguments represent two sides of the same coin: while the
RTB hypothesis illustrates the conduct of government, the PH conjecture de-
picts the outcome of ‹rm response to that conduct. Researchers of these hy-
potheses generally frame their arguments around two primary assumptions:
‹rst, that the out›ow of FDI from developed countries is positively associated
with the level of environmental regulatory stringency; and second, the in›ow of
FDI to developing countries is positively associated with an increase in pollu-
tion levels.12 In this book we empirically examine both of these assertions.
In addition to dissecting the relationship between the ‹rm, the Chinese
province, and the environmental outcome of variation in trade and investment
›ows, this book questions the assumption that all ‹rms are created equal. Re-
search into ‹rm behavior has demonstrated that ‹rms are both products of the
environment in which they are created and shaped by the actors they engage.13
The “trading-up” and “investing-up” phenomena described below help to illus-
trate these dynamics. According to the trading-up hypothesis, ‹rms that trade
with environmentally regulated jurisdictions should have ‹nancial incentive to
exhibit superior environmental behavior. Vogel uses the case of German auto-
mobile exports to California to illustrate how the stringent environmental reg-
ulation in importing countries exerts upward regulatory pressure on exporting
‹rms through a threat of diminished market access.14 Similarly, ‹rms that orig-
inate from countries with stringent environmental regulatory norms should be
more inclined to convey those norms to countries where they invest. Prakash
and Potoski call this “investing up” and ‹nd empirical support through a cross-
country examination of the impact of foreign investment on ‹rm self-regula-
tion. Using ISO 14001, one of the most well-known environmental self-regula-
tory programs in the world, they ‹nd that ISO adoptions in invested states are
positively proportional to ISO adoption rates in investing states.15 This indi-
cates that ‹rms can actually transmit constructive environmental policies and
operational norms through foreign investment. However, this process can be
negative as well. Though little research has been done on the corporate trans-
mission of de‹cient environmental norms and policies, chapter 7 demonstrates
that ‹rms that originate in environmentally unregulated states can convey poor
regulatory practices to states in which they invest. The trading-up and invest-
ing-up phenomena are important to our analysis because they highlight the
consequences of stringent environmental regulation in wealthy states and illus-
trate the mechanisms by which policy can diffuse through international eco-
nomic networks.
4 / greening china
This book empirically examines the impact of trade and foreign investment
on the Chinese environment at the provincial level. It reinforces this examina-
tion with an analysis of ‹rm behavior in China. Speci‹cally, we address three
questions that directly bear on the PH and RTB hypotheses.
• Do ‹rms engage in pollution-haven-seeking behavior among Chinese
provinces?
• Does international economic integration exert upward or downward
pressure on the environmental behavior of ‹rms in China? Moreover, to
the extent that ‹rms are the agents driving provincial policy outcomes
across Chinese provinces, how does this affect environmental conditions
across and deregulatory competition among Chinese provinces?
• Are provinces that export primarily to countries with stringent environ-
mental regulations and those that receive the bulk of their FDI from such
countries more likely to have superior environmental performance? In
other words, do the investing-up and trading-up phenomena apply to
China?
The empirical evidence presented in this book lends little support to the
pollution-haven and race-to-the-bottom hypotheses. Instead, our ‹ndings
provide considerable support to the following key theoretical conjectures: (1)
international investors do not engage in pollution-haven-seeking behavior at
the provincial level in China, nor do of‹cials compete to deregulate; (2) Chi-
nese provinces that are more heavily embedded in global trade and production
networks tend to have more sound environmental conditions; and (3) a
province’s environmental regulations are heavily in›uenced by the level of en-
vironmental stringency in primary export markets and FDI home countries.
We brie›y explain the underlying rationale for each of these theoretical conjec-
tures in the following section.
key theoretical contentions
This section highlights our key arguments regarding each of the above ques-
tions. First, multinational corporations (MNCs) do not seek out provincial pollu-
tion havens in China. Rather, MNCs often favor the harmonization of corporate
environmental policies with those of the most highly regulated markets in re-
sponse to a variety of social and institutional pressures. By engaging in self-reg-
ulation, export-oriented MNCs can avoid reputation costs from increasingly
sophisticated consumers who are aware of the environmental destruction
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wrought by irresponsible corporate behavior, and import-competing MNCs in
the host country can cultivate positive domestic public relations and enhance
eco-marketing potential. Pollution-haven-seeking behavior may also be miti-
gated by the need for MNCs to abide by home-country environmental regula-
tions to streamline operational ef‹ciency and, for exporters, by concerns about
regulatory trade barriers in export markets.
Furthermore, it has been argued that both export- and import-competing
groups have incentives to lobby for less stringent environmental controls be-
cause such measures could confer added cost advantages on both groups.16
However, in China, exporters already enjoy low-cost advantages against their
competitors elsewhere in the market, and there are few groups that directly
compete with imports from foreign countries. In other words, in China, and
perhaps other large export-dependent developing economies, key domestic
business groups lack strong incentives to favor less stringent environmental
controls as a way of lowering production and business costs. This should ren-
der inoperative another causal mechanism linking trade openness and lax en-
vironmental regulation described in other studies.
Second, the same factors that help explain why ‹nancial incentives are not
lucrative enough to induce MNC pollution-haven-seeking behavior also help
us understand why increasing trade and foreign direct investment in China do not
necessarily jeopardize the Chinese environment. Provincial of‹cials should be re-
luctant to jeopardize long-term economic growth by engaging in environmen-
tal deregulatory competition because it may engender provincial reputation
costs that deter future investment and subject Chinese exports to increased reg-
ulatory scrutiny in developed markets. In addition, even in absence of reputa-
tion costs as a deterrent, provincial of‹cials are unlikely to use this strategy sim-
ply because it is not likely to be effective. Overall, we expect that China’s
provincial governments are more concerned with ensuring the global mar-
ketability of their existing export base and the sustainability and effectiveness
of existing environmental policies. In a transition economy heavily dependent
on exports, the importance of unencumbered access to global export markets
outweighs any potential cost bene‹ts of enabling “dirty” production. Because
provincial governments are charged with increasing economic growth within
their provinces, threats to major export market access can be quite powerful.
At the ‹rm level, we expect ‹rms to transfer environmental standards en-
shrined in developed-world import markets, such as the United States and the
European Union (EU), through trade networks, along the lines of Vogel’s trad-
ing-up argument.17 Firms in China that export to environmentally stringent
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consumer markets face considerable threats from the erection of environmen-
tal trade barriers. Whether or not those threats are great enough to encourage
sustainable behavior is likely a function of the level of ‹rm export dependence
and the strength of environmental regulation in export markets. Further, simi-
lar to Prakash and Potoski’s investing-up argument, MNCs originating in envi-
ronmentally regulated markets are increasingly mandating continuity in envi-
ronmental regulatory norms between the home of‹ce and subsidiary
operations in China to avoid increased transaction costs and to streamline in-
ternational trade. In all but a few heavily polluting industries, the residual cost
savings derived from degrading local environments does not outweigh the risk
of high reputation costs if an MNC, its subsidiary, or its supplier is linked to en-
vironmental destruction. This argument can also be applied to domestic ‹rms,
as MNCs could potentially use environmental performance as a supplier-selec-
tion criterion. Environmentally conscious supplier selection should instigate
domestic ‹rms to self-regulate their environmental performance to meet de-
veloped-world standards.18 In addition, environmental technology developed
in response to regulatory pressures in highly developed markets can be trans-
ferred to subsidiaries via MNC networks. This can increase both intra‹rm op-
erational ef‹ciency and competitive pressure on host-country ‹rms, encourag-
ing them to environmentally innovate.
Taken together, the dynamics described above indicate that globalization
may not necessarily lead ‹rms to lower environmental standards or provincial
governments to relax enforcement of existing standards to attract investment,
as international pressures and technology diffusion via trade openness and FDI
contribute to enhanced regulation and policy enforcement. Our statistical tests
based on provincial-level pollution emission data, domestic and multinational
corporate executive survey, and a case study of an MNC in the paper and pa-
perboard industry lend substantial support to this hypothesis.
Finally, our third proposition ‹nds support for Vogel’s trading-up and
Prakash and Potoski’s investing-up hypotheses, which suggest that trade and
FDI can serve to transmit environmental product and production standards
through trade and investment networks.19 However, we contend that not only
does the aggregate amount of trade and FDI matter, the export destinations of
Chinese provinces and the identity of their key foreign investors matter too.
Chinese provinces that either export to or receive most of their foreign investment
from countries with more stringent environmental standards are also more likely
to exhibit superior environmental performance. In other words, trade and in-
vestment linkages encourage better environmental protection if a province’s
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main export markets and foreign investors have progressive environmental
standards.
In short, through a thorough examination of the largest developing coun-
try in the world with a signi‹cantly growing presence in the world economy,
this project generates empirical evidence to inform the contentious debate over
the environmental effects of globalization. Our empirical ‹ndings may also
have implications for policymakers as they attempt to harness the power of the
market to safeguard global ecology.
the approach of the book
To investigate the research questions laid out above, we focus on both provin-
cial-level policy responses and ‹rm behavior. We adopt multiple methods, in-
cluding statistical analyses, survey analysis, and a case study, to support our the-
oretical contentions. The ‹ndings derived from these different methodological
approaches reinforce one another, further strengthening our con‹dence in the
validity of our main theoretical claims.
Key Analytical Foci
This book locates its analytical foci in both provincial-level and ‹rm-level re-
sponses to the pressures generated by integration into the world market. Our
emphasis on subnational policy outcomes at the provincial level is appropriate
due to the substantial variation in Chinese provinces’ level of integration into
the international market and semiautonomy with regard to enforcement of
jointly mandated environmental policies. First, the geographical distribution of
trade and foreign direct investment in China is highly uneven as coastal
provinces were the ‹rst to reap the bene‹ts of liberalization policies and were
thus a step ahead of inland provinces in attracting foreign trade and direct in-
vestment. This asymmetrical distribution produced a dramatic dichotomy of
living standards among coastal and inland provinces and led to variation in
both supply and demand of environmental policy enforcement. Second, there
is also a signi‹cant disparity among provincial governments in their willing-
ness to enact or enforce compliance with national environmental laws.20 This
stems in part from the wealth generated by the coastal provinces’ geographical
advantages in investment and trade attraction and from the ongoing process of
power decentralization from Beijing to regional governments. This devolution-
ary process provided provincial authorities with more autonomy vis-à-vis the
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center and enabled regional innovation to contribute to market-oriented re-
form.21 It also gave provincial governments a much larger stake in environ-
mental policy implementation and enforcement.22 Such provincial autonomy
can lead to competition in environmental as well as economic performance.
Factors such as political leadership, citizen participation, different economic
policies, and different degrees of exposure to global environmental practices all
play a part in determining the willingness and capacity of a province or munic-
ipality to enforce existing environmental regulation.23 Thus, the substantial
variation in Chinese provinces’ level of integration into the international mar-
ket and provincial variation in policy implementation and enforcement pro-
vide a suitable testing ground for competing arguments about the linkage be-
tween globalization and environmental protection.
Our unique emphasis on subnational policy outcomes distinguishes our
work from most existing studies of the impact of trade and foreign direct in-
vestment on the environment as well as those dealing speci‹cally with the Chi-
nese environment. Existing analyses of the PH and RTB hypotheses are often
grounded in examinations of cross-national variation in environmental policy.
To the best of our knowledge, few works have tested these hypotheses on the
basis of subnational variation in environmental policy outcomes. Second, while
a growing body of literature deals with the environment in China,24 much of
the work has focused on environmental conditions in China as a whole without
providing detailed treatment of the diversi‹cation of provincial behavior in the
realm of environmental protection. Our study ‹lls this lacuna by engaging in a
detailed examination of the subnational variation in environmental policy reg-
ulation, implementation, and enforcement. In doing so, it contributes to the
growing body of literature on decentralization and provincial diversi‹cation in
China.25 While our ‹ndings are based on analyses of subnational governments
in China, they should also have implications for understanding the behavior of
subnational governments in other countries. If foreign investors are not driven
by disparities in subnational environmental regulatory stringency in their in-
vestment decisions in a large developing country such as China, then there is
less reason to expect that they should be motivated to do so in developed coun-
tries such as the United States, Canada, or Germany.
We further juxtapose our macrolevel analysis of environmental policy out-
comes across Chinese provinces with a microlevel analysis of the behavior of
‹rms located in China. Since ‹rms are the main emitters, their behavior bears
directly on observed policy outcomes across provinces. In other words, envi-
ronmental protection of a given province should represent an aggregation of
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the responses of ‹rms located within that jurisdiction. By examining ‹rm be-
havior, we are able to trace the process through which ‹rms affect the imple-
mentation of and compliance with environmental rules and regulations. Our
empirical work buttresses our key theoretical contentions about the transfer of
corporate environmental norms and practices from the developed world to a
developing country such as China.
Multifaceted Methodological Approaches
This study draws on both quantitative and qualitative methods to support its
contentions. The usefulness of this strategy is enhanced by the data contained
in the China Statistical Yearbook, published by the China State Statistical Bu-
reau. The China Statistical Yearbook provides detailed data about trade, foreign
direct investment, and indicators about environmental performance and im-
plementation at the provincial level. While critics might argue that the reliabil-
ity of the data published by Chinese authorities is very much in doubt, the year-
book represents the only comprehensive and systematic data source at the
provincial level that we can draw upon. Moreover, to the extent that there is a
bias in the data, such bias should affect all of the provinces in a similar fashion
and thus partially allay potential concerns about data reliability.
We supplement our analysis of provincial-level data drawn from the China
Statistical Yearbook with a survey analysis of business executives’ attitudes to-
ward ‹rm self-regulation, the adoption of environmental management systems
and technology, and the effect of such environmental attitudes on perceived
level of ‹rm competitiveness. This survey analysis demonstrates that the em-
pirical patterns observed in the work derived from the China Statistical Year-
book are not statistical artifacts.
Finally, we reinforce our ‹ndings with a case study of a foreign-invested
company in the pulp and paper industry in China—Asia Pulp & Paper (APP),
headquartered in Indonesia. Our case study demonstrates that APP has under-
gone subtle changes in behavior from a company known for its illegal forestry
practices to one that seems to increasingly heed the environmental impact of its
Chinese operations. We provide evidence showing that this evolution is due, at
least in part, to customer pressure from developed-world markets. This study
therefore lends support to arguments about the in›uence of investor home-
country regulatory environment (in this case transmitting poor environmental
norms) and the impact of exporting to developed-world markets on corporate
environmental behavior. Overall, the utilization of multiple methods enables
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us to generate strong empirical evidence to support our main theoretical
propositions.
contributions
This study makes several contributions to the existing literature. First, it adds to
the study of how external pressure generated by integration into the world
market in›uences domestic governance in environmental protection. Our
analysis points out pathways through which external forces shape domestic
policy outcomes. By applying the pollution-haven and race-to-the-bottom hy-
potheses to an important country case—China—our analysis lends credence to
arguments in defense of the impact of trade and foreign direct investment on
the global environment.
Second, our empirical ‹ndings amount to a strong critique of the race-to-
the-bottom argument and its corollary, the pollution-haven argument, sug-
gesting that considerations about the stringency of environmental regulation
represent but one of the factors in›uencing business investment decisions. In-
stead, our ‹ndings suggest that in order to prevent the possibility of “green tar-
iff” retaliation and to minimize operational adjustment costs in case the host
country raises regulatory standards, MNCs tend to engage in self-regulation to
meet developed-world regulatory standards and to implement environmental
management systems and technology that surpass host-country requirements.
Not only do these ‹ndings refute the RTB argument, they also challenge the
view that international trade and multinational corporations serve to under-
mine global standards of environmental protection. Our ‹ndings suggest that
environmental activists and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) may
need to revisit their strategies and to more actively involve multinational cor-
porations in efforts to promote environmental protection.
Third, the ‹ndings have implications beyond the Chinese case. We argue
that the race-to-the-bottom and pollution-haven hypotheses require careful
examination of each country context to which they are applied. As indicated by
the above discussion, theory and empirics underlie both sides of the PH and
RTB arguments. This suggests that rather than pursuing broad, cross-national
empirical analyses, the debate about the impact of economic integration on
governmental behavior is best pushed forward by studies that examine per-
spectives with greater contextual emphasis, and by moving beyond the nation-
state as a unit of analysis. To the extent that China represents the largest devel-
oping country with growing in›uence not only on the global economy but also
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on the global ecology, the evidence presented in this project should cast, at the
minimum, further doubt on the RTB and PH arguments and bolster the valid-
ity of arguments that tout the positive environmental externalities resulting
from enmeshment in global trade and production networks.
organization of the book
This project is composed of eight chapters. In chapter 2 we outline our key ar-
guments through an examination of the theoretical debate over the impact of
globalization on the environment in the developing world. Chapter 3 provides
an introduction to the current state of environmental protection in China and
its provinces. This includes an overview of the severity of environmental prob-
lems in China, the system of environmental regulation and enforcement
adopted by Chinese authorities to combat the problems, and Chinese govern-
ment regulation of the environmental behavior of foreign investors in China.
Chapter 4 empirically assesses the following questions. First, are foreign in-
vestors attracted to pollution havens in China? And second, what is the impact
of international economic integration on cross-provincial variation in envi-
ronmental protection? Since the pollution-haven and race-to-the-bottom hy-
potheses represent two sides of the same coin, combining our provincial-level
statistical analyses of these two hypotheses into a single chapter allows us to
better shed light on these theoretical constructs and the linkages among them.
Speci‹cally, this chapter shows that provinces with higher levels of environ-
mental protection actually tend to attract more foreign investment than those
with lower levels, controlling for a range of alternative hypotheses. This result
directly challenges the pollution-haven hypothesis, indicating that foreign in-
vestors tend to take into consideration a variety of factors besides the strin-
gency of environmental regulation in a province in their siting decisions. In ad-
dition, our statistical tests provide substantial evidence supporting our key
argument that provinces more integrated with the international economy via
trade and FDI also tend to have lower levels of pollution emission due to self-
regulation and the transfer of environmental technology.
Chapter 5 further examines the question of how the impact of trade and
FDI on the environment in China may be mediated by the environmental stan-
dards of the export destination or that of the FDI home country. This chapter
yields strong evidence in support of the trading-up argument, as well as some
empirical support for the investing-up argument.
Chapter 6 supplements the ‹ndings presented in chapters 3 through 5 with
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survey results of business executives across several industries in China. The sur-
vey results presented in this chapter support our theoretical conjecture that
trade and FDI do exert a ratcheting-up effect by bringing prevailing corporate
environmental norms and regulatory standards in Chinese ‹rms’ key export
markets and home country of foreign direct investment to bear on the host
market.
Chapter 7 supplements our ‹ndings derived mainly from quantitative
analyses with a case study of Asia Pulp & Paper, a pulp and paper manufacturer
originating in Indonesia with home of‹ces in Singapore. We chose this ‹rm
speci‹cally because APP has a poor environmental reputation in an industry
known for environmental problems. In this capacity, it should present an espe-
cially hard case to test our theories. Although in this case, the norms transmit-
ted from the investor’s home country, Indonesia, were actually harmful, pres-
sure from developed-world export markets has led to a gradual change in
corporate behavior. The evidence from this case study lends additional support
to the ‹ndings reported in earlier chapters. Chapter 8 concludes by discussing
the theoretical and policy implications of this study.
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chapter 2
Debunking the “Pollution-Haven” and 
“Race-to-the-Bottom” Hypotheses
This book grounds its analyses in the “pollution-haven” (PH) and “race-to-
the-bottom” (RTB) propositions. In doing so, we provide support for the
“trading-up” and “investing-up” arguments, and the general notion that eco-
nomic globalization can be bene‹cial to the natural environment.1 This
chapter details our primary theoretical contentions based on a critique of the
existing PH and RTB literature and insights from the case of China. Its struc-
ture and conclusions are embedded in our three central arguments: First,
‹rms do not seek out Chinese provincial pollution havens, nor do of‹cials engage
in deregulatory competition; second, economic integration can improve environ-
mental pollution outcomes; and third, the regulatory stringency of major export
markets and major foreign investors has a signi‹cant impact on ‹rm behavior.
Taken together, these propositions suggest that economic globalization does
not necessarily have a destructive impact on the Chinese environment and
may even be bene‹cial.
The PH and RTB hypotheses address the linkages between globalization
and the environment from the ‹rm and government perspectives, respectively.
Though some of our empirical analyses address provincial-level variation, the
underlying mechanisms leading to this variation derive directly from ‹rm ac-
tions. Thus, nesting our analysis in both hypotheses enables us to provide a
more comprehensive view of the impact of globalization on environmental
protection in China by clearly delineating the linkages between ‹rm and gov-
ernment behavior.
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overview of the argument
We base our criticisms of the pollution-haven hypothesis on the logic of ‹rm
self-regulation. We argue that rather than seeking out pollution havens to reap
residual environmental cost savings, ‹rms are more concerned with the inter-
national legitimacy of brand image and the maintenance of consistent envi-
ronmental regulatory policies for subsidiaries and throughout the supply
chain. These mechanisms enable ‹rms to hedge against revenue losses from en-
vironmental trade barrier erection and customer dissatisfaction upon exposure
of environmentally negligent policies. Further, self-regulation of corporate en-
vironmental policies can even increase long-term ‹rm competitiveness by
preparing it for inevitable increases in regulatory stringency in host-country
and developed markets.
We also argue that Chinese provinces do not race to the bottom with re-
spect to environmental deregulation. The lack of demand for environmental
deregulation is simply insuf‹cient to motivate provincial of‹cials to relax reg-
ulatory standards. First, the advanced environmental technology and produc-
tion processes used by ‹rms from highly regulated home countries diminish
the pressure these ‹rms might place on of‹cials to deregulate. Second, the man-
ufacturing processes and technologies used by these ‹rms spur competition in
local technological development and can produce technology and knowledge
spillovers to other ‹rms. This reduces the incentive of provincial of‹cials to
comply with the deregulatory demands of local ‹rms, and it increases the envi-
ronmental bene‹ts of trade and FDI more generally.
Finally, we argue that trade and investment can encourage the development
of sustainable business practices when a country or region’s key export market
or investment source country has rigorous environmental regulations, as pre-
dicted by the trading-up and investing-up arguments. We ‹nd that fear of trade
retaliation by importing countries with stringent environmental standards can
prompt exporters in less-regulated states to increase their environmental regu-
latory stringency. In addition, we ‹nd that foreign investors from heavily regu-
lated states tend to replicate their environmental practices in host countries. If
these arguments are valid, then we expect Chinese provinces that either export
to or receive investment from heavily regulated countries to exhibit relatively
more environmentally progressive behavior.
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the pollution-haven and 
race-to-the-bottom propositions
Do foreign ‹rms deliberately seek out pollution havens in China? Do Chinese
provincial governments engage in competitive environmental deregulation in
order to attract foreign investment? Before elaborating our hypotheses, we ‹rst
provide a brief survey of the existing PH and RTB literature. We argue that in
addition to the criticisms leveled against these propositions, proponents of
both views have largely ignored the dynamics of ‹rm self-regulation, the effects
of environmental technology transmission and spillover, and the fear of re-
duced export market accessibility on government of‹cials’ environmental pol-
icy calculations. The following section provides a basis for the theoretical de-
velopment that follows.
An Industrial Flight toward Pollution Havens
The pollution-haven hypothesis posits that changes in comparative advantage
induce variation in trade ›ows and industrial location.2 It also suggests that dif-
ferences in the stringency of environmental regulation may result in an “indus-
trial ›ight” of dirty industries from environmentally regulated markets to areas
of lax enforcement to reap the bene‹t of lower pollution abatement costs.3
Theoretically, the formation of pollution havens is a consequence of an envi-
ronmental race to the bottom among political jurisdictions that compete by
lowering environmental standards to promote trade and attract foreign invest-
ment.4 For government of‹cials, the potential economic bene‹ts of FDI offered
by relaxation of environmental regulations are expected to compensate for the
resulting damage. Supporters of these propositions argue that in addition to
the environmental injury resulting from the expansion of production, con-
sumption, and transportation of goods, trade liberalization could lead govern-
ments to privilege market shares over environmental protection.5 Accordingly,
industrialists in an open economy concerned about competition from abroad
should fear that stringent environmental regulation may increase their costs,
leading to loss of sales, employment, and investment, as well as loss of compet-
itiveness against foreign ‹rms. Under these circumstances, it is expected that
domestic producers will apply pressure on their governments to relieve the
burden of regulation, and foreign investors will follow suit through investment
location decisions.6 When national governments respond to these pressures by
setting marginal abatement costs below marginal damage costs, it can result in
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environmental dumping, without compensation for environmental damage.
Further, as both source- and host-country governments recognize the potential
bene‹ts of FDI, critics stress that irreversible environmental and social deteri-
oration will outweigh the bene‹ts provided by economic growth.7
Although the formation of pollution havens can be linked to governmental
preferences to deregulate, or to failures to enforce existing regulation, it is a
consequence of an aggregation of individual ‹rm-level investment decisions
and necessitates a ‹rm-level analysis. The idea that ‹rms should seek out areas
of minimal environmental regulation to avoid pollution control costs is theo-
retically sound, at least super‹cially. Indeed, there have been numerous exam-
ples of MNCs causing excessive environmental damage to host-country envi-
ronments. However, whether or not this is common or anomalous behavior is
very much in question.
Empirical results are mixed. On the one hand, some analyses ‹nd evidence
that MNCs deliberately seek out areas of lax environmental regulation to avoid
pollution control costs in regulated markets.8 Some studies also ‹nd that plant
location decisions or other types of FDI are driven at least in part by disparities
in environmental regulatory stringency across jurisdictions.9 For example, in a
recent analysis of the investment behavior of European ‹rms in twenty-‹ve
countries, Spatareanu discovered that a higher level of environmental regula-
tory stringency in the investor’s home country relative to that of potential host
countries indicates a higher probability of outward investment from regulated
to less-regulated markets. The investment ›ows were also positively correlated
with investment volume.10 Alternatively, studies in different contexts have been
unable to generate convincing supportive evidence that regulatory stringency is
a primary determinant of ‹rms’ location decisions.11 Javorcik and Wei found
no evidence that ‹rms engaged in pollution-intensive activities are more likely
to invest in locales with weak environmental institutions or institutional en-
forcement capacity in eastern Europe.12 Similarly, in an analysis of the invest-
ment behavior of Japanese ‹rms in ‹ve highly polluting sectors, Kirkpatrick
and Shimamoto found evidence suggesting that the quality of regulatory
framework actually had a much greater in›uence on investment decisions than
level of environmental regulatory stringency.13 In Latin America, Birdsall and
Wheeler ‹nd that more pollution-intensive industries actually tend to be lo-
cated in more protectionist countries.14 Using data on U.S. foreign direct in-
vestment in both developed and developing countries, Anderson and Kagan
suggest that U.S. ‹rms engaging in pollution-intensive production are also
more likely to be located in countries with more stringent environmental stan-
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dards.15 In reviewing the existing literature on the PH and RTB propositions,
Arik Levinson writes, “The conclusions of both the international and domestic
studies of industry location are that environmental regulations do not deter in-
vestment to any statistically or economically signi‹cant degree.”16 In any case,
it is fair to say that previous work has left the issue as an open-ended question.
Even in China, scholars report mixed results. While He ‹nds that increases
in environmental regulatory stringency only modestly deter capital in›ow into
China,17 a recent study by Shen demonstrates little support for pollution-
haven-seeking behavior on a provincial level.18 In their ‹rm-level study of pol-
lution-haven-seeking behavior in China, Dean, Lovely, and Wang found no ev-
idence that inward FDI from developed countries in the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), regardless of industry-
level pollution intensity, engages in pollution-haven-seeking behavior.19 In
contrast, they found that highly polluting industries from Chinese sources
(e.g., Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan) are signi‹cantly deterred by pollution
taxes. They note a possible explanation for this, one that is supported in the ex-
isting literature, that investment from advanced countries exempli‹es newer
and cleaner technology suggesting lower pollution abatement costs and a
higher probability that a plant will meet emission standards and avoid taxation.
Empirical analysis of the proliferation of technology transfer in China through
foreign investment channels has also yielded positive conclusions.
Critics of the PH hypothesis highlight several theoretical weaknesses. Im-
portantly, the PH hypothesis ignores the fact that corporate preferences may
vary in a way that precludes them from systematically seeking out pollution
havens. In some cases, MNCs may even prefer stringent regulation to protect
corporate interests.20 For example, the strong support that the American enter-
tainment, computer, pharmaceutical, and chemical companies have professed
toward the establishment of an intellectual property rights (IPR) regime within
the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to minimize pro‹t
losses due to piracy of IPR products in the developing world is an example of
this phenomenon. Although “corporate interest” in this sense speaks to the
‹nancial gain, or rather, loss minimization, that results from transparent laws
that are reliably enforced, this logic can also be applied toward environmental
regulation, as MNCs should be more inclined to invest in areas where compe-
tition is untainted by corrupt interests and where laws are equitably enforced.
Moreover, in the inevitable case that governments raise regulation on domestic
production or imports, MNCs that already abide by stringent regulatory stan-
dards will face far fewer adjustment costs. In this capacity, these ‹rms will en-
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joy a comparative advantage over ‹rms in countries that fall below the raised
bar, as well as the opportunity to expand and capitalize on shares in markets
that operate under the highest standards.21
A Race to the Bottom
Whereas the PH hypothesis focuses on the investment decisions of individual
‹rms and their aggregate effects on investment locations, the RTB debate illus-
trates governmental behavior in response to changes in international trade and
investment ›ows. According to the RTB hypothesis, trade barrier reduction and
FDI increases should cause relative increases in environmental pollution, espe-
cially in less developed countries (LDCs) that lack the motivation or capacity to
maintain stringent environmental regulation.22 In order to remain competitive
in a global environment, governments have an incentive to minimize regula-
tion within their jurisdiction to attract foreign investment and offer competi-
tive advantage to domestic producers who may be undercut by foreign rivals
upon trade liberalization. The result is a transnational downward convergence
of domestic environmental and social standards, ultimately reducing the po-
tential for economic gains in jurisdictions that do not participate, and expedit-
ing domestic environmental damage in those that do. Even developed-country
regulations could be pulled down by the threat of MNCs ›eeing to LDCs with
lax environmental standards.23
Supporters of the RTB hypothesis argue that if globalization does induce a
regulatory race to the bottom, then states more open to trade and investment
should have fewer and less rigorous environmental regulations, or inadequate
enforcement mechanisms to impose them. Accordingly, in an open economy,
governments are compelled to scale back or ignore onerous regulations to pre-
vent capital ›ight toward less regulated jurisdictions. Once a regulatory body
engages in these investment attraction strategies, it is likely to exert a domino
effect on states or regions with similar production-factor endowments. The
RTB argument, in its strongest form, suggests a bottoming out of environmen-
tal protection, as national governments react strategically to international eco-
nomic competition. It also implies that within a given nation-state, the need for
local economic development compels subnational governments to relax envi-
ronmental standards to the least stringent level.24 To the extent that businesses
can threaten to exit by relocating to areas where the costs of environmental reg-
ulations are lower, policymakers at both national and local levels should have
incentives to ease regulatory burdens.
Debunking Hypotheses / 19
Analyses of the trade-environment linkage have also focused on the obli-
gations that the WTO imposes on national governments.25 Some argue that
WTO rulings exhibit a distinct pro-trade bias, without giving due considera-
tion to environmental concerns, in two key ways. First, and perhaps most of-
fensive to environmentalists, is through the disregard of process and produc-
tion methods (PPMs) of imports. Represented in highly publicized disputes
such as the tuna-dolphin and shrimp-turtle cases, governments in developed
countries were prohibited from imposing PPM standards on imports, making
it dif‹cult for them to use trade restrictions to encourage the adoption of en-
vironmental production techniques and to discourage the use of polluting
methods. Second, the WTO has guidelines that concern trade in products that
might potentially be unsafe for use or consumption, as found primarily in
agriculturally related disputes. As an example, in trade disputes such as the EU
ban on hormone-fed beef and the imposition of the ‹ve-year moratorium on
genetically modi‹ed food and seeds, the WTO found the EU to be in violation
of trade disruption rules citing that no technical or scienti‹c evidence of ques-
tionable product safety currently exists. The above cases have often been cited
by critics of the WTO as evidence of the damaging effect of global trade on the
environment.26
Scholars criticize the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis on several accounts.
Importantly, some argue that rather than leading to a regulatory race to the
bottom, globalization can result in a race to the middle. The race-to-the-mid-
dle argument suggests that even though businesses may have incentives to lo-
cate operations in low-standard havens, the costs of such actions eventually
compel states to increase their standards to acceptable levels. For example, in an
examination of the impact of globalization on international environmental,
safety, and labor standards in the shipping industry, Elizabeth DeSombre sug-
gests that while shipowners tend to move ship registrations to states with low
standards, other factors such as trade restriction imposition, dockworker boy-
cotts, and inspection and detention processes targeting states that fail to com-
ply with international regulatory standards all exert pressure on these states to
upgrade their standards to the middle range of the regulatory spectrum.27
Alternatively, Porter argues that developed and rapidly industrializing
countries experience asymmetrical sensitivity to competitive pressures gener-
ated by unregulated trade. The absence of political institutions that can effec-
tively respond to public demand for tighter pollution regulation in developing
countries accentuates the political drag effect, and results in the perpetuation of
low and unenforced standards. This phenomenon creates a “stuck at the bot-
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tom” problem where rapidly industrializing countries, rather than countries
with rigorous standards, experience the most acute downward competitive
pressure on environmental standards. In this view, the accession of low-stan-
dard countries (such as China) to the WTO and economic integration into the
world trade regime threaten to exert even more intense downward pressure on
pollution standards than what the RTB argument would predict.28
A primary weakness of the RTB argument is that it assumes that the pref-
erences of capital dominate governmental calculations. Importantly, politi-
cal institutions can often serve to mediate multiple demands from society
and to insulate state decision makers from interest group demands.29 Indeed,
studies have shown that when confronted with globalization pressures, states
often respond by increasing resources not only for labor and consumers but
also for environmental protection.30 In addition, the race-to-the-top and the
race-to-the-bottom arguments both tend to neglect state heterogeneity and
oversimplify cross-national variation.31 For example, states may be more or
less likely to engage in race-to-the-bottom behavior depending on their in-
ternal characteristics such as economy size and structure, political system, or
the executive decision-making capacity. It is possible that countries’ internal
characteristics make them more or less likely to engage in race-to-the-bot-
tom behavior.
Finally, the relationship between trade and the environment cannot be deter-
mined a priori as the environmental consequences of trade are the result of the
combination of multiple effects: the scale effect—the correlation of pollution in-
creases with heightened economic activity; the technique effect—the propensity
toward cleaner production processes, management systems, and environmentally
friendly technologies as wealth increases expand market environmental de-
mands; and the composition effect—the impact of trade and investment on na-
tional industrial composition.32 Another dimension, the income effect, suggests
that as per capita incomes rise, so too should demands on governments to pro-
vide more stringent environmental regulation. However, analysts have yet to
agree upon the speci‹c threshold at which this occurs, as the effects appear to re-
late differently to various pollutants.33 Nevertheless, analyses of the combination
of these effects demonstrate that trade openness has positive environmental ex-
ternalities, although one has to examine the effect of trade along each of these di-
mensions in order to understand their aggregate consequences.34
Scholars have subjected the policy dimensions of the RTB argument to ex-
tensive empirical scrutiny. A study by Andonova, Mans‹eld, and Milner lends
support, ‹nding that governments in the postcommunist world of central and
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eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union placed less emphasis on the im-
plementation of strict environmental policies as their exposure to trade open-
ness and FDI increased.35 They argue that stringent environmental regulation
results in increased production costs. This leads import-competing ‹rms to be
edged out by less expensive foreign products, and exporting ‹rms to lose mar-
ket share to foreign competitors. These dynamics produce demand by local
‹rms to lower environmental standards, and they hinder economically
strapped governments’ ability to collect taxes and enforce regulation. However,
as Andonova et al. point out, the public salience of environmental concerns in
these countries during the period examined was minimal, and existing envi-
ronmental strategies for these governments were virtually nonexistent. This
implies that RTB behavior may exist, but it has the potential to change as con-
sumer environmental preferences evolve toward sustainable practices and as
(newly independent) governments learn to manage competing demands
within their jurisdictions. It also illustrates that cash-strapped governments
may favor short-term solutions to economic dif‹culties that undermine the
long-term health of a state, a hallmark of political “short-termism.”36
Scholars examining the possibility of RTB behavior in subnational con-
texts also produce divergent conclusions, though results are generally opti-
mistic. A World Bank study failed to ‹nd any meaningful discrepancy be-
tween the environmental regulations inside and outside of export processing
zones (EPZs) in host countries.37 If EPZs are established as competitive trade
and investment havens, then one would expect them to be primary culprits in
RTB behavior. However, this does not appear to be the case. In a study of
state-level enforcement of air, water, and hazardous waste pollution control
regulation in the United States, Konisky ‹nds that while states do engage in
environmental regulatory competition during the period covered by the
study, they do not do so in the manner that the RTB argument would predict.
Speci‹cally, while states do respond to regulatory policies in other states in
cases “where their own enforcement effort may plausibly put them at a disad-
vantage for attracting economic investment,” they also engage in similar be-
havior when a state’s “enforcement efforts (or lack thereof) already put it in a
‘better’ position than states with which it competes for economic invest-
ment.”38 In other words, his study yields evidence in support of both the race-
to-the-bottom and the race-to-the-top arguments. Konisky postulates that
variation in state size and industry pollution-intensity may help account for
the absence of RTB-like behavior.
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why isn’t china a pollution haven?
We argue that a key weakness of the PH argument is that it has overlooked ‹rm
self-regulation as an important dimension of business behavior. Indeed, percep-
tions of large, ruthless MNCs seeking out poor less-developed jurisdictions to
excessively pollute are, at best, misguided. MNC location decisions are
in›uenced by many factors other than host-country environmental regulatory
stringency.39 Firms tend to invest in foreign markets for one of two reasons: to
access host-country markets or to establish export production operations. We
argue that in both cases, ‹rms often have strong (and growing) incentives to self-
regulate industrial operations to meet or exceed host-country environmental
regulations.40 For ‹rms that establish export operations, the in›uence of both
home and primary export market regulations can outweigh the ‹nancial savings
associated with “dirty” production. In order to decrease the possibility of “green
tariff” imposition in developed markets, or minimize the risk of sales loss re-
sulting from public linkage to environmental damage, ‹rms can self-regulate to
maintain overall managerial consistency and create (or retain) public legitimacy
as responsible environmental stewards.41 For ‹rms that invest primarily for
host-country market access, the potential gains from establishing positive pub-
lic relations with consumers outweigh any savings generated by environmentally
destructive behavior. For both types of ‹rms, the pervasiveness of the media and
growing presence of corporate watchdog NGOs enable consumers to identify
poor corporate behavior and punish offenders accordingly. The pressure for
‹rm environmental self-regulation also exists internally as it can be associated
with maintaining consistent overall business strategies and streamlined manu-
facturing techniques, ultimately resulting in an overall increase in production
ef‹ciency.42 The following section provides an overview of the ‹rm self-regula-
tion hypothesis and details speci‹c mechanisms of ‹rm self-regulation.
Export Dependency and Firm Self-Regulation
Empirical research suggests that an important reason that export-oriented
‹rms in developing countries engage in self-regulation is to prevent the use of
environmental regulations in developed countries as protective trade barri-
ers.43 Exporters in developing countries have to weigh the bene‹ts of lax envi-
ronmental regulation and practice against the potentially devastating costs of
importing-country retaliation in the form of “green” tariff imposition or a loss
Debunking Hypotheses / 23
of export marketability, as well as the potential costs of ‹ling a WTO dispute
should such be justi‹ed under current WTO rules.44 To counter the prospect of
trade restrictions by importing countries, exporters in less environmentally
stringent jurisdictions may be compelled to meet the strictest environmental
regulations and product standards prevailing in the largest export markets. For
these ‹rms, the in›uence of environmental regulation and market require-
ments of major export markets could far outweigh the regulatory in›uence of
home or host countries.45
Exports account for over 30 percent of China’s GDP, and the North Amer-
ican and European markets account for over 40 percent of Chinese exports.
Thus, both foreign and domestic ‹rms in China are clearly dependent on
highly environmentally regulated markets for sales. Recent scandals resulting
from poor corporate regulatory practices in Chinese-produced goods, such as
those associated with pet food, toys, toothpaste, and pharmaceuticals, lend
credence to the idea that regulators and consumers in developed markets are
paying more attention to imported product content and production methods.
Though not directly linked to environmental pollution emission in China, the
negative international exposure is indicative of an overall trend toward in-
creased oversight of Chinese (and possibly other LDC) production processes
and products. The possibility of tariff imposition, product recalls, and corpo-
rate reputation costs due to negative publicity increases the costs of environ-
mentally damaging production and reduces the incentive for ‹rms to seek out
pollution havens. Similarly, these processes increase the long-term bene‹ts as-
sociated with transparent ‹rm environmental regulations throughout the
commodity chain and environmentally sustainable production practices and
product standards relative to the short-term savings associated with lax envi-
ronmental regulation.
David Vogel argues that the level of economic dependence on regulated
markets is directly associated with the export of environmental regulatory and
product standards to ‹rms in less-regulated economies.46 Dubbed the Califor-
nia Effect, this argument refers to the role of regulated political jurisdictions in
fostering a race to the top among ‹rms with respect to product standards en-
shrined in governmental regulation. In contrast to the Delaware Effect, which
assumes that more stringent regulatory product standards represent a source of
competitive disadvantage, the California Effect actually offers a competitive ad-
vantage for ‹rms that self-regulate toward higher standards because it is easier
for them to meet the regulatory standards in all markets. Although this argu-
ment applies primarily to product standards, we expect that increased interna-
tional visibility of producers in LDCs, fostered by international product 
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scandals, negative environmental publicity, and increased scrutiny by environ-
mental NGOs, should facilitate an increase in both ‹rm and governmental at-
tention to production processes. As an added bene‹t of tighter regulation,
‹rms can capitalize on the imposition (either internal or external) of stringent
environmental regulations through marketing campaigns designed to promote
the environmentally sensitive production of their particular good, or “eco-mar-
keting.” If this argument is valid, then ‹rms in LDCs with more stringent envi-
ronmental product and production standards should have a distinct competi-
tive advantage over LDC “dirty” producers in that they are more responsive to
changes in environmental regulation in either market and less susceptible to
environmental criticism. The bene‹ts to ‹rms that maintain common stan-
dards across diverse national jurisdictions are reinforced by the political power
of constituencies in highly regulated markets that advocate superior environ-
mental standards at home and abroad.47
Local Market Access and Firm Self-Regulation
Many of the claims made above about the importance of ‹rm self-regulation
and the impact of developed-world regulatory stringency and consumer pref-
erences also apply to ‹rms that invest for local market access. First, ‹rms must
weigh the ‹nancial bene‹ts of excessive environmental pollution against the
costs of damaging domestic relations among host-country consumers. The in-
creasing number of corporate watchdog NGOs and environmental activists in
China and elsewhere in the developing world are enhancing the power of de-
veloping-world consumers vis-à-vis multinational corporations. As foreign
‹rms are especially susceptible to accusations of poor corporate practices from
domestic host-country competitors, they must be as rigorous as possible in
mandating strict corporate environmental production practices. The resulting
increases in corporate accountability reduce the ‹nancial attractiveness of
pollution-haven-seeking behavior. This is especially relevant in growing
economies such as China, where homegrown companies can play off national-
istic sympathies to create competitive advantage.
Second, many MNCs that invest in less-developed economies such as China
also have extensive operations in highly regulated developed markets. This im-
plies accountability to consumers in these markets, as well as those in the host
market. The omnipresent specter of global media demands that ‹rms cannot
easily get away with claims of environmental sustainability in one market while
degrading another. Although the extent to which media coverage impacts ‹rm
decisions is a function of media freedom in a particular economy, the Chinese
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government is increasingly allowing media and NGO corporate watchdogs to
assist them in monitoring corporate activity.48
Methods of Firm Self-Regulation
The above arguments interpret the logic of ‹rm self-regulation and demon-
strate that pollution-haven-seeking behavior undermines corporate legitimacy
and pro‹tability. This section details some additional motivations behind self-
regulation and methods of implementation of different self-regulatory mecha-
nisms. The arguments touting the methods and effectiveness of self-regulation
as a deterrent to unpredictable increases in long-term external costs and inter-
national diminution of brand legitimacy are not new. The empirical evidence
supports these contentions, suggesting that ‹rms, especially those from OECD
countries, may promote environmental ideas and practices or engage in self-
regulation in response to existing standards in developed home and export
markets, pressure from environmental interest groups, and pressure from con-
sumers facilitated by media attention.49 Self-regulation in this capacity refers to
the policies implemented by foreign-invested and domestic ‹rms in developing
countries to respond to consumer preferences and product standards in highly
regulated export markets (e.g., the California Effect).
Researchers have previously identi‹ed several means by which ‹rms self-
regulate their environmental performance to hedge losses caused by linkages to
poor environmental practices.50 First, it has been shown that ‹rms self-regulate
by developing internal “green” environmental management systems (EMS).51
They do so in response to both national and international environmental regu-
lations, and apply them transnationally throughout the company. These internal
strategies can enable the ‹rm to outperform the competition by maintaining
consistency throughout and ultimately creating ef‹ciency-based economies of
scope. Strategy development is dependent upon a number of factors, including
the home country of the ‹rm, the markets of operation, and the environmental
regulatory exposure. Porter and Van Der Linde argue that ‹rms based in coun-
tries with strict domestic regulations, such as the United States, Canada, or the
European Union (EU), are more apt to develop a management strategy that ac-
commodates a higher level of environmental performance, making it easier to
export those strategies to subsidiaries abroad.52 The implementation of EMS by
subsidiaries in countries with less stringent regulation offers them a competitive
advantage over domestic host-country ‹rms by making them more ef‹cient in
environmentally sensitive manufacturing operations and more responsive to
stringent regulation in primary export markets and changes in host-country
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regulations. The development of these environmental innovations enables ‹rms
to improve resource productivity, thereby offsetting compliance costs.
Second, internal pressure to self-regulate from investors motivated by nor-
mative and ‹nancial concerns is evidenced by the use of investment screening
mechanisms and shareholder advocacy. Screening funds allow investors to
“screen” potential investments through a ‹lter, discarding those that do not
meet the criteria established by the investment fund. The growth of screened
funds has exploded in recent years, rising from $12 billion in 1995 to $202 billion
in 2007, in the United States alone. In the same year, socially responsible invest-
ing, including screened funds, screened separate accounts, shareholder advo-
cacy, and community investing totaled $2.71 trillion in the United States, a 324
percent increase from 1995.53 Labor and environmental screens consistently rank
in the top four of the most consequential screens.54 In addition, shareholder ad-
vocacy has become an integral part of ‹rm self-regulatory motivation. Through
the use of voting rights and direct communiqué in the form of advocacy cam-
paigns, resolutions, and corporate dialogue, shareholders concerned with both
environmentally oriented normative issues and ‹nancial issues related to de-
creasing overall ‹rm risk exposure have succeeded in instigating ‹rms to self-
regulate their environmental performance through the adoption of changes in
international environmental codes and company policies.55
Third, in response to external pressure from corporate customers and other
market-based incentives, MNCs have substantially increased their adoption of
environmental management systems such as the International Standards Orga-
nization’s ISO 14001, a nongovernmental process-based set of regulations.56
Numerous studies have assessed the effectiveness of EMS adoption on environ-
mental performance, concluding that their proliferation in recent years sug-
gests that ‹rms often operate with environmental standards that surpass host-
country regulation in the developing world.57 However, the ability of EMSs,
such as ISO 14001, to actually act as a vehicle for the transmission of environ-
mental standards abroad via FDI has only begun to be understood. Prakash and
Potoski make the investing-up argument that FDI can serve as a mechanism for
a ratcheting-up of corporate environmental practices.58 Examining a panel of
98 countries and a subset of 74 developing countries, they found that high lev-
els of ISO adoption in the home country signi‹cantly increase the likelihood of
ISO adoption in developing host countries. This result correlates strongly with
the case of China: concomitant with a steady stream of investment in›ows, the
number of registered ISO 14001 certi‹ed operations in China has increased
from a mere 81 in 1998 to almost 20,000 by 2008, making China the country
with the second largest number of such operations in the world, though per
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capita adoption in China remains low by comparison.59 In a survey of 118 for-
eign-owned and domestic ‹rms operating in China, Christmann and Taylor
found that multinational ownership, multinational customers, and exports to
developed countries positively affect environmental compliance through an in-
crease in ‹rm self-regulation and ISO 14001 adoption.60 The above evidence
contradicts the pollution-haven or industrial ›ight argument by suggesting
that MNCs with home operations in highly regulated markets encourage,
rather than ignore, the adoption of sound environmental policies by their sub-
sidiaries abroad.
Fourth, in response to increased pressure from export consumers, often fa-
cilitated by nongovernmental organizations and corporate watchdog groups,
MNCs can exert pressure on subsidiaries and suppliers in developing countries
to self-regulate their environmental performance to surpass local standards.61
In the case of China, NGOs such as the China Environmental Protection Foun-
dation (CEPF) are playing an increasingly important role in raising consumer
awareness of the importance of ‹rm-level contribution to environmental pro-
tection. In 2004 CEPF awarded their ‹rst ever China Environment Prize to Otis
Elevator Co, a unit of the U.S. multinational United Technologies Corporation
(UTX), for its commitment to maintaining environmental regulatory stan-
dards and practices that exceed local laws.62
Finally, MNCs increasingly incorporate environmental performance and
product requirements as supplier-selection criteria. For example, corporations
such as Toyota, Ford, and Shell all include certain environmental performance
requirements when selecting suppliers.63 In short, as MNCs increasingly engage
in self-regulation of environmental performance, it will follow that global stan-
dards of uniformity that go beyond national requirements will develop and
supplant themselves as the new environmental norms.64
In sum, we argue that the convergence of the dynamics illustrated in this
section provides a strong case for the ‹rst main proposition of this book: inter-
national investors do not engage in pollution-haven-seeking behavior at the
provincial level in China (proposition 1).
why don’t provincial governments 
race to the bottom?
If ‹rm self-regulation mitigates pollution-haven-seeking behavior, then how
does this affect the decision-making behavior of governments, the other player
in the game? Should we expect provincial governments to compete to reduce
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environmental regulatory standards or enforcement to attract foreign investors
and increase local ‹rm competitiveness? We argue that increasing reputation,
environmental, and economic costs, as well as diminished ‹rm demand, pre-
clude provincial of‹cials from engaging in deregulatory competition. In this
section, we elaborate our argument and critical evaluation of the race-to-the-
bottom hypothesis.
Our critique of the RTB hypothesis as it applies to China is twofold. First,
there is minimal demand from developed-world investment capital and devel-
oped-world exporters (both foreign-invested and domestic) on provincial gov-
ernments to reduce environmental regulatory stringency because of the effects
of developed market regulation and consumer preferences on ‹rm behavior, as
discussed in the PH section. Furthermore, the development of environmental
production technology in regulated markets enables cheaper and cleaner pro-
duction. We call this the demand effect—as demand placed on provincial gov-
ernments for environmental deregulation is reduced, so too is supply. Second,
despite huge disparities in provincial comparative advantage and industrial
output (the composition effect), level of industrial development (the scale ef-
fect), per capita income (the income effect), and production methods (the
technique effect), the bene‹ts of environmental deregulation in all provinces
are diluted by the costs associated with environmentally competitive behavior
among provinces. Speci‹cally, provincial leaders charged with maintaining
high levels of economic growth ‹nd it more advantageous to capitalize on the
positive environmental externalities of trade with and investment from envi-
ronmentally regulated markets than to attract capital and encourage domestic
competitiveness through deregulation.65 The following section details each of
these arguments in turn.
The Demand Effect
The RTB argument hinges on the assumption that ‹rms always prefer less reg-
ulation. While this may be true in some instances, it is becoming less so in the
area of pollution emission, as consumer preferences alter business strategies,
and as the evolution of cleaner production methods decreases production costs
across industries. We contend that ‹rm self-regulation (as discussed previ-
ously) and environmental technology development and spillover reduce the
demand that industry places on provincial governments to supply pollution
havens. Firms develop production technology in response to market demand
and regulatory pressure. In environmentally regulated, developed markets,
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both of these causal mechanisms facilitate the development of environmental
production technology that decreases the costs of clean(er) production.66 Fur-
ther, research has found that FDI from rich countries acts as a conduit for the
international diffusion of cleaner environmental technologies and manage-
ment systems to developing countries.67 When these ‹rms invest in China or
other developing markets, the technology they developed in the home country
already gives them a cost advantage over domestic ‹rms. This reduces their in-
centive to demand less regulation from provincial host governments.
Empirical studies demonstrate that MNC subsidiaries in developed coun-
tries engage in information transfer, including both organizational knowledge
and technology transfer, with other divisions of the MNC.68 Ivarsson and Alv-
stam ‹nd that inter‹rm linkages enhance these transfers.69 The sharing of en-
vironmental technology among developed-world ‹rms and Chinese sub-
sidiaries reduces the incentive for these ‹rms both to demand lower
environmental regulation and to credibly threaten exit as a cost-saving strategy.
For purely domestic ‹rms that rely on developed-world exports, demands for
reduced environmental regulation may be redundant or counterproductive be-
cause of the growing importance of cleaner production to regulators and con-
sumers in developed export markets.
A counterargument to the above contention suggests that in response to in-
creased competition from technologically superior developed-world ‹rms, all
other ‹rms operating in China should increase pressure on provincial govern-
ments to reduce regulation. Because purely domestic Chinese industry com-
poses a substantial proportion of total industry, and because trade with and in-
vestment from regulated markets do not constitute the entirety of Chinese
trade and investment, the pressure to reduce regulation should induce provin-
cial governments to comply. We believe this is wrong for two reasons: ‹rst, al-
though increased competition from technologically superior rivals may en-
courage calls for deregulation, it should also spur technological development.
Understanding this, provincial of‹cials may encourage this process, rather than
face increased social and international criticism for lax regulatory stringency.
Second, in addition to spurring domestic technological development, there is
evidence that investment from regulated markets can engender knowledge and
technology spillovers to purely domestic ‹rms.70 This indicates that some ‹rms
may bene‹t from investment by technologically superior rivals, as worker mo-
bility and product sales facilitate knowledge increases. For example, in their
case study analysis of two companies operating in Shanghai, Li and Yeung
found that technology transfer has much more of an economic impact than
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FDI data has previously suggested, and it extends well beyond the invested re-
gion.71 As an additional example, a 1998 survey of power plants in China indi-
cates that FDI has contributed signi‹cantly to an overall increase in power
plant energy ef‹ciency as a large number of these plants now use advanced en-
ergy-ef‹cient technologies such as combined-cycle gas turbines, integrated
gasi‹cation combined-cycle turbines, and ›uidized-bed combustion.72 Thus,
as a result of increased competition, technological spillover, and the upward
thrust of market forces, trade openness and foreign investment can raise the
environmental operating standards for all ‹rms in a developing economy,
thereby reducing demand on government to lessen environmental regulatory
stringency or enforcement.
The Positive Economic Impact of Environmental Regulation
Provincial leaders in China are evaluated and (presumably) retained and pro-
moted based on the economic performance of their province.73 This creates
strong incentives among these leaders to ensure long-term provincial economic
growth. Undoubtedly, a primary impetus to growth in many Chinese provinces
follows from trade and foreign direct investment. In provinces that are heavily
trade dependent, of‹cials should be reluctant to jeopardize the developed-
world export market accessibility of local manufacturing industry. We argue
that one way to ensure continued export market accessibility of ‹rms in trade-
dependent provinces is for provincial of‹cials to guarantee that their provinces
can not be categorized as “pollution havens.” Environmentally poor production
processes may not only diminish the export market accessibility of individual
‹rms but also result in the labeling of a particular province or locale as a pollu-
tion haven. Such a moniker could generate reputation costs if international
NGOs and corporate watchdog groups link provincial production with exces-
sive environmental damage. These economic and reputation costs could jeop-
ardize both the market accessibility of existing ‹rms and future foreign invest-
ment decisions from companies that shun linkage to environmental
destruction. We argue that this dynamic creates economic incentive among
provincial of‹cials to tighten environmental regulatory stringency to mitigate
the potential export costs of the pollution-haven reputation. This likely ex-
plains (at least partially) why we ‹nd that provinces that are more open to trade
and investment also tend to be environmentally cleaner.
Although some foreign investors may eschew investment in provinces with
substandard environmental policy enforcement to avoid reputation costs out
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of ideological considerations or to prevent unfair competition from local ‹rms
that maintain negligent business strategies,74 it is not clear that this applies to
all investors equally. Provincial of‹cials may be less concerned (broadly speak-
ing) with the consequences of environmental deregulation or poor policy en-
forcement on foreign investment decisions. In the absence of concerns by
provincial of‹cials about the effects of reputation costs on investment, we ‹nd
that ‹rms investing in China do not have generalizable ‹nancial incentives to
seek out provincial pollution havens. Rather, we ‹nd little evidence that ‹rms
predicate investment decisions on provincial environmental regulatory strin-
gency. The fact that China is the largest FDI destination in the developing world
indicates that there are many factors beyond environmental regulation that en-
tice inward foreign investment. Further, when determining where to direct in-
vestment ›ows within China, MNCs also face a wide array of locational differ-
ences that may affect investment decisions. There exist substantial provincial
discrepancies in infrastructure, education level, income level, market size, geo-
graphic advantage, and level of economic development that may account for
the uneven distribution of FDI. Even in the most pollution intensive of indus-
tries, factors such as land and labor cost differentials and available infrastruc-
ture also play heavily into location decisions.
Along the same lines, it has also been argued that ‹rms operating in LDCs,
regardless of environmental regulatory stringency, tend to have lower pollution
control costs than those operating in developed nations because the labor and
materials used for pollution abatement cost less.75 In particular, heavy polluters
tend to have lower per unit pollution costs because pollution abatement is sub-
ject to economies of scale.76 This suggests that the ‹nancial incentive for pollu-
tion-haven-seeking behavior might be minimal to all but the heaviest polluters.
Moreover, the use of environmental regulatory stringency as an explanation for
international capital ›ows is inherently endogenous. As income increases with
trade and FDI in›ows, so too should environmental regulation, making pollu-
tion havens a transient phenomenon.77 These dynamics indicate that even in
the absence of strong provincial of‹cial attention to the effects of regulation on
investment decisions, regulatory disparities do not induce investment shifts to
pollution havens and thus do not motivate RTB behavior.
In sum, we argue that Chinese provincial of‹cials do not engage in regula-
tory competition as a means for investment attraction and growth encourage-
ment. Although the thrust of our work is aimed at the ‹rm perspective of the
RTB and PH debate, our analysis of the impact of economic integration on pol-
lution outputs in chapter 4 lends insight into the deregulatory demands placed
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on Chinese provincial governments. The empirical evidence presented in this
chapter indicates that increasing levels of trade and investment are not harmful
to the Chinese environment and may actually be bene‹cial. This, coupled with
the positive environmental externalities of foreign investment discussed previ-
ously, leads us to expect that Chinese provinces more dependent on trade and FDI
should environmentally outperform those with fewer international economic link-
ages (proposition 2).
do firms (and provinces) trade up and invest up?
While the bulk of this book addresses the pollution-haven and race-to-the-bot-
tom hypotheses, we also address and empirically test the closely associated
trading-up and investing-up arguments. We contend that the same factors that
account for the absence of evidence for PH and RTB types of behavior in China
also help us to understand the ratcheting-up effect of trade and investment on
local environmental regulatory stringency.
According to the trading-up or California Effect argument, trade can ele-
vate environmental standards in exporting countries when key import markets
have stringent environmental standards.78 Vogel argues that the threat of trade-
barrier erection in importing markets on exporters in less-regulated states en-
courages a ratcheting-up of product standards in export markets.79 In this
sense, the total volume of trade is not as important as the speci‹c pattern of
trade among nations. Previous studies have also investigated how the trading-
up argument may explain the impact of trade on cross-national variation in the
diffusion of nongovernmental environmental regulations such as ISO 14001.80
We argue that the trading-up logic can help us understand how patterns of
trade, not simply the total volume of trade, can affect the cross-provincial vari-
ation in environmental performance in China, and that this dynamic can also
apply to production standards.
We ‹nd that foreign direct investment generates a comparable effect. Simi-
larly dubbed, the investing-up argument illustrates the positive impact of busi-
ness strategies developed by ‹rms in the highly regulated markets on invest-
ment locations in less regulated economies. Prakash and Potoski argue that FDI
can generate incentives for ‹rms to improve their environmental performance
beyond host-country requirements by encouraging them to adopt self-regula-
tory environmental regimes like the ISO 14001 and by facilitating positive pro-
duction knowledge and technology spillovers.81 This dynamic is certainly ap-
plicable to MNC subsidiaries in less-regulated markets but can also apply to
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MNC suppliers and other ‹rms as MNCs demonstrate the positive externalities
of these regimes and engage in worker training in areas with a mobile labor
supply.82 This dynamic lends credence to those who posit that FDI can lead to
a divergence (rather than convergence) in global corporate practices, as distinct
regulatory environments can be partially replicated through MNC investment
decisions.83 In adapting insights from the investing-up argument to the case of
China, we argue that FDI from environmentally regulated markets is likely to
result in improved provincial environmental protection, especially when it
originates from countries that maintain stringent environmental regulations.
We expect that the environmental behavior of Chinese ‹rms and provinces
should be heavily in›uenced by the environmental standards of the external ac-
tors with which they interact. Speci‹cally, Chinese provinces that export to or re-
ceive investment from countries or regions with stringent environmental regula-
tions should engage in more rigorous environmental regulation (proposition 3).
discussion
We contend that rather than relocating to areas of lax environmental regulatory
stringency, ‹rms often environmentally regulate themselves and their sub-
sidiaries and encourage the self-regulation of their suppliers based on con-
sumer preferences in export markets and the environmental norms and poli-
cies developed from home-country operations. In some instances, MNCs, even
in highly polluting industries, lobby host governments to elevate environmen-
tal standards in their jurisdiction to increase competitiveness against less-regu-
lated domestic rivals.84 At the same time, provincial governments face dwin-
dling demand from private industries to relax environmental regulation and
are compelled by the need to provide unimpeded export-market accessibility
for local ‹rms to maintain rigorous environmental standards.
Though there have certainly been cases of MNCs polluting host-country
environments or anecdotal evidence of environmental deregulation by host
governments, the theoretical and empirical substantiation in this book presents
strong evidence that ‹rms and governments do not engage in such behavior
systematically.
The thrust of our argument rests on forces and mechanisms external to the
‹rm itself. Although chapter 7 of this book is a case study of a foreign ‹rm op-
erating in China, the processes highlighted in that chapter are illustrative of our
overall argument and do not attempt to “unpack the ‹rm” in order to demon-
strate internal processes that lead to divergent outcomes. This limitation, while
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purposive, does not diminish the importance of research that attempts to ex-
plain ‹rm environmental outcomes through internal mechanisms, as does
Prakash, or the cascade of environmental business norms among international
‹rm networks, as does Kollman.85 Indeed we believe the exploration of internal
‹rm dynamics is another fruitful avenue for future research. However, in ap-
proaching this project, the generalizability, or breadth, offered by external ar-
guments and basic assumptions of pro‹t-seeking motives outweigh the gains
in depth one might achieve from making arguments speci‹c to the inner work-
ings of individual ‹rms.
In addition, our argument about the positive environmental impact of
trade and foreign investment rests in large part on the logic of industry self-reg-
ulation. Questions may therefore arise as to the effectiveness of such practices,
especially in developing countries. Given that ‹rm self-regulation remains vol-
untary, with rather minimal requirements in certain areas, such practices are
likely to produce little positive environmental impact in the long term.
In response, we argue that certi‹cation costs, particularly for non-devel-
oped-country ‹rms, are not insigni‹cant and therefore represent a fairly clear
commitment to sustainable business practices. Furthermore, existing theoreti-
cal and empirical literature suggests that the adoption of voluntary environ-
mental programs such as ISO 14001 does result in improved corporate environ-
mental conduct that conforms to broader societal objectives. For example, the
literature on nonstate environmental governance suggests that voluntary envi-
ronmental programs can mitigate against shirking of members’ environmental
commitments either through sociological pressures from other ‹rms or stake-
holders that prod members to comply with program requirements or through
institutional designs that ensure more effective monitoring and sanctioning
programs.86 By participating in a voluntary program, a ‹rm can signal its com-
mitment to environmentally friendly policies, thus earning the goodwill of
stakeholders and lowering its perceived risks of environmental misconduct as
assessed by banks, insurers, and stock markets.87
While existing empirical studies have not reached de‹nitive conclusions
about voluntary environmental program ef‹cacy, there is some evidence that
they are effective in improving members’ environmental record. For example, a
study by Dasgupta, Hettige, and Wheeler indicates that Mexican ‹rms that have
adopted ISO 14001 more frequently report compliance with government regula-
tions than those who have not signed up for the program.88 Through a cross-na-
tional analysis of ISO 14001 adoption, Prakash and Potoski suggest that while
‹rms in different policy and economic contexts attach varying value to the pro-
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gram, joining ISO 14001 “reduces the amount of time members spend out of
compliance with government regulations and reduces the amount of toxic pol-
lutants they release into the atmosphere.”89 Other studies have also yielded evi-
dence showing that participation in voluntary programs such as ISO 14001 or
the 35/50 voluntary program sponsored by the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) reduces ‹rms’ pollution emissions.90 In short, the above discus-
sion suggests that far from being a token gesture to improve corporate environ-
mental behavior, ‹rm self-regulation via voluntary programs such as ISO 14001
can have a tangible impact on ‹rm environmental and regulatory performance.
In conclusion, this chapter presents our critique of the pollution-haven and
race-to-the-bottom hypotheses and develops our key theoretical propositions.
Before engaging in empirical tests of our main hypotheses, we ‹rst turn to a
critical review of the Chinese government’s regulation of foreign direct invest-
ment in the era of economic reform. This review provides no indication that
foreign ‹rms have rigorously lobbied the Chinese government to relax envi-
ronmental regulation as China’s regulation of the environmental impact of FDI
has become more stringent since the early 1980s.
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chapter 3
Environmental Pollution and Regulation in China
This chapter introduces China’s perilous environmental situation and the steps
the Chinese government has taken to address what some have called “one of the
greatest environmental threats the earth has ever faced.”1 We highlight the ac-
tors involved in the system of Chinese environmental protection, with particu-
lar attention to the limited role of the environmental protection agencies in en-
forcing local environmental regulations. We also discuss attempts by the
Chinese government to regulate the environmental impact of foreign invest-
ment projects.
In recent years, the Chinese government has progressively improved the le-
gal framework for regulating foreign investment in response to concerns about
foreign pollution-intensive investment and adoption of outdated, environ-
mentally damaging technology. China has developed a set of detailed and strin-
gent criteria for governing the environmental impact of foreign investment.
However, the real obstacle has not been policy development but local govern-
ment policy implementation. As in many other areas of policy-making in
China, the pursuit of local economic development often takes precedence over
other socioeconomic priorities such as environmental protection or health and
safety regulation. As a result, the central government has yet to strengthen its
oversight of local governments to minimize local government intervention in
the work of environmental protection agencies at various levels. This has led to
a complete lack of cross-provincial conformity in screening foreign investment
projects and enforcing central injunctions.
The ‹rst section of this chapter provides an overview of China’s increas-
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ingly perilous environmental conditions, justifying our analysis of how China’s
growing integration into the world economy shapes its environment. The fol-
lowing section lays out China’s system of environmental governance by pre-
senting an analysis of the actors and institutions involved in China’s environ-
mental policy-making process. The chapter then turns to focus on the Chinese
government’s legislative attempts to regulate the impact of foreign investment,
tracing the development of China’s legal framework for governing foreign in-
vestment since the early 1980s.
china’s mounting environmental problems
China is currently experiencing environmental degradation on a monumental
scale. While reforms have produced remarkable economic growth and resulted
in substantially improved living standards for many Chinese citizens, rapid in-
dustrialization and minimal oversight have in›icted considerable environmen-
tal damage. Environmental pollution in China is manifested in many areas, but
air and water pollution, industrial waste, and deforestation have had the great-
est consequences—and not just for China. Spillovers and pollution disasters se-
verely affect surrounding countries and the Earth at large through increased
climate change risk. The following sections detail the threats posed by various
pollutants, identifying key causes and consequences.
Air Pollution
Air pollution poses a signi‹cant threat to the Chinese environment. A recent
World Bank analysis reports that only 1 percent of China’s 560 million urban-
ites breathe air that is considered safe by EU standards. This research is based
on urban measurements of PM 10, a descriptive term for ‹ne-grained particu-
late matter such as soot, aerosol, and ‹ne dust. Only Cairo has higher average
measurements than Beijing.2 According to a report released by the Worldwatch
Institute in Washington, DC, sixteen of the twenty cities in the world with the
most serious air pollution can be found in China.3 While China has become the
world’s largest producer of steel, aluminum, coke, cement, chemicals, and other
environmentally high-cost goods, it also has become its smokestack.
China has also emerged as a leading emitter of carbon, sulfur dioxide, par-
ticulate matter, and other greenhouse gases. China has recently surpassed the
United States to become the world’s leading emitter of carbon dioxide (CO2).
4
According to the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, Chinese CO2
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emissions grew by 8 percent in 2007 and accounted for two-thirds of the total
increase in global CO2 emissions that year. The same source suggests that China
contributes to 24 percent of global CO2 emissions.
5 Estimates of the annual
growth rate of China’s CO2 emissions vary widely, ranging from conservative
estimates of 2.5 to 5 percent between 2004 and 2010 to less sanguine forecasts of
11 percent for the same period.6 While China’s CO2 emissions on a per capita
basis remain far behind that of the United States, its population and economic
scale make the country a primary cause for concern in global attempts to com-
bat greenhouse gas emissions.
Coal and cement are two key factors contributing to such high (and in-
creasing) CO2 emissions. China is awash in cheap, accessible coal. China builds
two or three new coal-‹red power plants per week, and has for quite some time.
The low-cost design of these plants means that they are less ef‹cient and emit
more CO2. Moreover, to the extent that these plants are meant to last for some-
where between forty and seventy-‹ve years, it seems highly unlikely that China
will be able to eliminate or substantially reduce their numbers in the near fu-
ture.7 Cement production has also increased drastically in recent decades as the
rush toward modernization has increased the demand for infrastructural de-
velopment. Consequently, China now accounts for half of all global cement
production, and a ‹fth of China’s total CO2 emissions can be traced to the ce-
ment industry.
China is also the ultimate global emitter of sulfur dioxide (SO2), a poten-
tially much more environmentally destructive gas. In 2006, China emitted a
staggering 26 million tons of SO2 into the atmosphere, producing untold
amounts of damage from acid rain and contributing to the rapidly increasing
numbers of citizens affected by cardiopulmonary lung disease, cancer, emphy-
sema, and other respiratory illnesses. Sulfur dioxide and particulate matter
emissions from coal-‹red electric plants contribute to an estimated 400,000
premature deaths per year and result in annual economic losses of around 500
billion yuan.8 Indeed, the utilization of coal as the primary Chinese energy
source has contributed enormously to China’s overall SO2 emissions, to the
health detriment of rural and urban residents alike. But it is not the only cul-
prit. Millions of city dwellers choke on unregulated diesel emissions from the
multitudinous trucks that supply China’s economic boom, trucks so numerous
that many cities permit only nocturnal operation.
Unfortunately, CO2, SO2, and other greenhouse gases are not the only air-
borne challenges faced by China. The rapid expansion of the Gobi desert, fu-
eled by overcultivation and deforestation, is also a tremendous problem. The
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yellow dust of the Gobi regularly coats Beijing in a thick blanket of ‹lth, forc-
ing citizens to suffer the summers with doors closed or face the consequences
of noxious, dusty air. Indifferent to international borders, dense clouds of par-
ticulate matter from the Gobi combined with various other pollutants have
been spotted by American satellites as they leave China, cross over Seoul and
the Paci‹c Ocean, and ‹nally hit the United States’ western shores.9 Such oc-
currences are not uncommon. Dust particles regularly bind with industrial
pollutants such as arsenic, cadmium, and lead produced from China’s indus-
trial boom, forming huge clouds that blow into surrounding areas, shrouding
cities like Seoul in a debilitating yellow cloud of toxic smog.10
Water Pollution
Putrid water threatens many Chinese cities and towns. With China’s already in-
adequate water resources and rapidly deteriorating water quality, this is a chal-
lenge with no easy solution. The country supports a ‹fth of the world popula-
tion with access to only 7 percent of the global water supply, a total that is being
diminished by waterborne pollution. Some 90 percent of Chinese cities suffer
from some degree of water contamination from industrial, municipal, and
agricultural runoff. Damage reports are con›icting, but roughly 78 percent of
the rivers and 75 percent of the lakes are polluted and incapable of being used
as drinking water. More than one hundred major Chinese cities face severe wa-
ter shortages, or will very soon. It is estimated that the country has an average
annual shortfall of 30 billion cubic meters (m3) in water requirements for irri-
gation, and a shortfall of 6 billion cubic meters for urban and industrial water
requirements.11
The Huang River in northern China provides a stark example of pollution
damage done to already overextended water supplies. It is estimated that toxic
sludge from the discharge of industrial pollutants such as ammonia, phenols,
and nitrates accounts for about 5 percent of the river’s average daily runoff, and
that number increases to more than half during the dry season. About 65 per-
cent of the entire river basin falls into the worst two categories of state-pre-
scribed standards, and only 8 percent meets either ‹rst- or second-class stan-
dards. Such extreme levels of pollution have severely affected the Huang’s
ability to serve as a main source of irrigation and industrial water supply for the
millions of Chinese citizens that rely on it, with those residing on and around
its lower reaches experiencing the most detrimental effects.12
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Although larger rivers make larger pollution receptacles, it is the smaller
rivers and tributaries with their lower-volume ›ows that are arguably suffering
the worst effects of the pollution. Annual average densities of phenols were an
alarming 69 times the national standard in the Liao River, and 7 times the stan-
dard in the Hai River. Biological oxygen demand (BOD), chemical oxygen de-
mand (COD), nitrogen, mercury, and other heavy metals also far exceed state-
prescribed standards.13 According to a survey conducted in the 1990s, up to 75
percent of the river sections in the Huai River basin are no longer ‹t for use as
drinking water. Serious pollution caused by chemical, paper, dyeing, leather,
and liquor factory discharges led 80 percent of the Huai’s tributaries to have
black and green water, causing millions to lose access to their primary water
source.14 In response to ›oods and pollution accidents in 1992 and 1994, the
central government adopted a major pollution control plan for the Huai River,
ordering local authorities to shut down highly polluting factories and threaten-
ing to impose charges and ‹nes on industries and government of‹cials that
failed to comply with stringent regulations. Unfortunately, the dif‹culties faced
by local governments to accommodate compliance were compounded by fac-
tory closures and diminished tax revenue streams. Examples of this, in recent
years, are not uncommon as provincial governments struggle to accommodate
growth and sustain livelihood, while at the same time ensuring environmental
sustainability.
Unfortunately, the problems affecting China’s waterways do not end in the
north; they reach every corner of China and affect rich and poor alike. In
southern China, supplying the prosperous city of Guangzhou, the water in the
Zhu River has deteriorated to such an extent that it now regularly falls into cat-
egories of 4 and 5, the most polluted by governmental standards. The release of
industrial wastewater containing heavily polluting substances and residential
sewage, pollution from ships and boats, and chemical fertilizers all contribute
to the contamination of the Zhu River and affect the health of the entire
Guangzhou metropolitan area.
While reducing these problems is not impossible, it does require consider-
able organizational mobilization and foresight to make the most effective use of
investment funds, make wise choices about industrial relocation, impose
higher levies on highly polluting factories and facilities, and establish quality
control and discharge permit systems.15 These solutions are not beyond the
Chinese government’s reach, but they will take time, creativity, and, most im-
portant, political will.
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Solid Waste
Solid waste management presents yet another challenge to Chinese environ-
mental protection. National statistics hint at the magnitude of the problem.
National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA) data suggests that state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) have released 645 million tons of industrial waste
just since 1995. Power generation and mining compose the lion’s share, while
chemical and metallurgical industries contribute another 70 and 30 million
tons, respectively. Of this total number, 142 million tons have been treated,
while 22 million tons have been released directly into the environment as un-
treated toxic waste. Sichuan, Yunnan, and Shaanxi have the worst practices.16
Industrial waste reuse rates vary widely, from 20 percent in some provinces to
65 percent or more in some cities. Treatment rates vary as well, ranging from 0
to 30 percent.17 Prevention and control of industrial dumping, toxic waste in
particular, are dif‹cult due to the inability of the Environmental Protection Bu-
reaus (EPBs) to prevent factories from storing it on their own ground, limited
expert knowledge about toxic substances, and the prohibitive cleanup costs of
polluted soils.
Deforestation
Forest destruction is one of China’s oldest problems, and one with the most di-
verse consequences. The past ‹ve thousand years have witnessed the cyclical
deforestation of China for fuelwood consumption, timber, paper and chopstick
production, cropland cultivation, and other agricultural and economic expan-
sion.18 Although such a long time-frame has allowed the Chinese to witness
and harvest many forest life cycles, the last ‹fty years have perhaps been the
most destructive in history.19 The population boom, minimal forest manage-
ment and oversight, and vastly increased domestic forest product demand have
reduced China’s forest cover to a mere 18.5 percent of total landmass, up from a
low of 16 percent in 1999. Currently only Tibet and some parts of Yunnan
province contain any remnants of what could be considered virgin forestland.
Within China deforestation has produced a dramatic array of environmen-
tal effects from wildlife habitat destruction to erosion-facilitated ›oods. NGOs
such as the World Wildlife Federation (WWF) and the Rainforest Alliance have
been working for years to stop logging to protect threatened and endangered
species such as the giant panda and Indo-Chinese tiger. Erosion-induced ›ood-
ing has become increasingly destructive, in some cases costing billions of yuan
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in economic damages and thousands of lives. Some of the most dramatic ex-
amples have occurred in recent years. In 1998, massive ›ooding on the Yangtze
prompted governmental of‹cials to place a complete logging ban in thirteen
provinces and autonomous regions on the upper Yangtze to promote forest re-
generation.
Chinese deforestation has had some profound global effects. First, as a re-
sult of rampant logging, China has nowhere near the capacity to sustain con-
temporary domestic demand for forest products. In light of this, China relies
heavily on forest imports from surrounding countries to maintain production
and consumption levels. Currently China is the second largest importer of for-
est products in the world behind the United States. Although roughly 63.5 per-
cent of China’s pulp and timber imports are sourced from veri‹ed sustainably
managed forests, the remainder likely originates in eastern Russia, Indonesia,
Burma, and elsewhere in Southeast Asia, where forest governance capability is
minimal and sustainable harvest practices unlikely.20 The second major global
impact of Chinese deforestation lies in the relationship between forest cover
and global warming. Forests act as a major carbon sink, or repository for CO2.
When forests are removed, stored CO2 escapes into the atmosphere, and future
CO2 emissions are left with reduced storage facilities.
21 Recognizing this, the
Kyoto Protocol, the primary intergovernmental treaty on climate change, di-
rectly addresses the importance of forest sustenance by allowing participating
countries to meet carbon targets with the use of “forest credits.”22 These forest
credits can be applied to overall carbon emission targets, providing a counter-
balance to carbon emissions.
The Role of the Chinese Government in Combating Pollution
China’s mounting environmental problems make it imperative for the govern-
ment to adopt effective pollution control programs. Indeed, in recent years the
Chinese government seems to have increasingly recognized the need to balance
the tensions between economic development and environmental protection.
For example, Beijing made improving environmental quality and protecting
natural habitats key priorities of social and economic development during its
tenth ‹ve-year plan period, from 2001 to 2005. It has also adopted speci‹c envi-
ronmental protection strategies, especially in such areas as nature conservation
and water resource management.23 The eleventh National Five-Year Plan for
Environmental Protection, from 2005 to 2010, spells out key environmental tar-
gets to be met by the end of the plan period, including reducing sulfur dioxide
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by 10 percent, cutting back on greenhouse gas emissions, and making polluters
pay for cleanup. The plan re›ects a clear governmental recognition of the im-
portance of strained environmental resources, and it represents a major effort
to raise public awareness and funding for environmental protection.24
However, the Chinese government has not been entirely successful in ad-
dressing the environmental externalities of rapid economic growth. On the one
hand, Chinese government agencies have passed regulations designed to raise
environmental standards and have periodically cracked down on offenders. For
example, in January 2007, SEPA investigations found that four major power
‹rms and four highly polluted cities did not meet energy consumption and
emission reduction goals in 2006. The agency subsequently issued an injunc-
tion banning these entities from undertaking new development projects until
they brought their environmental performance up to governmental stan-
dards.25 On the other hand, these crackdowns have been considered as primar-
ily public relations moves that had little tangible impact. According to Elizabeth
Economy, the promulgation of rules and regulations and periodic attacks
against offenders are mostly signi‹cant for their symbolic value. While the gov-
ernment intends to convey its resolution to clean up pollution through these
gestures, it has refrained from their use in the absence of incentives.26
china’s system of environmental governance:
the actors
The following section addresses the Chinese administrative system for environ-
mental protection. Speci‹cally, we discuss how well the environmental protec-
tion bureaucracy is suited to its task and how effective the government has been
in minimizing the negative environmental externalities of inward foreign in-
vestment. While Chinese authorities have substantially improved the country’s
legislative framework for environmental protection, problems associated with
legal implementation, including bureaucratic weakness, substantial local au-
tonomy, and limited environmental NGO in›uence, have severely impaired the
ability of the central government to implement environmental laws and to rein
in recalcitrant local and business actors.
The Power of Local Environmental Protection Bureaus vis-à-vis 
Local Governments
The Chinese environmental bureaucracy is charged with environmental policy
creation and implementation. The organization and capacity of this bureau-
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cracy largely determine the extent to which the Chinese state is able to provide
environmental policy enforcement. A key problem with this system, as many
studies have emphasized, is the degree of autonomy possessed by local govern-
ments.27 This autonomy has substantially curtailed the center’s ability to effec-
tively enforce environmental regulations and ensure local policy compliance.
This bureaucratic structure bears considerable resemblance to the pattern of
“fragmented authoritarianism” that characterizes the overall decision-making
process in China.28
Environmental policy-making is the responsibility of the State Environ-
mental Protection Agency and occurs at both the national and subnational lev-
els. The program of environmental protection is based on the principle of a
“polluter pays” levy collection system, where ‹rms that pollute above a certain
threshold pay a levy proportional to their pollution discharge. Firms are re-
sponsible to self-report emissions to local environmental agencies and pay un-
der the threat of surprise inspections. Local and national regulators set pollu-
tion concentration standards jointly, while only national regulators establish
levy rates and threshold parameters. This formula allows for substantial local
variation in levy collection for otherwise identical pollutants and industries. In
addition, pollution levies can be discounted or eliminated at the discretion of
local environmental inspectors, postinspection, giving provincial authorities
much latitude with regard to treatment of foreign and domestic polluters.29
In March 2008, SEPA gained considerable status and prestige when it was
updated to the level of ministry. As this is such a recent development, whether
or not the newly anointed Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) will
improve upon SEPA’s performance remains to be seen.30 Although MEP lead-
ership remains the same, with Zhou Shengxian as its head, it appears that the
MEP mandate did receive a boost, though the extent is unclear. In any case, the
elevation may allow for easier interministerial negotiation on environmental
issues prior to the implementation of governmental projects.
At the national level, the MEP is charged with overseeing China’s environ-
mental policy implementation and reports directly to the State Council, which
also serves as the MEP’s main source of funding.31 However, despite the au-
thority of the MEP, its institutional effectiveness has historically been under-
mined by a lack of resources and enforcement capacity. For example, prior to
elevation to MEP, SEPA was grossly understaffed, with only 300 full-time pro-
fessionals in Beijing. In comparison, the staff of the U.S. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, serving a country with less than one-quarter of China’s popu-
lation, employs an average of 9,000 just in Washington, DC.32 Further,
pollution control authority has been traditionally divided among various gov-
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ernmental ministries and local governments, although, as of this writing, it ap-
pears that some of this authority has been transferred to the MEP itself under
its internal Department of Pollution Control. Microlevel replicates of the
MEP—the Environmental Protection Bureaus (EPBs)—bear much of the re-
sponsibility for implementing national environmental laws at the provincial,
municipal, and county levels. These bureaus enforce and implement MEP poli-
cies and help draft regulations that cater to local conditions. As county-level
governments constitute the locus of policy implementation in China, county-
level EPBs have taken up most of the responsibility for policy enforcement, in-
cluding conducting inspections, ‹ne assessment, and environmental quality
monitoring.
The principal responsibility of the local EPBs is to implement policy direc-
tives from the administrative rank directly above it. However, in reality the
tasks of local EPBs are substantially complicated by the system of “fragmented
authoritarianism.” In this system, a governmental agency, such as an EPB, at
any given level is responsible not only to the functional bureaucracy directly
above it (a so-called tiao or vertical relationship) but also to other coordinating
bodies within the same geographical jurisdiction with whom it enjoys equal
authority (so-called kuai or horizontal relationships).33 For example, a county-
level EPB not only takes orders from the municipal-level EPB above it but also
accommodates the interests of other county-level bureaucracies who may share
an interest in environmental policy (such as the county-level construction bu-
reau whose approval is needed for new investment projects with an environ-
mental impact).
County-level EPBs are also subject to county government in›uence.
County governments not only provide an important source of funding for lo-
cal EPBs but also exercise considerable in›uence over the appointment and
promotion of personnel within them.34 This makes local EPB of‹cials directly
beholden to local governments in their regulatory work and subjects them to
the political whims of local of‹cials. This lack of clear accountability also di-
minishes any local EPB capacity to check other local governmental activity, as
Huang Xihua, vice director of the environmental protection bureau of
Huizhou, Guangdong Province, in reference to the performance of EPBs under
the leadership of the SEPA, recently noted.
Environmental protection bureaus at provincial level and below are under the di-
rect leadership of local governments, who are in charge of our personnel changes
and funding. . . . Eat one’s hay, walk his way. It is hard for a local environmental
protection bureau to work independently and monitor the government.35
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The multiple authorities that bureaucratic entities must accommodate re-
sult in considerable interagency rivalry and competition. This system also pro-
duces gridlock and impasse in policy implementation.36 The dependence of lo-
cal EPBs on local governments means that horizontal (kuai) authorities often
prevail over vertical (tiao) authorities. Overlapping bureaucratic authorities
mean that interests in favor of stringent regulations are not always given ‹rst
priority. Instead, competing bureaucratic interests are frequently able to insert
themselves in the policy process, undermining the power and authority of local
environmental protection agencies.
Environmental protection agencies at all administrative levels regularly
work within a system of interministerial umbrella organizations called Envi-
ronmental Protection Commissions that coordinate the work of environmen-
tal protection agencies with other functional units at the same governmental
level, monitoring stations that provide the technical information needed for
policy implementation, and a loose network of research institutions and uni-
versity departments that assist in environmental impact assessment and equip-
ment design.37 Industrial ministries and companies are responsible for indus-
try-level environmental management. In any case, although the complex task
of environmental protection involves coordinated actions among a number of
Chinese political actors, primary responsibility still resides in the environmen-
tal protection bureaucracy. The local EPBs evaluate the environmental impact
of potential investment projects and supervise the environmental performance
of factories.
While the tasks of the EPBs are by no means trivial, the fragmented nature
of China’s political system places considerable burdens on their functions. Lo-
cal ‹nance bureaus’ budgetary control of EPBs means that local interests are
frequently able to affect policy implementation and circumvent uniform com-
pliance throughout the nation. In this context, the incentive structure of local
governments has played an important role in shaping China’s environmental
policy outcomes.
Local authorities are often confronted with con›icting tasks of promoting
local employment and production and preventing environmental degradation.
Unfortunately, these of‹cials often attach greater importance to economic de-
velopment, as growth constitutes the key criterion for performance assessment.
Pressure from businesses driven by revenue considerations, commercial ven-
tures, and corruption, as well as pressure from local citizens to keep factories
open all compound the problem. Despite recent moves to add environmental
criteria to local of‹cials’ performance evaluations, there has been no consensus
on what the criteria should be or how to implement them.38
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Government of‹cials’ attitudes toward the environment are in›uenced by
the “environmental Kuznets curve” (EKC) hypothesis, which posits a curvilin-
ear relationship between economic growth and environmental protection.39
Because economic growth is assumed to exert a positive effect on the environ-
ment after a certain income threshold is achieved, many have considered eco-
nomic development to be a means of fostering better environmental protection
at the expense of oversight.40 In addition, the public good nature of environ-
mental protection contributes to local authorities’ tendency to free ride on oth-
ers’ contributions in environmental cleanup.
Given the numerous channels through which local of‹cials can interfere
with policy enforcement, there is little the MEP can do to rigorously enforce
China’s impressive set of environmental rules and regulations. Unless top party
of‹cials value environmental protection equally alongside economic growth,
the MEP is likely to remain “an island of environmental awareness in a sea of
disregard,” and its attempts to utilize alternative measures to force better com-
pliance are likely to remain largely ineffective.41
Weak Legal System
China’s court system also undermines authorities’ environmental regulatory
enforcement capacity. While China’s courts do provide legal recourse to pollu-
tion victims against companies that fail to comply with environmental stan-
dards, the system is highly dependent on local governments for funds, operat-
ing expenses, and judicial salaries.42 This compromises its autonomy and
independence. In addition, adjudication committees and party committees can
bypass judges to in›uence court decisions, further undercutting the courts’
ability to provide legal transparency and accountability.43
The Limited Role of Nongovernmental Organizations
China constrains the work of environmental NGOs. Although environmental
NGOs have experienced steady growth since the 1990s, their ability to in›uence
environmental policy-making is curtailed by governmental surveillance and
activity suppression.44 While the Chinese government appreciates the role of
environmental NGOs in promoting environmental awareness and mitigating
damage, it is wary that these groups may pose a threat to legitimacy by foment-
ing political unrest and impeding policy directives, or by evolving into political
parties.45 Consequently, the state restricts the number and nature of these or-
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ganizations while simultaneously establishing state-sponsored groups to con-
trol resources and information ›ows between the government and society.46
Nevertheless, despite these obstacles, environmental NGOs are providing an
increasing counterbalance to environmental degradation through public edu-
cation and awareness promotion. Guobing Yang underscores these points in a
study on the rise of environmental NGOs in China. He argues that notwith-
standing high levels of state intervention, these organizations have achieved
some success in opening up channels of citizen participation in political
processes. Environmental NGOs in›uence policy outcomes and contribute to
the ongoing expansion of civil society by introducing new environmental
rhetoric into the public discourse through civic debates and media cam-
paigns.47 However, this process is limited by political intervention.48
As an example of the heavy restrictions Chinese authorities impose on envi-
ronmental NGOs, the registration and legalization process is fraught with
dif‹culty and designed to exclude certain factions of dissent from the public
sphere. Because of this, many environmental NGOs register as pro‹t-seeking
business organizations or simply do not register at all.49 Given their ambiguous
legal status, Chinese environmental NGOs often shy away from confrontational
activities or “contentious politics,” favoring indirect actions rather than direct al-
tercation. Unlike their counterparts in other countries, Chinese environmental
NGOs can not ‹le court cases directly on behalf of citizens. While the number of
citizen environmental protests has been on the rise, and while there are signs of
growing public involvement and activism in environmental policy,50 the activi-
ties of environmental NGOs have been primarily limited to innocuous issues
that pose no direct threat to polluting industries or industrial expansion.51
Regardless of domestic political constraints, Chinese environmental NGOs
are growing in number and scope, and will likely continue, albeit in a limited
manner. In addition to domestic activity, NGOs also describe Chinese environ-
mental problems for international observers. These budding organizations have
actively participated in international environmental conferences, such as the
World Summit on Sustainable Development sponsored by the United Nations
in Johannesburg, South Africa. NGOs have also hosted a slew of domestic con-
ferences with international participants. With the support of the Ford Founda-
tion, Chinese environmentalists have established the Center for Legal Assistance
to Pollution Victims in Beijing in 1999, which provides legal assistance to ordi-
nary citizens seeking judicial redress for environmental injuries and assists in
their efforts to seek remuneration from the government and private sector.52
However, continued political interference, coupled with NGOs’ embeddedness
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in the broader political context, casts doubt on the ability of environmental
NGOs to ever become as independent as their Western counterparts.
temporal patterns of trade, fdi,
and pollution emission
The above discussion highlights two important aspects of the development of
Chinese environmental problems and policies during the reform period. First,
despite an incremental strengthening of environmental NGOs, civil society, the
Chinese middle class, and the legal regulatory framework for governing foreign
investment and environmental pollution (discussed in the following section),
local of‹cials still have immense ›exibility in enforcing central injunctions.
This, combined with strong economic growth incentives for local of‹cials, cre-
ates considerable regulatory disparities among provinces, forming ideal condi-
tions for interprovincial competitive RTB behavior. Second, in response to a
disjointed legal backdrop, foreign investors and domestic industrialists have
had ample opportunity to seek out areas of lax regulatory enforcement to save
on levy costs, use outlawed but cheaper production equipment, and shirk envi-
ronmental production standards.
In light of the strong motivations for RTB competition and PH-seeking be-
havior and for collusion among local of‹cials, foreign investors, and domestic
producers, investment and trade ›ows should positively correlate with a relax-
ation of environmental regulatory stringency. However, the numbers provided
in ‹gures 3.1–3.3 indicate that as investment and trade ›ows have increased
since the mid-1990s, so too have the ratios of treatment and removal of major
environmental pollutants to overall emissions. Each of these ‹gures details the
annual level of foreign investment, exports, and imports (scaled on the right
side of the graphs) alongside ratios of cleaned, treated, and removed volumes of
air, wastewater, and solid waste pollution, respectively, to overall pollution dis-
charges (scaled on the left side of the graph). Although the level of economic
activity has increased aggregate levels of pollution discharge (i.e., the scale ef-
fect), the relative pollution amounts released into the environment as untreated
waste have declined, in some cases precipitously. This has occurred even as for-
eign investment, exports, and imports have surged. This dynamic likely speaks
to the income and technique effects, indicating a response by private and gov-
ernmental actors to public calls for greater environmental protection and the
use of more sophisticated and cost-effective pollution abatement equipment,
respectively. While the income effect is thought to be a function of rising in-
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fig. 3.1. Temporal distribution of trade, FDI, and wastewater pollution treatment. (Data
from China Statistical Yearbook, various years.)
fig. 3.2. Temporal distribution of trade, FDI, and solid waste treatment. (Data from
China Statistical Yearbook, various years.)
fig. 3.3. Temporal distribution of trade, FDI, and air pollution treatment. (Data from
China Statistical Yearbook, various years.)
comes, the technique effect is likely a result of technological and knowledge
spillovers, competition-induced development, and a growing number of devel-
oped-world foreign ‹rms included in emission reports. Though not conclusive,
these ‹gures lend support to our general propositions that pollution-haven and
race-to-the-bottom behavior are anomalous, and that trade and investment
may actually have a positive impact on the Chinese environment by contribut-
ing to the income and technique effects.
legislative attempts to regulate the 
environmental impact of foreign investment
In China, the ability of local governments to circumvent injunctions from the
center and to affect policy enforcement is not a new phenomenon.53 As an old
saying goes, “the mountains are high, and the emperor is far away.” Indeed, as
in other areas, this has been the case with respect to provincial environmental
policy enforcement, especially when it contradicts economic growth generated
by foreign investment. In light of this, the effectiveness of Beijing’s environ-
mental regulatory attempts has historically been mixed. There is some evidence
that local governments engage in lax enforcement of the center’s policies when
evaluating, approving, and implementing foreign investment projects.54
While local government recalcitrance constitutes an important part of the
problem in regulating foreign ‹rms, an additional concern of central authori-
ties is the tendency for foreign ‹rms to invest in pollution-intensive industries
or engage in dirty production processes. Because of this, the central govern-
ment continuously attempts to strengthen China’s legal framework for invest-
ment project supervision.
A number of factors in›uence the stringency of China’s environmental reg-
ulations. First, as Lester Ross argues, domestic forces provide the primary im-
petus for the progressive expansion of China’s environmental laws as citizen
complaints of environmental pollution often prompt of‹cial responses.55 Sec-
ond, the wealth generated by China’s rapid economic growth provides many re-
sources for environmental regulatory expansion. Third, as environmental is-
sues gain salience in China’s bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, international
forces are increasingly shaping China’s regulatory environment by disseminat-
ing scienti‹c knowledge and raising environmental awareness. These global
forces place normative pressure on China and elevate the status of the MEP and
other related bureaus.56 While international pressure from environmental
regimes, foreign governments, and NGOs plays an important role in this
54 / greening china
process, the private sector also exerts a powerful in›uence.57 The following dis-
cussion illustrates how China’s regulatory framework for foreign investment
attraction has become more stringent over time. This indicates that contrary to
the pollution-haven hypothesis, in general foreign ‹rms do not lobby for less
stringent environmental laws at either the national or provincial levels, and
they sometimes go beyond Chinese domestic law in their local operations.
Weak Legislative Framework in the Late 1970s and Early 1980s
China had relatively few restrictions on the behavior of foreign ‹rms at the be-
ginning of the reform era. It was not until the late 1970s that Chinese authori-
ties ‹rst began to engage in extensive legislation concerning the environmental
regulation of ‹rm behavior. In 1979 the Chinese began to test the impact of en-
vironmental legislation designed to stem industrial pollution through eco-
nomic incentives in article 18 of the Trial Environmental Protection Law (later
rati‹ed in 1989).58 In the following three years, various local governments ex-
perimented with the effectiveness of this incentive system, and by 1981 the proj-
ect had been implemented across China. In 1982 Beijing introduced an Interim
Procedure on Pollution Charges, formally creating a levy system that mandated
fee collection for pollution discharges.59 Though the overall effectiveness of this
system has been debated, it represented an important initial step on the path
toward industrial environmental regulation and is still in effect today.
In 1981 the Chinese government issued the Administrative Measures for Ba-
sic Construction Projects’ Environmental Protection, which contained provisions
for environmental impact assessments (EIA) and delineated the EIA imple-
mentation procedure. As the Administrative Measures were issued at the begin-
ning of the reform period when central planning still carried considerable
weight, the provisions were of primary concern to local governments. Impor-
tantly, the Administrative Measures required feasibility assessments for any po-
tential project to include an EIA. However, in effect the local industrial bureaus
overseeing the various projects wielded by far the most in›uence over project
approval. Moreover, it is not entirely clear whether or how the Administrative
Measures applied to foreign-invested projects. Thus, while the Administrative
Measures represented an early development of Chinese EIA regulation, early re-
quirements were considerably vague in applicability and the locus of enforce-
ment authority.
The weaknesses evident in the Administrative Measures were again on dis-
play in the Implementing Regulations for Joint Venture Law issued in 1983. Ulti-
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mately, Implementing Regulations stated that pollution-intensive foreign invest-
ment projects should not be approved. However, while it provided broad
speci‹cations on the conditions under which foreign-invested projects should
be permitted, it ultimately failed to give any guidelines on what constituted a
pollution-intensive project. Nor did it require foreign investors to submit any
type of EIA in their applications for project approval.60 Instead, these directives
were mostly concerned with the economic impact of foreign projects rather
than their environmental effects.
The Progressive Strengthening of China’s Environmental Laws in 
the Mid-1980s and Early 1990s
The steady increase in foreign investment in China in the mid-1980s and early
1990s led Chinese authorities to tighten regulations with a ›urry of legislative
activities over foreign investment to minimize environmental externalities.
Of‹cials introduced initial legislation directly concerning industrial pollution
emission in 1984 with the Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law and later
in 1987 with the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law.61 Laws concerning
solid waste and soil contamination followed, as did the designation of various
emission standards. Most of these have since been amended. The Temporary
Regulations on Enhancing the Environmental Management Practices of Economic
Development Zones, introduced in 1986, were directed primarily at local gov-
ernment of‹cials overseeing the economic development zone construction.
These regulations mandated that it was important for local government
of‹cials and businesses to abide by existing environmental laws during the con-
struction process. They upheld the importance of environmental protection
for local economic development and spelled out certain areas in which pollu-
tion-intensive investments were to be prohibited. These regulations also re-
stated the requirements laid out in earlier environmental legislation (e.g., the
1979 Environmental Protection Law) that potential investors must submit both
an EIA and related information on projects’ environmental impact, such as the
type and amount of pollution discharges and intended abatement measures,
prior to project approval.
Several other laws issued during this period also illustrate the government’s
growing awareness of the potential negative environmental impact of foreign
investment. The Chinese government passed the Law of the People’s Republic of
China on Foreign Capital Enterprises in 1986 and the Detailed Rules and Regula-
tions for Implementing Foreign Capital Enterprise Law in 1990. The latter dealt
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more speci‹cally with the environmental behavior of foreign ‹rms. An impor-
tant breakthrough of this legislation was that it speci‹cally stated that foreign
investment projects with the potential to “produce environmental pollution”
should not be approved. While this law fell short of de‹ning what exactly con-
stituted an environmentally polluting project, it does illustrate the growing im-
portance of environmental protection among state of‹cials and the need to
strengthen the regulatory framework governing foreign investment impact.62
In 1986, the Management Procedures for Environmental Protection of Capital
Construction Projects (originally issued in 1981) was modi‹ed to include explicit
guidelines for the environmental impact assessment system. The 1986 docu-
ment eliminated a primary weakness of the original legislation by stating that
the EIA requirements apply to domestic as well as foreign-invested enterprises.
Some of the originally vague provisions in the original document were also
clari‹ed. These measures were strengthened yet again in Procedures on the Ad-
ministration of Environmental Protection of Construction Projects, which, among
other things, speci‹cally outlined which projects were to be approved and ex-
actly how the EIAs were to be implemented.63
Following the revised Measures, the government issued a number of other
regulations that laid out even more clearly the guidelines for the EIA system.
Among other things, these regulations spelled out the licensing requirements
for organizations responsible for conducting construction project EIAs and the
detailed procedures for EIA fee collection.64 As a result of these regulations, for-
eign ‹rms became subject to China’s increasingly rigorous criteria for environ-
mental impact assessment.
Several other regulations issued in the early 1990s dealt speci‹cally with the
environmental impact of foreign ‹rms. The government issued regulations re-
lating to the reprocessing of imported waste for export, admonishing local gov-
ernments to more rigorously supervise, restrict, or exercise caution in approv-
ing pollution-intensive projects. Similarly, to deal with the tendency of foreign
investors to use outdated and highly polluting technologies in their Chinese
operations, a State Council document issued in 1993 reiterated the need to sub-
ject foreign investment projects to all necessary approval procedures.
In short, throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, Chinese of‹cials became
increasingly aware of the potential environmental hazards of unregulated for-
eign investment. The government’s growing concern with the environmental
behavior of foreign ‹rms was re›ected in a stream of regulations released dur-
ing this period that reaf‹rmed the importance for local government of‹cials to
follow established guidelines when approving foreign investment projects.
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However, while the greater guideline speci‹city represented an improvement
over previous legislation, the regulations unleashed during this period con-
tained a number of weaknesses that hampered legal development of foreign in-
vestment policies. For example, laws passed during this period were consider-
ably vague about the type of polluting projects that should be rejected. They
also did not put forward a detailed penalty schedule for enterprises that failed
to submit environmental data or secure EIA approval. In the absence of de-
tailed implementation guidelines, local government of‹cials gained consider-
able discretion over project approval and other areas of environmental policy
implementation. Stalley suggests that while the central government was clearly
aware that a lack of local enforcement contributed to the policy implementa-
tion dif‹culties, it was unwilling and unable to induce local government com-
pliance.65 It was not until the mid-1990s that more concrete criteria for policy
implementation were established.
Toward More Rigorous Environmental Regulation since the Mid-1990s
Beginning in the mid-1990s, China’s environmental regulatory framework
went through another series of improvements. In 1995, Chinese authorities re-
leased Provisions on Guiding the Orientation of Foreign Investment and the Cat-
alogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries. These documents were
a signi‹cant improvement over the 1986 Foreign Enterprise Law, as they pro-
vided a detailed categorization of industries where foreign investment was “en-
couraged,”“restricted,” or “prohibited.” While sectors in the “encouraged” cate-
gory became eligible for preferential government policies such as tax breaks,
the law mandated that those in the “restricted” category go through a rigorous
and lengthy approval process with either the central or the local government.66
The Catalogue also provided a more ‹ne-grained de‹nition on what exactly
constituted a pollution-intensive industry. Even though economic develop-
ment promotion took precedence over environmental protection in the draft-
ing of the Catalogue, and even though SEPA’s in›uence on the legislation was
likely minimal, it represented another step toward the strengthening of govern-
ment control over the environmental aspects of foreign investment. Impor-
tantly, a number of economic activities with potentially damaging environ-
mental impact were classi‹ed as “restricted” categories and subjected to more
stringent screening during the approval process. For example, pesticides and
fertilizers were removed from the “encouraged” category, while environmen-
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tally friendly products and production processes such as Freon-substitution
technologies and energy-saving technologies were added to the “encouraged”
category. By enunciating more detailed criteria for screening foreign invest-
ment, the central government made environmental protection an important
criterion in foreign investment attraction and provided greater speci‹city for
screening polluting projects.
Amendments of the 1995 Provisions in 2002 and 2004 further illustrate the
government’s desire to limit foreign investment in pollution-intensive sectors
and to contain the environmental fallout of foreign-invested projects. Both of
these amendments singled out investment projects using outdated environ-
mental technology as “restricted” categories. Similarly, in 1999 the State Eco-
nomic and Trade Commission issued the Catalogue of the Backward Production
Capacities, Processes, and Products to Be Eliminated listing products, production
equipment, and processes to be prohibited. The items covered in this list range
from mining and mineral extraction industries to certain products in the tex-
tile, chemical, pulp and paper, and leather industries.67
The Catalogue also prohibited the transfer, import, and distribution of
these items. However, unlike its treatment of domestic ‹rms, the Catalogue did
not require foreign ‹rms already producing with outlawed technology to cease
operations. Instead, foreign ‹rms were merely required to work with local gov-
ernments to deal with the situation. This loophole in the document once again
left local governments with substantial discretion in policy enforcement.
Legal development since the late 1990s continues to strengthen the devel-
opment of China’s EIA system. The Environmental Impact Assessment Law
(EIA law), passed in 2002, represents a milestone in the expansion of China’s
EIA framework. Importantly, this law requires government development plans
to include EIAs while also mandating public participation in the EIA process.
The 2002 EIA law places certain government plans under external scrutiny and
requires construction projects that mandate EIAs to go through a process of so-
liciting the government, expert, and public opinions via evidentiary meetings
or testimony hearings. This is notable in that it is the ‹rst time that China’s en-
vironmental regulations have emphasized public participation. To the extent
that public scrutiny of investment projects has increased the pressure on for-
eign ‹rms to comply with local environmental regulations, the EIA Law’s ex-
plicit emphasis on public participation subjects foreign ‹rms to greater envi-
ronmental oversight.
Another important development in China’s EIA system is the growing pro-
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fessionalism of the EIA service agents. Historically, China’s EIA service agents
have been plagued with problems such as corruption and low quality. This
problem became much more acute as economic growth progressed and more
and more projects were being implemented without proper EIA protocol. Leg-
islation throughout the 1990s sought to increase EIA agents’ professionalism
and responsibilities while enhancing agent oversight. In 1998, the government
eliminated the requirement that all EIA agents must simultaneously be af‹li-
ated with a government agency to minimize government in›uence in the EIA
process. Later initiatives focus on the EIA certi‹cation programs, strengthening
the system of EIA agent management, and the creation of a national testing
program for certifying EIA engineers. In 2005, the government passed a regula-
tion that speci‹cally prohibits environmental monitoring institutions, which
often belong to the local EPB, from applying for EIA licenses, thus mitigating
another potential source of con›ict.
Finally, the Criminal Law of the PRC, passed in 1997, for the ‹rst time de-
clared several environmental acts to be illegal, including the import of haz-
ardous or regular waste for treatment. The Criminal Law also speci‹ed the
penalty for both government and nongovernment entities that violate the law
or fail to live up to their obligations.68
Ultimately, the series of legal initiatives undertaken since the mid-1990s
have made China’s environmental regulations more detailed, complex, and
comprehensive. By specifying the type of investment that is encouraged, creat-
ing a set of legal instruments to address emerging problems in foreign opera-
tions, and steadily expanding the EIA system in China, the Chinese government
has created an effective legal framework for governing foreign investments’ en-
vironmental aspects. However, passing legislative measures is not the primary
problem. Rather, the lack of uniformity in policy enforcement among provin-
cial and local of‹cials, the lack of clear structural accountability for EPBs, and
the con›icting directives of environmental preservation and rapid economic
growth have all led to an untenable situation for the Chinese environment.
How this will change under the newly designated MEP is still in question.
conclusion
This chapter has provided a brief overview of China’s environmental crises, the
bureaucratic system governing environmental protection in China, and a pic-
ture of the legislative development since the late 1970s designed to strengthen
China’s legal foundations. As a result of extensive legislation, authorities today
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have a far wider range of legal instruments at their disposal to rein in noncom-
pliant business actors. However, legislative enforcement still remains an obsta-
cle to further implementation. In this respect, the behavior of foreign and do-
mestic ‹rms themselves will continue to be of paramount importance to
environmental sustainability. Fortunately, at least since the mid-1990s, in-
creases in foreign investment and trade openness have not correlated with in-
creases in environmental deterioration.





Pollution Havens and Racing to the Bottom:
A Provincial-Level Analysis
This chapter provides an empirical test of the pollution-haven and race-to-the-
bottom hypotheses among Chinese provinces. According to the pollution-
haven hypothesis, foreign investors have ‹nancial incentives to seek out areas of
lax environmental regulation to establish production operations.1 The concen-
tration of pollution-intensive investment in these areas turns them into “pollu-
tion havens.”2 If the pollution-haven argument is valid, then Chinese provinces
with lower levels of environmental regulatory stringency should attract higher
levels of foreign direct investment, ceteris paribus. Conversely, the race-to-the-
bottom argument posits that the need to attract FDI exerts intergovernmental
competitive pressure to lower environmental standards.3 Based on this hypoth-
esis, Chinese provinces with greater foreign investment in›ows should be less
likely to stringently enforce environmental regulations, resulting in lower levels
of environmental protection.
This chapter presents two empirical tests of these hypotheses by using Chi-
nese provincial-level statistical data. These tests examine both the destination-
seeking behavior of FDI in response to environmental regulatory stringency
disparities among Chinese provinces and the impact of trade and FDI on envi-
ronmental performance across Chinese provinces. As a preview of our results,
our econometric analyses of the pollution-haven hypothesis ‹nd little evidence
of pollution-haven-seeking behavior among foreign ‹rms in China across
speci‹cations. Nor does our analysis of the race-to-the-bottom argument sug-
gest that the growing amount of trade and foreign direct investment in China
negatively impacts the environment, other things equal. The lack of empirical
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support for both of these hypotheses lends credence to the central propositions
of this book regarding the importance of ‹rm self-regulation, the transfer of
environmental management systems and technology, and the ratcheting-up ef-
fect of exporting to the world market. The ‹rst two sections of this chapter
elaborate on our empirical tests and discussions of each hypothesis. This chap-
ter concludes by highlighting its contributions and identifying future research
opportunities.
empirical test of the pollution-haven hypothesis
In line with previous pollution-haven analyses, our test of the pollution-haven
hypothesis attempts to capture the effects of disparities in environmental regu-
latory stringency on investment ›ows. But, in a departure from previous stud-
ies that employ various proxy measures for regulatory stringency such as total
pollution abatement costs, the degree of participation in various environmen-
tal treaties, the existence of environmental nongovernmental organizations op-
erating in the host country, provincial sulfur dioxide emissions, or the provin-
cial levy of a single pollutant (such as wastewater) as respective measures of
environmental regulation,4 we gauge provincial regulatory stringency by the
annual environmental levies paid per ‹rm in a variety of environmental pollu-
tants, including wastewater, solid waste, industrial waste gas, radioactive waste,
and an additional above-legal-limit emission levy. We argue that the use of pol-
lution levy payouts represents a much closer approximation of the provincial
regulatory environment than any of the previous dependent variables analyzed
in other studies, as it actually captures the regulatory penalties faced by ‹rms
for excessive (i.e., above the legal limit) pollution emissions. Only total pollu-
tion abatement costs would, arguably, represent an equitable proxy; however,
there is no consistent time-series data available for such a measure. Neverthe-
less, following previous studies, we also conduct empirical tests using alterna-
tive measures of the dependent variable, as detailed in the following sections.
Data
We test the pollution-haven hypothesis using provincial-level data available
from the China Statistical Yearbook.5 This data contains detailed information
regarding annual FDI in›ows, emissions levels, and primary pollutant levies at
the provincial level. We focus on the 1996–2004 period as that is the only period
for which we can locate consistent provincial time-series data.6 Figure 4.1 pre-
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sents the spatial distributions of FDI and primary pollutant levies in China. A
visual inspection of the data suggests that coastal provinces where FDI is most
heavily concentrated do not necessarily have more stringent pollutant levies. In
our test of the hypotheses about the potential pollution-haven-seeking behav-
ior of FDI in China, we control for a number of alternative factors that may po-
tentially affect the direction of foreign investment ›ows in order to increase the
robustness of our results.
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fig. 4.1. Spatial distributions of FDI and primary pollutant levies. (Data from China
Statistical Yearbook, various years.)
Dependent Variable
Our key dependent variable ( fdi/GDP) is the actual FDI in›ow into each of
the Chinese provinces in each of the years examined. We normalize FDI
in›ows by provincial GDP to account for the possibility that larger provinces
are likely to attract a greater amount of FDI. Although it may be argued that
provincial FDI stock is a more adequate measure of FDI location decisions
than FDI ›ow, we contend that this is not necessarily the case for this analysis.
While a stock variable does indeed allow for the estimation of regulatory strin-
gency on FDI accumulation and establishment, this chapter seeks only to
gauge the effects of regulatory stringency at the point of investment location
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fig. 4.1. (continued) 
decision. Further, variations in capital mobility across industries limit invest-
ment re-location in some industries much more than others. Some industries
are simply much better equipped to respond to a changing regulatory envi-
ronment than others. For these reasons we argue that ›ow variables are better
equipped to capture the effects of regulatory stringency on investment deci-
sions than stock variables are.
Key Independent Variable
Our key independent variable in this analysis is provincial environmental reg-
ulatory stringency. We calculate regulatory stringency using data published by
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fig. 4.1. (continued) 
the All China Data Center on the volume of provincial environmental levies
collected during the 1996–2004 period.7 This data contains detailed informa-
tion about total environmental levies, total levies for above-limit emission, and
levies for wastewater, solid waste, and radioactive emissions by province-year.
We divide these data by the number of ‹rms paying levies. The average pollu-
tion levy paid by a ‹rm in a given province should provide an indication of its
environmental regulatory costs.
Control Variables
We control for other factors that may affect FDI in›ows based on previous em-
pirical studies of in›ow determinants:
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fig. 4.1. (continued) 
GDP per capita. Since one of the major motivations for FDI is to seek
new sophisticated markets, scholars argue for a positive correlation be-
tween development and FDI attraction.8 For example, Wang and Swain ‹nd
that while interest rate and exchange rate are negatively associated with FDI
›ows in China’s manufacturing sector, GDP and GDP growth rate posi-
tively affect in›ows.9 Other empirical studies yield similar supportive evi-
dence.10 To account for the effects of economic development on FDI loca-
tion decisions, we include the natural logarithm of annual provincial GDP
per capita.
GDP growth. Fast-growing regions may be more likely to attract foreign
investors seeking to maximize potential returns and market opportunities.11
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fig. 4.1. (continued) 
Thus, we include the percentage change in a province’s GDP from the previous
year to the current one to capture these effects.
Rail and Highway. Transportation linkages may affect regional and na-
tional market accessibility for foreign investors.12 For example, Chen ‹nds that
transportation, technological ‹ltering, and potential market share expansion
are the most signi‹cant determinants of FDI location decisions in China.13
Other studies yield similar evidence.14 We use two alternative measures of
transportation infrastructure in our analysis, the length of railway (rail) and
the length of highway (highway), as percentages of provincial land area. China’s
highway network features several separate networks with few interconnections
72 / greening china
fig. 4.1. (continued) 
and is underdeveloped across much of the country. The railway system ar-
guably provides more ef‹cient transportation, especially for moving raw mate-
rials and heavy industrial products over long distances. We test our hypothesis
using these two alternative infrastructure measures to increase the robustness
of our analysis.
Schools and Graduates. Numerous studies ‹nd labor quality to positively
affect FDI in›ows.15 To account for labor’s effects, we use both the natural log-
arithm of the total number of universities and secondary schools in a province
(schools) and the total number of higher education institution and secondary
school graduates normalized by provincial population (graduates). On the one
hand, FDI may be attracted to areas with more educated workers. On the other
hand, to the extent that educational attainment re›ects labor costs,16 FDI
in›ows may be attracted to areas of limited education where labor is cheap.
Due to these contradictory arguments, we do not place any expectations on the
sign of this variable.
SOE output share. We gauge provincial openness to foreign investment as
the share of the output of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in provincial GDP.
Studies by Sun, Tong, and Yu as well as Fujita and Hu reveal a signi‹cant rela-
tionship between SOE concentration and FDI in›ows.17 However, the relation-
ship between regional openness and FDI cannot be determined a priori. On the
one hand, greater openness may attract more investment, as a more open econ-
omy implies greater host-market familiarity among investors. On the other hand,
greater openness may curb investment ›ows because of greater foreign competi-
tion and reduced competitive advantage. We include SOE output share to capture
the effects of economic openness and economic reform progress on FDI in›ows.
Regional dummy variables. Finally, we include dummy variables for the
inland, central, and coastal regions, respectively, to tap the effect of the uneven-
ness of China’s reform policy across regions on FDI location decisions. It is well
known that China’s regional development policy in the post-Mao era has an
important geographic dimension. Because the coastal regions enjoy great ad-
vantages in infrastructure, technology, capital, and education, the central gov-
ernment provides these provincial governments with considerable latitude in
FDI attraction. Consequently, coastal governments are able to provide a variety
of incentives to encourage foreign investment, including tax breaks, the reduc-
tion and exemption of enterprise tax and pro‹t remittance taxes, and the es-
tablishment of Special Economic Zones (SEZs). It is not surprising that the im-
plicit geographical targeting of China’s FDI policy has resulted in substantial
FDI in›ows into the developed eastern region, while the central and inland re-
gions have lagged behind.18 To account for the effects of the central govern-
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ment’s preferential policies on the spatial distribution of FDI, we use a dummy
variable for each of the inland, central, and eastern regions. Our coding of this
variable follows the research done by Chen.19 The developed eastern region in-
cludes Liaoning, Hebei, Tianjin, Beijing, Shandong, Jiangsu, Shanghai, Zhe-
jiang, Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan, and Guangxi. The central region includes
Heilongjiang, Jilin, Inner Mongolia, Shanxi, Henan, Anhui, Hubei, Hunan, and
Jiangxi. The western region includes Shaanxi, Ganxu, Ningxia, Sichuan, Yun-
nan, Guizhou, Qinghai, Xinjiang, and Tibet.
Limitations
Data limitations prevent us from controlling for other factors that may also af-
fect FDI in›ows such as R&D expenditures, tax structure, FDI attraction ex-
penditures, and other special treatment offered to foreign investors. Impor-
tantly, labor cost has been considered to exert in›uence on MNCs’ locational
choice.20 Consistent with the race-to-the-bottom argument, multinational
companies may be attracted to provinces with lower wages to reduce produc-
tion costs. However, multinational corporations may also have demand for
higher-quality labor with higher wages. While we are unable to include a direct
measure of labor cost, as wage data is only available for 2003, our two education
variables, Schools and Graduates, provide a proxy because educational attain-
ment is a well-known predictor of future wage earnings.
Table 4.1 describes the measurement of key variables and indicates expected
signs between each independent variable and the dependent variable, FDI. Ta-
bles 4.2 and 4.3 provide summary statistics and the correlation matrix of key
variables in the sample, respectively. As illustrated in table 4.3, the independent
variables are not highly correlated with one another, which should ameliorate
potential multicollinearity concerns.
Since our data is essentially time-series, cross-sectional data, we estimate
ordinary least square (OLS) models with panel-corrected standard errors (PC-
SEs).21 Beck and Katz argue that compared to the conventional feasible gener-
alized least square (FGLS) estimator, models with PCSEs produce estimates of
standard errors and variance-covariance estimates assuming that the distur-
bances are heteroskedastic and contemporaneously correlated across panels.22
We also assume that there is ‹rst-order autocorrelation AR(1) within each
province and that the coef‹cient of the AR(1) process is common to all the pan-
els. Test results are presented in tables 4.4 and 4.5. In table 4.4 the models use
Graduates and Highway as control variables; table 4.5 reports results with
Schools and Railway as control variables.
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Results
The most notable result is that our alternative pollution emission levy variables
consistently demonstrate a positive relationship with the outcome variable
across speci‹cations (Models 1 and Models 2d–2e), and the relationships are
statistically signi‹cant in Models 1e and 2e. While the emission variables
demonstrate negative signs in Models 2a–2c, these relationships are statistically
insigni‹cant. These results do not provide support to the argument that FDI is
attracted to areas with lower levels of pollution levies. The statistically
signi‹cant results in Models 1e and 2e actually suggest the opposite, that FDI
may be attracted to areas of elevated environmental regulatory stringency. In
Pollution Havens and Racing to the Bottom / 75
TABLE 4.1. Variable Measurement and Expected Signs of the Pollution Haven
Analysis
Variable Measurement Expected Sign
Dependent Variable
FDI/GDP FDI divided by the GDP of each province
Independent Variables 
Schools Natural logarithm of the total number of universities ±
and secondary schools in each province 
Highway The length of highways divided by the land area +
of a province
Graduates Natural logarithm of the total number of primary ±
and secondary schools in each province
Railway The length of highways divided by the land +
area of a province
GDP growth Percentage change in GDP from the previous to +
the current year 
GDP per capita Natural logarithm of the GDP per capita of +
each province 
SOE output share The share of industrial output accounted for by SOEs ±
in each province
Total levy Total pollution levy divided by the number of reporting + 
firms in a province
Total above- Total levy on exceeding limit discharge divided by +
limit levy  the number of reporting firms in a province
Wastewater levy Total levy on wastewater discharge divided by the + 
number of reporting firms in a province
Solid waste levy Total levy on solid waste divided by the number of +
reporting firms in a province
Radioactive  Total levy on radioactive material discharge divided +
emission levy by the number of reporting firms in a province
any case, our results do not indicate that FDI is in any way attracted to provin-
cial pollution havens.
Regarding the other independent variables, our alternative measures of in-
frastructure (Railway and Highway) consistently demonstrate positive relation-
ships with the dependent variables, and the relationships are statistically
signi‹cant across model speci‹cations. This is in line with the theoretical ex-
pectation that FDI is attracted to provinces with better infrastructure. Variables
representing labor quality (Schools and Graduates) are negatively associated
with the independent variable, and the relationships are highly signi‹cant
across model speci‹cations. This lends support to the argument that FDI is
more likely to be attracted to areas where the educational quality and educa-
tional attainment are lower in order to save on labor costs.
It is also notable that the share of the provincial income accounted for by
state-owned enterprises (SOE output share) demonstrates a positive relation-
ship with the emission variables, and the relationships are statistically
signi‹cant in Models 1a and 1b. This indicates that economic openness may
have a negative impact on FDI in›ows and that the higher competition may de-
ter foreign investment.
Finally, we did not ‹nd GDP per capita or GDP growth rate to affect provin-
cial FDI in›ows in any way. While these variables are negatively signed in all
model speci‹cations, they are also generally insigni‹cant.
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TABLE 4.2. Summary Statistics of Key Variables Included in the Pollution Haven
Analysis
Variable OBS Mean S.D. Min Max
FDI/GDP 308 0.355 0.466 0.000 2.916
Graduates  277 645,130.700 466,447.100 7,680.000 2,360,532.000
Schools 277 7.582 0.904 4.500 8.775
Highway 276 0.303 0.203 0.009 1.023
Railway 276 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
GDP growth 245 10.980 5.268 –21.231 29.065
GDP per capita 277 6.679 0.560 5.371 8.391
SOE output share 246 3.254 2.306 0.022 9.640
Total levy 263 107.924 111.274 9.073 1,467.189
Total above- 234 73.992 77.995 4.313 902.167
limit levy
Wastewater levy 235 46.821 51.119 0.000 371.013
Solid waste levy  234 4.373 4.256 0.000 53.656
Radioactive 235 0.196 2.037 0.000 30.985
emission levy
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In order to increase con‹dence in our ‹ndings, we divided the country into
eastern, central, and western regions and ran the statistical analysis described in
the previous section for each of these regions.23 Results from this test corrobo-
rate the ‹ndings reported above. Our levy variables are positively associated
with FDI in›ows in most model speci‹cations and are occasionally statistically
signi‹cant. These results provide support to our hypotheses, indicating that
foreign investors are not necessarily attracted to areas with lax environmental
protection and enforcement.
As additional robustness checks, we employ several secondary measures of
regulatory stringency—the actual annual emissions of SO2, soot, and dust by
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TABLE 4.4. Average Pollution Levy by Province and FDI Inflow (Models 1a–e)
Variable 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E
Graduates –0.108*** –0.109*** –0.108*** –0.109*** –0.082***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.017)
Highway 0.459** 0.448** 0.454** 0.455** 0.482**
(0.218) (0.217) (0.216) (0.220) (0.199)
GDP growth –0.002 –0.002 –0.002 –0.003 –0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
GDP per capita –0.016 –0.020 –0.016 –0.015 –0.022
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.046) (0.046)
SOE output share 0.011* 0.012* 0.011 0.011 0.009











Regional dummies suppressed suppressed suppressed suppressed suppressed
Constant (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) 2.064 (dropped)
(.416)
Number of 176 173 174 174 174
observations 
Number of groups 31 31 31 31 31
R2 0.587 0.583 0.584 0.585 0.637
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; e stands for exponential notation.
*significant at 10% **significant at 5% ***significant at 1%
province,24 the annual percentage emission reduction of each of these pollu-
tants,25 the annual percentage emission reduction adjusted for percentage
change in GDP,26 and the provincial investment completed in industrial pollu-
tion treatment as a percentage of provincial GDP (Investment)—as instru-
ments for our key independent variable.27 Although these measures are less di-
rect than our primary ones, they do provide corroborative support for our
initial results. These variables also enable us to account for multiple sectors of
industrial investment, as the payout and emission data accommodate multiple
industrial pollutants. The combination of multiple proxies creates a more com-
plete picture of environmental regulatory stringency.
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TABLE 4.5. Average Firm Pollution Levy by Province and FDI Inflow (Models 2a–e)
Variable 2A 2B 2C 2D 2E
Schools –0.080*** –0.077** –0.076*** –0.082*** –0.063***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.019)
Railway 370.291** 377.991** 402.481** 348.599** 325.236***
(160.393) (163.645) (174.674) (159.361) (98.684)
GDP growth –0.002 –0.002 –0.002 –0.002 –0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
GDP per capita –0.053 –0.044 –0.052 –0.040 –0.031
(0.075) (0.075) (0.073) (0.077) (0.068)
SOE output share 0.010 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.008











Regional dummies suppressed suppressed suppressed suppressed suppressed
Constant (dropped) (dropped) 1.613 (dropped) (dropped)
(0.458)
Number of 173 176 174 174 174
observations
Number of groups 31 31 31 31 31
R2 0.576 0.581 0.577 0.577 0.628
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; e stands for exponential notation.
*significant at 10% **significant at 5% ***significant at 1%
The results, shown in tables 4.6a–4.6c, are very similar to those reported
above and do not diminish our central ‹ndings. Our alternative pollution
emission measures consistently demonstrate a negative relationship with the
FDI variable, and the relationships are occasionally highly signi‹cant. These re-
sults directly contradict the pollution-haven hypothesis. Models using mea-
sures of the annual percentage reduction in SO2, soot, and industrial dust as
well as those using measures of the annual percentage reduction in those pol-
lutants adjusted for percentage change in GDP yield similar conclusions. In
these models, while the adjusted emission variables demonstrate a positive re-
lationship with the FDI variable in some of the model speci‹cations, they are
also generally insigni‹cant. Finally, the Investment variable exhibits different
signs in Models A and B in table 4.6c, but the variable did not achieve statisti-
cal signi‹cance in either model. These test results therefore provide no empiri-
cal support to the pollution-haven hypothesis.
We also ran all models controlling for provincial ‹xed and random effects.
In this set of tests, the levy variables are positively signed in some of models and
are occasionally signi‹cant. They are insigni‹cant in models where they
demonstrate a negative sign, and do not alter our central ‹ndings.
Finally, we estimate models that include the total number of domestic en-
terprises as control variables, because provinces with larger numbers of inter-
mediate goods suppliers may be more attractive to foreign investment. How-
ever, because the data for this variable are inconsistent across provinces, their
addition leads to substantial case attrition. The results again do not affect our
central ‹ndings.
empirical test of the race-to-the-bottom
hypothesis
We once again draw on data contained in the China Statistical Yearbook (vari-
ous years) to test our hypotheses about the effects of trade openness and for-
eign direct investment on provincial environmental protection. As with the
pollution-haven hypothesis, we focus on the 1996–2004 period as it is the only
period for which we can locate consistent time-series data.28 We control for al-
ternative hypotheses about the factors that in›uence environmental protection
seen in the political economy literature in order to increase the robustness of
our results.
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TABLE 4.6a. Pollution Emission and FDI Inflow (A)
% Reduction in Emissions
Variable Emissions % Reduction in Emissions plus % Change in GDP
GDP per capita .51** .48** .46* .74*** .73*** .74*** .74*** .73*** .74***
(.20) (.21) (.23) (.18) (.18) (.18) (.18) (.18) (.18)
GDP growth .005 .005 .004 –.02** –.03** –.02** –.02** –.03** –.02**
(.006) (.007) (.006) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
SOE output share .06** .07** .05* .04** .04** .04** .04** .04** .04**
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02)
School .82*** .76*** .83*** .85*** .85*** .85*** .85*** .85*** .85***
(.15) (.13) (.18) (.09) (.09) (.09) (.09) (.09) (.09)
Highway 2.08*** 1.98*** 1.90*** 2.10*** 2.09*** 2.11*** 2.10*** 2.09*** 2.11***



















Central dummy –1.28***–1.23***–1.32*** –1.24***–1.25***–1.24*** –1.24***–1.25***–1.24***
(.13) (.13) (.13) (.15) (.14) (.15) (.15) (.14) (.15)
Inland dummy –1.98***–2.05***–2.09*** –1.91***–1.91***–1.90*** –1.91***–1.91***–1.90***
(.21) (.21) (.21) (.23) (.23) (.23) (.23) (.23) (.23)
Intercept 2.04 2.47 2.26*** –.27*** –.22*** –.27 –.27 –.22 –.27
(1.63) (1.72) (1.67) (1.69) (1.68) (1.69) (1.69) (1.68) (1.69)
N 205 204 205 147 146 147 147 146 147
R2 .95 .95 .96 .97 .97 .97 .97 .97 .97
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; e stands for exponential notation.
*significant at 10% **significant at 5% ***significant at 1%
TABLE 4.6b. Pollution Emission and FDI Inflow (B)
% Reduction in Emissions
Variable Emissions % Reduction in Emissions plus % Change in GDP
GDP per capita .32** .35** .31* .80*** .78*** .74*** .80*** .78*** .78***
(.23) (.23) (.25) (.22) (.21) (.18) (.22) (.21) (.22)
GDP growth .004 .004 .004 –.03*** –.03*** –.03*** –.03*** –.03*** –.03**
(.007) (.007) (.006) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
SOE output share .06** .06** .05* .03** .04** .04** .03** .04** .04**
(.02) (.03) (.02) (.01) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02)
Graduates .86*** .77*** .83*** .84*** .84*** .84*** .84*** .84*** .84***
(.17) (.15) (.19) (.09) (.09) (.09) (.09) (.09) (.09)
Railway 1,324.88** 1,047.76** 863.38* 719.73*** 731.80*** 746.84*** 719.73*** 731.80*** 746.84***



















Central dummy –1.41*** –1.37*** –1.44*** –1.35*** –1.36*** –1.36*** –1.35*** –1.36*** –1.36***
(.12) (.13) (.13) (.12) (.11) (.12) (.12) (.11) (.22)
Inland dummy –2.14*** –2.27*** –2.27*** –2.05*** –2.06*** –2.05*** –1.91*** –2.06*** –2.05***
(.20) (.23) (.22) (.22) (.21) (.22) (.23) (.21) (.22)
Intercept –.66 –.23 –.30 –4.45** –4.28* –4.39* –4.45** –4.28* –4.39*
(1.99) (1.98) (1.85) (2.21) (2.20) (2.25) (2.21) (2.20) (2.25)
N 205 204 205 147 146 147 147 146 147
R2 .95 .95 .95 .97 .97 .97 .97 .97 .97
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; e stands for exponential notation.
*significant at 10% **significant at 5% ***significant at 1%
Dependent Variables
We use three annual provincial indicators of environmental pollution levels as
our outcome variables: sulfur dioxide (SO2) emission, soot emission, and solid
waste emission.29 To ensure that these measures are comparable across
provinces, we divide the raw data by the number of reporting enterprises in
each province and take their natural logarithm. Figures 4.2–4.4 present the av-
erage emission of sulfur dioxide, soot, and solid waste across Chinese provinces
between 1995 and 2004. We use pollution levels as our dependent variables be-
cause they capture both environmental regulatory stringency and the extent of
regulatory enforcement. Provincial-level measures are justi‹ed because provin-
cial of‹cials have the most leeway in the enforcement and implementation of
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TABLE 4.6c. Pollution Abatement Expenditure and FDI Inflow
Variable Model A Model B
GDP per capita .81*** .94***
(.21) (.21)
GDP growth –.02 –.03**
(.01) (.01)












Central dummy –1.16*** –1.22***
(.15) (.13)






Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*significant at 10% **significant at 5% *** significant at 1%
central government regulations. A visual examination of the data suggests that
provinces that have received more FDI do not necessarily have higher emissions
levels than those provinces that receive relatively less FDI.
To ensure the robustness of our analysis, we also include additional alter-
native pollution intensity measures: waste gas discharge, industrial dust emis-
sion, and industrial wastewater emission. Regression results for these alterna-
tive measures of environmental pollution are not as overwhelming as those
reported in this chapter, though they do not affect our interpretation of the ef-
fects of our key independent variables.30
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fig. 4.2. Spatial distribution of sulfur dioxide emission across provinces (tons),
1995–2004. (Data from China Statistical Yearbook, various years.)
Key Independent Variables
Consistent with previous works on the political economy of environmental
protection, we directly address industrial pollution determinants. But in a de-
parture from previous studies, we focus on the impact of both trade openness
and foreign direct investment. We develop two variables to tap the effects of in-
ternational economic integration on environmental protection in China: open-
ness and fdi. Openness is the sum of a province’s imports and exports divided by
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fig. 4.3. Spatial distribution of industrial soot emission across provinces (tons),
1995–2004. (Data from China Statistical Yearbook, various years.)
its GDP in a particular year. Since data on provincial GDP are based on the Chi-
nese currency yuan, and the trade data are recorded in U.S. dollars, we convert
the GDP data into U.S. dollars using historical average annual exchange rates.31
To determine if there are any systematic differences between the effects of
provincial export and import dependence on environmental protection, we
employ measures of each separately: the share of provincial imports in its GDP
(impgdp) and the share of provincial exports in its GDP (expgdp).
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fig. 4.4. Spatial distribution of industrial solid waste emission across provinces (10,000
tons), 1995–2004. (Data from China Statistical Yearbook, various years.)
Data on FDI is based on actual FDI in›ows into each of the Chinese
provinces. Since it is possible that provinces that offer better environmental
protection are also more likely to attract FDI in›ows, we include a lagged FDI
variable in our analysis. Lagged variables enable us to gauge the effects of FDI
and trade from the previous year on environmental outcomes in the following
year. The fdi, openness, impgdp, and expgdp variables are all lagged by one year.
Control Variables
We control for the following variables to address potential alternative explanations.
GDP per capita. GDP per capita taps the impact of economic develop-
ment on environmental protection. The environmental Kuznets curve (EKC)
argument posits that the rise in environmental pollution in developing coun-
tries should be accompanied by an initial increase in pollution levels, followed
by a decline at some economic threshold.32 From this perspective, the develop-
ment of pollution abatement or environmentally friendly technologies, in-
creases in demand for more stringent environmental policies, and a shrinking
manufacturing sector facilitated by economic development combine to im-
prove environmental protection. We include a lagged measure of annual
provincial GDP per capita.
Growth rate. Similarly, recent research emphasizes that economic devel-
opment should heighten the implementation of environmentally friendly poli-
cies.33 We include the annual percentage change in provincial GDP to account
for this possibility. A negative relationship is expected between growth rate and
each of the three pollution indicators.
Coal. Coal production is a key source of pollution in China34 and may po-
tentially confound any relationship we ‹nd between trade, foreign direct in-
vestment, and environmental protection. To control for the effect of coal pro-
duction on pollution levels, we create an annual dummy variable for the top ten
coal-producing regions.
SOE output share. Most foreign direct investment in China has gone into
light-manufacturing industries and is concentrated in southern and eastern
coastal provinces. In contrast, most inward-looking heavy and energy-related
industries (i.e., the heavy polluters) tend to be state-owned enterprises and his-
torically have been located in the northern and central regions. As regions with
a greater concentration of SOE production tend to generate more pollution,35
we include a variable that measures the share of a province’s industrial produc-
tion accounted for by state-owned enterprises.
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Personnel. The number of personnel charged with enforcement of envi-
ronmental laws and regulations is another factor that may potentially affect en-
vironmental enforcement capacities. Previous research has shown that admin-
istrative capacity has an important bearing on policy outcomes.36 It is
conceivable that more environmental enforcement personnel may help
strengthen environmental protection. Conversely, lower ratios of enforcement
personnel in a province’s population may prevent effective environmental
oversight. To measure the effect of enforcement personnel on pollution levels,
we include personnel, measured as the share of the environmental personnel in
a province’s total population. We take these data from the China Statistical
Yearbook.
Finally, we include two additional control variables following conventions in
the environmental pollution literature: land size and population density. Previ-
ous studies ‹nd that land size affects industrial usage.37 Similarly, greater popu-
lation density is often associated with higher pollution levels.38 We take the nat-
ural logarithm of provincial land area (in square kilometers) and the natural
logarithm of the annual provincial population density to gauge these effects.
All of the above variables are also lagged by one year to mitigate potential
endogeneity problems. We employ the same method for analyzing the pollu-
tion-haven hypothesis to assess the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis.
Results
Our key measures of foreign direct investment and trade openness hold up well
in all of the model speci‹cations reported in tables 4.7–4.9. Further, in all of the
model speci‹cations, our key independent variables (e.g., fdi, openness, impgdp,
and expgdp) consistently demonstrate a negative and statistically signi‹cant re-
lationship with our alternative measures of environmental pollution, and the
relationships are highly signi‹cant. The FDI variable increases the overall
goodness of ‹t by .05, .08, and .10 in Models 1A, 2A, and 3A, respectively;
whereas openness increases the adjusted R2 by .01, .01, and .11 in Models 1B, 2B,
and 3B, respectively.39
This suggests that far from leading to environmental degradation, integra-
tion into the world market via foreign direct investment and trade is associated
with pollution emission reduction. Moreover, the statistically signi‹cant effect
of trade openness is not an artifact of either import dependence or export de-
pendence, as measures of both demonstrate a negative and statistically
signi‹cant sign on alternative measures of pollution levels.
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Turning to the effect of other control variables, faster economic growth
seems to negatively impact emission levels, but growth rate is not statistically
signi‹cant except in Model 3C. There is some evidence that the level of eco-
nomic development, as measured by per capita GDP, tends to reduce pollution
emissions. GDP per capita is negatively associated with our alternative mea-
sures of pollution emission levels, and the relationships achieve statistical
signi‹cance in a few of the model speci‹cations. This result is consistent with
the view that economic development promotes environmental protection by
increasing the funding available for pollution abatement technology or by fos-
tering demand for environmentally friendly policies.
Land and population density are positively associated with pollution levels
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TABLE 4.7. Effect of Foreign Direct Investment and Trade Openness on
Sulfur Dioxide Emission
Variable Model 1A Model 1B Model 1C Model 1D
GDP per capita –.0002*** –.00009 –.0001 –.0002
(.00009) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
Growth rate .025 –.016 –.020 –.015
(.022) (.031) (.030) (.031)
Land .155* .239*** .287*** .221**
(.094) (.080) (.082) (.088)
Population density .238* .360*** .387*** .345***
(.128) (.069) (.072) (.072)
Coal –.101 –.076 –.063 –.071
(.080) (.102) (.102) (.104)
SOE output share .0002** –.00004 –.0006 –.00003
(.0001) (.0001) (.0008) (.0001)
Personnel  17.022 15.871 20.133 14.955









Intercept 4.220*** .880 .183 1.175
(1.590) (1.454) (1.465) (1.610)
N 178 184 184 184
R2 .892 .849 .838 .849
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*significant at 10% **significant at 5% *** significant at 1%
in Models 1 and 3, and the relationships are statistically signi‹cant. These re-
sults suggest that larger land areas and higher levels of population density may
increase the dif‹culties of environmental regulation.
The dummy variable representing the top ten coal-producing provinces in
China is positively associated with levels of industrial soot and solid waste
emission (Models 2 and 3), but the variable did not achieve statistical
signi‹cance. There is some evidence that provinces with a heavy concentration
of SOEs have higher emission levels as the SOE output share variable is posi-
tively associated with pollution levels in most model speci‹cations and is occa-
sionally statistically signi‹cant.
Contrary to our expectation, the percentage of environmental enforcement
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TABLE 4.8. Effect of Foreign Direct Investment and Trade Openness on
Industrial Soot Emission
Variable Model 2A Model 2B Model 2C Model 2D
GDP per capita –.0006*** –.0005** –.0005** –.0005***
(.0001) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002)
Growth rate –.006 –.027 –.026 –.027
(.042) (.035) (.034) (.035)
Land –.018 –.045 .004 –.057
(.222) (.278) (.284) (.289)
Population density –.074 –.094 –.065 –.104
(.236) (.306) (.309) (.316)
Coal .051 .089 .091 .093
(.168) (.170) (.169) (.176)
SOE output share .0003*** .0001 .0001 .0001
(.0001) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002)
Personnel 41.743*** 29.977* 33.789** 29.528









Intercept 7.496** 6.201 5.441 6.406
(3.240) (4.695) (4.783) (4.879)
N 177 183 183 183
R2 .576 .497 .490 .506
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*significant at 10% **significant at 5% ***significant at 1%
personnel in provincial population is positively associated with emission levels
and the relationship between these two variables is statistically signi‹cant
(Models 2 and 3). It is possible that the size of the environmental protection en-
forcement agencies is not directly correlated with enforcement capacity. As
Economy points out, the key agencies in charge of environmental protection in
China—the Ministry of Environmental Protection (formerly SEPA, updated to
ministerial level in 2008) and the local environmental protection bureaus
(EPBs)—are confronted with a number of challenges in their regulatory ef-
forts.40 For example, as part of the governmental restructuring in 1998, SEPA
experienced bureaucratic authority encroachment and received lower funding
and many staff cuts. The local EPBs in turn had limited resources and over-
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TABLE 4.9. Effect of Foreign Direct Investment and Trade Openness on
Solid Waste Emission
Variable Model 3A Model 3B Model 3C Model 3D
GDP per capita –.0002 –.00006 –.00004 –.0001
(.0001) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002)
Growth rate –.012 –.040 –.044* –.041
(.017) (.024) (.024) (.026)
Land .211** .266*** .326*** .279***
(.093) (.098) (.094) (.103)
Population density .118 .243*** .281*** .242***
(.105) (.091) (.092) (.090)
Coal .060 .056 .058 .059
(.066) (.072) (.072) (.076)
SOE output share .0002** .00003 2.25e-06 .00003
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
Personnel 27.596*** 35.540** 39.238*** 35.665**









Intercept –1.336 –4.180*** –5.093*** –4.322***
(1.484) (1.584) (1.545) (1.668)
N 207 214 214 214
R2 .263 .268 .220 .181
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; e stands for exponential notation.
*significant at 10% **significant at 5% ***significant at 1%
sight, inadequate inspection teams, and a problematic fee collection system.
The local EPBs’ effectiveness was further undermined by their greater account-
ability to local governments than to the SEPA, a typical problem in China’s sys-
tem of “fragmented authoritarianism.”41 These challenges indicate that the
number of personnel charged with environmental protection may not provide
a good indication of the enforcement capacity of the various administrative
agencies. Unfortunately, data limitations preclude us from obtaining adequate
alternative speci‹cations.
Robustness Checks
As a robustness check on our regression results, we include alternative measures
of our dependent variables: emission levels of waste gas, industrial wastewater,
and industrial dust. All of these variables are also taken from the China Statistical
Yearbook. Statistical analyses using these alternative measures of the dependent
variable yield very similar results to those reported in this chapter. FDI and trade
openness measures demonstrate a negative relationship with emission levels, and
the relationships are signi‹cant in most model speci‹cations.
In addition to estimating OLS models with PCSEs, we estimate Models 1–3
using the conventional feasible generalized least squares method. Estimation
results using this procedure do not differ substantially from those based on the
PCSEs. Most important, trade openness and foreign direct investment in›ows
retain their negative and statistically signi‹cant relationship with alternative
measures of environmental pollution levels. These ‹ndings indicate that inter-
national economic integration via trade and foreign direct investment is actu-
ally associated with decreased emission levels in China and that the effects are
independent of many potentially confounding variables.
Another potential concern about our statistical analysis is the existence of
multicollinearity. Table 4.10 presents the correlation matrix of key variables
used in our analysis of the RTB hypothesis. It indicates a relatively high level of
correlation between population density, land area, and GDP per capita that
may be of potential concern. We ran our models dropping these variables one
at a time to address this concern. The removal of these variables from the
model does not affect the signi‹cance of our key independent variables. It does
result in reduced R2s, which suggests that the full model better explains the
variation in observed pollution levels. Moreover, in view of the relatively high
level of correlation between GDP per capita and our alternative measures of
trade, export, and import openness, we regressed each of these key indepen-









































































































































































































































































































































































































dent variables on other independent variables. This procedure did not yield ev-
idence of alarmingly high R2s in each case.
Finally, to ensure that the results reported in this chapter are not distorted
by provinces with disproportionately large shares of China’s total trade and in-
vestment, we experimented running the models dropping Beijing, Shanghai,
and Guangdong one at a time from the sample. Once again, this procedure did
not alter our central ‹nding as indicators of trade openness and FDI in›ow
consistently demonstrate a negative relationship with pollution levels, and the
results are robust across model speci‹cations.
Discussion
In contrast to previous studies that examine the impact of either trade open-
ness or foreign direct investment on the environment, our analysis of the RTB
argument investigates the in›uence of both aspects of international market in-
tegration on industrial pollution levels in China. This is noteworthy because
the exclusion of one or the other reduces the likelihood of capturing the full ef-
fects of globalization on environmental protection.
Our results are consistent with the ‹ndings reported in Elizabeth Econ-
omy’s study of China’s environment. She suggests that, just as in other areas of
economic development, the Chinese government utilizes an approach to envi-
ronmental protection that emphasizes authority decentralization and in-
creased participation of private and international actors.42 She argues that this
strategy results in increasing cross-regional environmental protection discrep-
ancies. While a few regions with relatively high income levels, strong leadership,
and extensive links with the world economy experience enhanced local envi-
ronmental protection, other less-developed, less-integrated regions tend to in-
cur much greater environmental degradation.
Limitations
Our analysis focuses primarily on the pollution emission determinants. While
our results are supported by robustness tests, our analysis does not deal with
other aspects of environmental governance such as governmental policy-mak-
ing, environmental enforcement capacity, and the effects of corruption on local
environmental protection bureaus. Nor are we able to provide a full answer to
the question as to whether our results apply to different forms of environmen-
tal degradation such as deforestation. In addition, this study associates envi-
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ronmental protection in a particular region with the amount of foreign direct
investment received. Due to data limitations, we do not control for the poten-
tial for environmental degradation in one province to stem from foreign in-
vestment in another province. Future studies could extend this analysis to fur-
ther analyze the link between globalization and environmental governance in
China.
conclusion
The above empirical results are largely at odds with the pollution-haven and
race-to-the-bottom hypotheses. Our evidence suggests that the pollution-
haven hypothesis does not apply to the case of China. Rather than (re)directing
investment ›ows toward pollution havens, environmental regulatory strin-
gency does not appear to have a noticeable effect on investment decisions. In
some cases, MNCs actually seem to favor investing in provinces with higher
standards. Whether or not a rigorous regulatory environment actually attracts
investment is the subject of another study. However, our results lend substan-
tial support to the hypothesis that the institutional and social pressures for self-
regulation outweigh the ‹nancial bene‹ts correlated with pollution-haven in-
vestment. These pressures are generated from an array of sources, including
external pressure from consumers, potential investors, and corporate cus-
tomers, and internal pressure from shareholders. In addition, environmental
technology developed in response to higher standards in regulated markets can
be exported to subsidiaries in host countries. This increases operational
ef‹ciency and heightens competitive pressure on host-country ‹rms, and it di-
minishes the need for pollution-haven-seeking behavior.
Our ‹ndings challenge the conventional wisdom that globalization encour-
ages “industrial ›ight” from developed to developing countries to reap residual
cost bene‹ts of lax regulations. It also supports prior arguments that pollution
havens may be no more than a “popular myth.”43 Rather, globalization encour-
ages corporate self-regulatory strategy adoption, which, in turn, promotes the
development of global environmental norms. These effects may be suf‹cient to
supplant the need for a transnational environmental regulatory body such as
the WTO. As our results imply, communication technologies and external cor-
porate monitoring can encourage better ‹rm behavior through public aware-
ness of corporate activity; and MNCs ‹nd environmental self-regulation to be
more ‹nancially advantageous than the diminished sales and market values
that follow from dirty production.
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Our analysis of the effects of provincial trade openness and foreign direct
investment on industrial pollution levels yield similar but more robust conclu-
sions. Increased trade openness and foreign direct investment is actually posi-
tively associated with greater environmental protection. Our results suggest
that far from creating a race to the bottom, trade openness encourages envi-
ronmental protection via ‹rm self-regulation, technology transfer, and an im-
provement in ‹rm-level environmental regulatory and production standards
in order to ensure global export market accessibility. FDI fosters similar dy-
namics. Technology transfer and knowledge spillovers signi‹cantly improve
provincial environmental performance. Taken in concert, our ‹ndings suggest
that as the world shifts toward a more globalized market, environmental stan-
dards should also rise.
Our results support prior contentions on the relationship between trade,
the environment, and the environmental Kuznets curve.44 The scale of eco-
nomic activity in China has increased dramatically over the past two decades,
contributing to massive pollution problems (i.e., the scale effect). However, as
trade and foreign investment have increased, so too has the propensity to use
cleaner production processes, foster higher product standards, and adopt envi-
ronmental management systems and environmentally friendly technologies
(i.e., the technique effect). The cross-provincial variation in levels of trade, FDI,
and environmental pollution provides evidence of the technique effect at work
in China.45 With respect to the income effect, it is yet unclear as to precisely
what extent the increases in national income brought about by trade and in-
vestment contribute to increased demand for environmental protection. This is
a fruitful avenue for future research.
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chapter 5
Do Chinese Provinces “Trade Up” and “Invest Up”?
In this chapter, we analyze how regulatory pressure in primary export markets
and FDI source countries affects Chinese provincial environments. Our empir-
ical results demonstrate that provinces that export to or receive the bulk of their
investment from countries with superior environmental standards also tend to be
more environmentally responsible. In a re‹nement to our original argument, we
posit that for provincial environmental protection, speci‹c trade and invest-
ment partner identity matters, as investment ‹rms often replicate practices de-
veloped in response to home-country laws in host countries; and developing-
country exporters adapt product development and production strategies to
meet customer and consumer demands in export markets.
This hypothesis illustrates a more nuanced depiction of the environmental
effects of trade and FDI than those presented in previous chapters. Our empir-
ical test of the race-to-the-bottom argument essentially examines the impact of
the openness of a province to trade and FDI on that province’s environmental
performance, without considering the potential effects of trade partner and in-
vestor identity. In this chapter we move a step further by detailing how the en-
vironmental performance of a given province is shaped, at least in part, by the
environmental standards of the entities with which it interacts. Our empirical
analysis demonstrates that having trade and investment ties with environmen-
tally regulated countries positively affects local environmental protection. The
arguments presented in this chapter encompass two key components of eco-
nomic integration: the environmental impact of export destinations and the
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environmental effects of foreign investment source country. We elaborate the
rationale for each component of our main hypothesis in subsequent sections.
export destinations and the environmental
performance of chinese provinces
David Vogel’s “trading-up” argument posits that trade can serve as a vehicle for
transmitting importing countries’ environmental (product) standards to ex-
porting countries.1 In this view, trade partner identity matters as much as trade
volume. We extend Vogel’s argument to include process as well as product stan-
dards, and provide theoretical and empirical support that importer regulatory
stringency positively affects both product and process standards in exporting
countries.
Product Standards
An oft-touted argument claims that producers in environmentally regulated
jurisdictions are disadvantaged with respect to competitors in less regulated
economies. Free trade between regulated and unregulated countries, it is
claimed, exacerbates this disadvantage by placing all ‹rms on an equal footing
within a single market regardless of regulatory outlays at the production origin.
Preservation of environmental regulations is costly and can undermine the
‹nancial position of regulated producers. If this insight is correct, then regu-
lated ‹rms have a strong incentive to relocate production operations to unreg-
ulated jurisdictions or “pollution havens.”2 In fact, scholars have demonstrated
that stringent regulation can have a signi‹cant effect on trade ›ows.3
To combat the potential for an “industrial ›ight” toward pollution havens,
and to meet the demands of corporate lobbies and environmental groups, gov-
ernments have the option of either imposing tariffs or nontariff barriers
(NTBs) on imports that don’t meet certain environmental or consumer safety
regulations, or deregulating to reduce domestic production costs. However, as
environmental concerns and product safety issues continue to take a promi-
nent position in the public eye of developed countries, product deregulation is
declining in political salience. In order to maintain reduced import prices, do-
mestic importers have an incentive to counter with lobbies for deregulation;
however, they often face uphill battles against “Baptist and Bootlegger” coali-
tions formed by domestic producers and environmental NGOs.4 This position
gives domestic producers the moral authority of environmental and consumer
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protection, and it provides them with important environmental political sup-
port in their lobbying efforts. In this respect, trade with environmentally regu-
lated countries can act as a boon for the elevation of product standards.
If governments impose regulation as more of a protectionist rather than
safety measure,5 injured producers, assuming WTO membership, can ‹le a
complaint of protectionism in disguise. However, litigation can be an extremely
lengthy and costly process, diminishing it as an option to many small and
medium-sized producers in developing countries.6 Therefore, in lieu of ade-
quate government regulation, export producers in poorly regulated jurisdic-
tions have ‹nancial incentive to improve their environmental conduct in order
to meet higher product standards in regulated markets. Competitive advantage
is conferred upon exporting ‹rms in less-regulated jurisdictions who are better
able to meet the regulatory requirements of developed markets and produce
environmentally sound products. Indeed, it has been demonstrated that regu-
lation in the form of green tariffs or NTBs imposed by importing countries
compels foreign producers to maintain product standards consistent with their
most regulated markets of operation, a practice David Vogel termed the “Cali-
fornia Effect.”7 Although Vogel initially applied the California Effect argument
to trade and regulatory convergence among developed countries, we argue that
this effect can also apply to trade between developed and developing countries.
If this is true, then international trade can enable convergence of environmen-
tal product standards across political jurisdictions and offer competitive ad-
vantage to those better able to meet higher standards.
Production Processes
Firms have an incentive to regulate their export products to meet governmen-
tal regulatory requirements in developed markets in order to maintain unim-
peded market access abroad. However, export-oriented ‹rms in less regulated
jurisdictions also have competitive incentive to regulate their process and pro-
duction methods (PPM) to accommodate the public (and corporate) will of
developed export markets. Speci‹cally, we are referring to ‹rms that supply di-
rectly to developed markets, supply to multinationals that sell in developed
markets, and/or act as corporate subsidiaries in less-regulated economies. Be-
cause adverse environmental conditions in developing countries caused by ex-
cessive industrial pollution are coming under heightened scrutiny from con-
sumer and environmental NGOs and corporate watchdog groups in the
developed world, MNCs with extensive suppliers and subsidiary operations in
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developing countries have a strong incentive to elevate PPM standards
throughout the supply chain.
When major MNC suppliers in poorly regulated countries come under
public ‹re for execrable environmental practices, MNCs are faced with the
choice of a continuing loss of sales and public diminution of brand credibility,
changing suppliers, or mandating higher PPM standards on existing suppliers.
There is a range of factors that can in›uence the ‹rm’s decision on a speci‹c
course of action. However, the threat of loss of corporate supply contracts for
many small and medium-sized developing-country producers can mean the
difference, in a relative sense, between clean and dirty production. The regula-
tory requirements mandated by the MNC, and ultimately the consumers, can
cascade down the supply chain and in›uence the actions of ‹rms in less-regu-
lated economies. In such a case the premise of signi‹cant competitive advantage
conferred by participatory ‹rms remains the same as with product standards. In
fact the greening of the supply chain, as it is known, has the potential to marshal
‹nancial bene‹ts for the MNC in terms of enhanced corporate image through
public accountability and responsible environmental stewardship, an increase
in existing market shares, and the exploitation of new green markets.8
The convergence of these forces places strong pressure on MNCs to seek
out suppliers with superior environmental performance records, and on sup-
plier operations to maintain PPM standards consistent with regulations in the
most progressive markets of MNC operation. Considering the fact that a large
portion of all trade among developed and developing nations occurs in the
form of contract relationships, the environmental effects of green accountabil-
ity and supply chain management could be quite signi‹cant.
While the empirical evidence on the overall competitive advantage proffered
by green supply chain management (GSCM) is mixed, the strong theoretical
foundations outlined here have led researchers to develop extensive economic
models demonstrating potential bene‹ts.9 Importantly, recent empirical evi-
dence of the advantages of green supply chain management among ‹rms oper-
ating in Southeast Asia suggests that GSCM signi‹cantly increases the competi-
tive advantage and subsequently the economic performance of the ‹rm.10
To reiterate, trade can exert upward pressure on the environmental product
and production standards in less regulated, export-based economies contin-
gent upon importing-country environmental standards. On the basis of the
above discussion, we derive the ‹rst component of our overall argument in this
chapter (hypothesis 1): Provinces that export to countries with stringent environ-
mental standards tend to adopt more environmentally friendly policies.
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fdi source country and chinese 
provincial environments
We further posit that FDI from countries with stringent environmental regula-
tions can act as a vehicle for the diffusion of those practices to host countries.
This challenges the conventional view of globalization critics who maintain
that competition for FDI exerts pressure on national governments to weaken
domestic regulation. When MNCs from heavily regulated countries transmit
home regulatory standards to subsidiaries operating in China, it should im-
prove environmental conditions in provincial FDI destinations.
Whether globalization induces a convergence or divergence in corporate
practices is a useful way to approach the environmental impact of FDI. Advo-
cates of the convergence theory posit that economic integration results in a
common model of economic activities as international competition, globaliza-
tion, and regional integration generate pressure for similar patterns of eco-
nomic behavior across the globe, resulting in “common institutional con‹gu-
rations and ways of organizing the economy.”11 While cross-national variations
may persist due to different historical legacies, they are likely to “fade over time,
giving way to common economic structures whose ef‹ciency and universality
produce superior strength in the market.”12 In this view, FDI is likely to en-
courage the adoption of common corporate practices across the globe as MNC
subsidiaries are expected to operate according to a uniform set of corporate
practices instead of behaving in a country-speci‹c manner. In sum, advocates
of convergence posit that globalization can generate pressure for uniform cor-
porate practices around the world, mediated by local institutional contexts.13
In contrast, advocates of the divergence perspective emphasize that coun-
try-level practices and institutions are often embedded in speci‹c cultural and
historical contexts and can represent an internal struggle among domestic in-
terest groups. As globalization threatens the interests of groups negatively im-
pacted by the convergence of economic norms and activities, these status-quo-
oriented groups are likely to organize in opposition to such changes. Con›icts
between those in favor of and those against globalization therefore make it pos-
sible for divergent models of corporate governance to emerge.14
FDI can lead to cross-country divergence in corporate practices in a num-
ber of ways. First, in part due to domestic resistance to convergence, MNC sub-
sidiaries may seek to adapt their behavior to the expectations of the host gov-
ernments and mold their practices in a way that is consistent with the
prevailing practices in the host country.15 For example, through an analysis of
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the behavior of the largest U.S. af‹liates of foreign ‹rms in manufacturing,
‹nancial, and services sectors, Hansen and Mitchell found that far from con-
verging to uniform patterns of behavior, ‹rms often adapt their practices to the
host political economy.16
Second, as MNC subsidiaries develop operating standards in response to
home-country regulatory requirements, they are likely to reproduce these prac-
tices in host countries. Consequently, the substantial cross-national variation
in the practices of the home country of FDI should be replicated in the recipi-
ent countries.17 Pauly and Reich contend that “the domestic structures within
which a ‹rm initially develops leave a permanent imprint on its strategic be-
havior.” Through a study of the behavior of ‹rms based in the United States,
Japan, and Germany, they conclude that as different national institutions and
ideological traditions continue to exert strong in›uence on corporate deci-
sions, MNCs continue to diverge “fairly systematically” in their internal gover-
nance and corporate structure and strategy.18
MNCs can also in›uence host-country practices by creating externalities
for host-country ‹rms. Previous studies have shown that MNCs can diffuse
their home-country practices through a host country either by demonstrating
the effectiveness of these standards or by requiring their local suppliers to abide
by the same standards.19 In addition, MNCs can transfer technology to local
‹rms and boost the productivity of local ‹rms by generating backward linkages
and through worker training provision.
The “industrial organization” approach to FDI posits that the exploitation of
‹rm-speci‹c, intangible assets such as technological know-how, marketing and
managing skills, and reputation is an important factor underlying multinational
‹rms’ investment decisions.20 Given that intangible assets are gained through ex-
perience, they can be transferred at a reasonable cost to host-country subsidiaries
instead of being licensed to unaf‹liated host-country ‹rms. In this view, host-
country ‹rms may improve their productive ef‹ciency and reduce average costs
of production by learning from foreign ‹rms and their subsidiaries.
Worker mobility and technical support can also be signi‹cant channels for
knowledge spillovers.21 Workers employed by foreign-invested enterprises that
acquire knowledge through foreign-‹rm production-process exposure or tech-
nical on-the-job training have the capacity, and occasionally the ‹nancial in-
centive, to leave. In doing so, they are able to bring their knowledge and exper-
tise to future domestic employers. Through this channel, knowledge of more
environmentally ef‹cient production processes can be transferred to host-
country ‹rms. Technical support provided by either upstream or downstream
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foreign ‹rms to domestic ‹rms could serve a similar function by contributing
to the absorption of new production techniques.22 Several empirical studies
have found evidence that FDI may result in the spillover of superior knowledge
to ‹rms located in the host country.23 The combination of these mechanisms
should lead us to expect MNCs to transfer prevailing practices and standards in
the home country to the host country.
In short, MNCs replicate the prevailing environmental policies and proce-
dures in their home countries in order to streamline production costs. Through
this process, they are able to generate positive externalities for the host econ-
omy via technology transfer, worker training, technical support, and produc-
tivity increases. These insights yield the second component of our overall argu-
ment (hypothesis 2): Provinces that receive more FDI from home countries with
stringent environmental standards tend to adopt more environmentally friendly
policies.
ISO 14001
In our empirical analysis, we use the ISO 14001 adoption rate of the export des-
tination country and FDI source country, normalized by GDP, as a proxy for
domestic environmental regulatory standards. The ISO 14001 is a series of en-
vironmental management standards created by the International Standards
Organization. Because it is a voluntary program, ‹rm adoption may signal the
importance of corporate environmental responsibility to consumers, conse-
quently making it an ideal proxy.
Established in 1946, the Geneva-based international organization issues
both speci‹cations that normalize product standards and metastandards that
standardize procedures. The adoption of the ISO 9000 series in 1987 represents
the ‹rst systematic international effort by business and government actors to
create management standards on a global basis and has since then helped to
improve global management practices. While adoption and compliance with
such standards remain voluntary, failure to observe them threatens to impose
both reputational costs and costs associated with denial of key international
markets. The adoption of ISO 14000 in 1996 represents a similar process. By
stipulating a set of criteria for certi‹cation, ISO 14000 commits a certi‹ed party
to comply with veri‹able regulatory standards, thus encouraging the pursuit
and implementation of environmental corporate practices.24
We normalize the ISO adoption data by the GDP of a given country be-
cause higher ISO 14001 adoption numbers may re›ect factors other than regu-
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latory stringency such as country size.25 Thus, with the normalized ISO data, it
is expected that exporting to or having investment from countries with a higher
rate of ISO adoption according to the size of their GDP is likely to positively
impact the environmental performance of a province.
statistical analysis
To test the above hypotheses, we use a research design similar to the one used to
test the race-to-the-bottom argument. Our key dependent variable is the
provincial rate of ISO 14001 adoption for each of the years from 2004 to 2007.
Data on provincial-level ISO 14001 adoption rate is taken from the China Na-
tional Accreditation Service for Conformity Assessment (CNASCA).26 Figure
5.1 presents the distribution of ISO 14001 adoption rate by province between
2004 and 2007.
We develop measures of a province’s bilateral export context and its bilat-
eral FDI context on the basis of the volume of provincial exports and FDI by
source country.27 The trading-up argument should lead us to expect a given
province’s environmental standards to be in›uenced by its net exports as well
as by the ISO 14001 adoption levels in its main export markets. To measure a
province’s export context, we ‹rst take the square of the share of a province’s
exports to a given destination country in the province’s total exports and mul-
tiply it by the ISO adoption rate in that export destination country. We then av-
erage the above ‹gure for all the export destination countries of that province.
This allows us to test our hypothesis regarding the bilateral export context of a
given jurisdiction. A province’s bilateral export context is calculated as follows:
Bilateral exports weighted by ISO adoptionit = ∑j
ISOjt × (Exportsij / 
Exportsi )
2
where ISOjt is the number of ISO certi‹cations in country j in year t, Exportsij 
is province i’s exports to country j in year t, and Exportsi is province i’s total ex-
ports in year t.
From the country-of-origin school’s perspective, the host’s environmental
performance is in›uenced not only by the overall amount of FDI but also by
the ISO 14001 adoption levels in the FDI source countries (hypothesis 2). To
measure a province’s bilateral FDI context, we take the percentage of FDI that a
province receives from a given country in the province’s total incoming FDI in
a given year and multiply it by the ISO adoption rate in the FDI home country.
We then average the above ‹gure for all the countries investing in that province.
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This allows us to test our hypothesis regarding the bilateral FDI context of a
given province. We calculate each province’s bilateral investment context as fol-
lows.
Bilateral FDI weighted by ISO adoptionit = ∑j
ISOjt × (FDIij / FDIi)
2
where ISOjt is the number of ISO certi‹cations in country j in year t, FDIij is the
total FDI province i receives from country j in year t, and FDIi is the total
amount of FDI province i receives from all source countries in year t.
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fig. 5.1. ISO 14001 registered enterprises across Chinese provinces, 2004–7. (Data from
China National Accreditation Service for Conformity Assessment.)
We also include a province’s total exports and total FDI to tap the environ-
mental effect of overall exports and FDI. These variables are expdep and FDI,
and measure the share of a province’s total exports and total FDI in›ows di-
vided by GDP.
In addition, we include the following control variables that may potentially
in›uence the rate of ISO 14001 adoption at the provincial level into our analysis.
Emission variables. There may be more demand for environmental pro-
tection in provinces with higher pollution levels. If so, then ‹rms should adopt
more environmentally friendly policies in response to public pressure for more
regulation. Consequently, we use alternative measures of pollution emissions,
such as the emission levels of SO2, soot, and solid waste, as proxies for the
provincial pollution levels to account for this possibility.28
GDP. It is reasonable to expect provinces with more certi‹able facilities to
have higher ISO 14001 adoption rates. While one may best proxy the number of
certi‹able facilities by the number of industrial enterprises in a province, the
data reported by the China Statistical Yearbook nevertheless contains consider-
able gaps. Consequently, we use the gross domestic product (GDP) of a
province as a proxy of the number of its potentially certi‹able facilities.
GDP per capita. The level of economic development of a province is ex-
pected to positively affect its ISO 14001 adoption rate, as wealth increases
should generate demand for greater environmental protection.29 As ISO 14001
adoption can signal ‹rms’ willingness to reduce the negative environmental ex-
ternalities of production, wealthier provinces should be expected to have
higher rates of ISO 14001 adoption.
Per capita GDP 2. Following Prakash and Potoski,30 we square provincial
GDP per capita and include it as a covariate to account for the possibility of a
curvilinear relationship between economic development and environmental
protection along the lines of the environmental Kuznets curve.31
Because provincial ISO adoption data are available only for the more recent
years (i.e., 2004–7), while country-speci‹c export and FDI data are only avail-
able for earlier years (i.e., 2001–5), we lag all of the above independent variables
by three years in order to make maximum use of the data.
Statistical Method
Because our dependent variable is a count variable, we run negative binomial
models of provincial ISO 14001 adoption rates. We assume that registering for
ISO 14001 entails commitment by ‹rms in terms of personnel and logistics.
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Consequently the factors that in›uence the occurrence of the ‹rst “event”
should similarly in›uence the occurrence of subsequent events. Moreover, our
data dispersion suggests that the negative binomial model is more appropriate
than the Poisson model for the purposes of our analysis.
To increase the robustness of our analysis, we run models both with and
without provincial “‹xed effects.” We include provincial ‹xed effects in a varia-
tion of our model speci‹cations to address the possibility that the independent
variables do not fully account for provincial differences. Scholars have debated
the pros and cons of employing ‹xed effects for panel analysis. Fixed effects
control for the in›uence of unit-speci‹c (province in this case) variables not
addressed by the other covariates in the model. Opponents of using ‹xed ef-
fects in the models acknowledge the usefulness of ‹xed effects in certain situa-
tions but argue that if covariates that are expected to in›uence cross-sectional
variations in the dependent variable do not vary suf‹ciently over time, which is
the case in our analysis, then there are costs involved in using ‹xed effects.32
Moreover, ‹xed effects chew up substantial degrees of freedom, making esti-
mates of standard errors and other coef‹cients less precise. In light of these
criticisms, we estimate the models with and without ‹xed effects. In models
without ‹xed effects, we include a dummy variable for the central, inland, and
coastal regions, respectively, to control for any ‹xed effects that may exist at the
regional level. Our coding of the regional dummy variable follows the research
done by Chen, as described in chapter 4.33 Regression results from these two
sets of models are similar and do not substantially affect the interpretation of
our results.
Results
Models I–III in table 5.1 present results from negative binomial models without
‹xed effects at the regional level. Models IV–VI present negative binomial esti-
mates with regional ‹xed effects. The most notable result is that the variable
measuring the bilateral FDI context at the provincial level is statistically
signi‹cant in Models I, II, III, and VI, and the variable measuring the bilateral
export context at the provincial level is statistically signi‹cant in Models II, III,
V, and VI. Both variables are positively signed as well. These results are in line
with our theoretical expectations, indicating that provinces that export pri-
marily to or receive the bulk of their FDI from countries with high levels of ISO
14001 adoption are also more likely to evince high levels of ISO 14001 adoption.
Other control variables performed well too. With the exception of soot
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emission, our alternative measures of pollution emission (i.e., SO2 emission and
solid waste emission) are positively associated with ISO 14001 adoption rate, and
the relationships are statistically signi‹cant. This result is in line with our theo-
retical expectation, indicating that a higher level of pollution is likely to gener-
ate greater demand for environmentally friendly policies.
Using provincial GDP as a proxy of the number of certi‹able facilities in a
province, we found that provincial GDP is positively associated with ISO 14001
adoption rate, and the relationship is statistically signi‹cant at the p < 0.001
level across model speci‹cations. This suggests that ISO 14001 adoption rate
corresponds positively to the number of potentially certi‹able facilities in a ju-
risdiction.
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TABLE 5.1. Negative Binomial Models of ISO 14001 Adoption





Solid waste .070** .059*
(.032) (.029)
GDP .2000*** .194*** .186*** .197*** .202*** .194***
(.013) (.019) (.012) (.016) (.016) (.016)
GDP per capita .0002** .0002** .0004** .0003*** .0002** .0004**
(.0001) (.0001) (.0002) (.0001) (.0001) (.0002)
Per capita GDP2 –2.21e-08 –1.02e-08 –7.17e-08 –3.56e-08 –2.36e-08 –6.62e-08
(2.58e-08) (3.01e-08) (4.31e-08)* (2.79e-08) (2.90e-08) (4.42e-08)
Bilateral 9.99e-07* 1.21e-06** 1.27e-06** 7.54e-07 7.04e-07 9.72e-07*
FDI (5.42e-07) (6.05e-07) (5.01e-07) (4.95e-07) (6.31e-07) (5.82e-07)
context
Bilateral export 2.95e-06 5.19e-06** 4.41e-06* 3.11e-06 4.99e-06** 4.21e-06*
context (2.57e-06) (2.65e-06) (2.58e-06) (2.36e-06) (2.33e-06) (2.39e-06)
Coastal dummy –.098**
(.044)
Central dummy .060 –.046 .010
(.045) (.056) (.040)
Inland dummy .059 .058
(.048) (.046)
Constant –.983*** –.552*** –.615*** –1.021*** –.632*** –.717
(.163) (.110) (.148) (.119) (.121)
N 46 45 46 46 45 46
Wald chi2 2,203.10 437.61 1,155.93 1,955.18 1,304.04 4,488.64
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; e stands for exponential notation.
*significant at 10% **significant at 5% *** significant at 1%
GDP per capita at the provincial level is likewise positively associated with
the ISO 14001 adoption rate, and the relationship is statistically signi‹cant
across model speci‹cations. This ‹nding lends support to arguments empha-
sizing the positive environmental spillovers of economic development. How-
ever, while we found the expected positive relationship between GDP per capita
and ISO 14001 adoption, the effect of per capita GPD 2 on ISO 14001 adoption ap-
pears more tenuous. Per capita GDP 2 has a negative sign across model speci‹-
cations, potentially supporting the inverted U-shaped relationship between
economic development and environmental protection along the lines of the
environmental Kuznets curve, whereby economic growth will help to clean up
the environment only after a certain threshold of income level has been
reached. However, this variable is only statistically signi‹cant in Model III.
Robustness Checks
As a robustness check of our key ‹ndings, we use alternative measures of actual
pollution emissions at the provincial level as our key dependent variables. The
choice of such an outcome variable may be defended on the ground that policy
outcomes in large part provide an indication of the regulatory environment as
industries located in provinces with more stringent regulations are likely to
emit less than their counterparts in less heavily regulated provinces, other
things being equal.34
In other words, we infer that economic interactions with countries with su-
perior regulatory standards should encourage ‹rms in a host province to adopt
sound microlevel environmental standards, which would in turn help to curb
pollution in this province. As provincial pollution emissions are simply aggre-
gate reports of individual ‹rm emissions and do not account for emissions
elsewhere such as vehicle or consumer emissions, they provide an adequate
proxy for ‹rm-level behavior.
In this set of tests, we adopt alternative measures of the emission of sulfur
dioxide (SO2), solid waste, and waste gas among Chinese provinces as depen-
dent variables. We include a set of control variables that were utilized in our
analysis of the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis in chapter 4 in this set of analy-
ses. To reiterate, these variables are GDP per capita, GDP growth rate, SOE out-
put share, land, population density, the share of environmental personnel in a
province’s total population, and a dummy variable for the top ten coal-produc-
ing provinces. All of these variables are measured at the province-year level.
We estimate the conventional generalized least squares model for cross-sec-
Do Chinese Provinces “Trade Up” and “Invest Up”? / 109
tional time-series data. In addition, while we have assumed that observations
across provinces are independent, it is possible that observations within
provinces are not independent, resulting in heteroskedasticity across provinces
and inef‹cient estimates. To account for this possibility, the models employ ro-
bust standard errors adjusted for clustering within provinces.
Tables 5.2 and 5.3 present our random- and ‹xed-effect estimation results,
respectively. In all of the model speci‹cations, the variables representing aggre-
gate FDI and exports at the provincial level hold up well. With a couple of ex-
ceptions, expgdp and FDI have the expected negative sign with the emission
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TABLE 5.2. Bilateral Export and FDI Contexts and Pollution Emissions at the Provincial
Level (without fixed effects)
Solid Waste Waste-
Waste Soot Dust SO2 Gas water
Variable (1A) (1B) (1C) (1D) (1E) (1F)
GDP per capita .001*** –.0005** –.001*** –.0005*** .000*** .000
(.000) (.0002) (.000) (.001) (.000) (.0001)
Growth rate .000 –.163** .055 .088* .066** –.135***
(.043) (.064) (.064) (.046) (.029) (.038)
Land .574*** –.263 .107 .060 .048 .183**
(.134) (.170) (.169) (.122) (.069) (.086)
Population .508*** –.318** .189 .311** .024 0.199**
density (.110) (.161) (.142) (.130) (.070) (.079)
SOE output .000 .0004*** .000 .0003*** .000*** .000
share (.000) (.0001) (.000) (.0007) (.000) (8.01e-05)
Coal .018 –.191 –.238** –.082 –.051 –.348***
(.064) (.129) (.107) (.080) (.070) (0.070)
Personnel 6.458 37.870* 17.019 –.724 4.650 –10.264
(10.342) (20.451) (15.951) (14.215) (11.179) (11.115)
EXPGDP –.016*** –.011* .003 .003 –.004* –.006
(.004) (.006) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.004)
FDI –.467*** –.190** –.297*** –.362*** –.296*** –.070
(.073) (.105) (.091) (.067) (.037) (.054)
Weighted –4.76e-07 –.933e-07** 1.00e-06** –2.71e-07 –9.17e-07*** –6.32e-07*
export (4.95e-07) (4.61e-07) (5.11e-07) (2.74e-07) (1.37e-07) (3.73e-07)
Weighted FDI –7.59e-08 –6.42e-07*** –6.58e-08 3.78e-08 –9.25e-08 4.70e-08
(6.25e-08) (1.24e-07) (5.32e-08) (2.75e-08) (9.85e-08) (3.21e-08)
Constant –4.923** 13.270*** 5.810** 6.295*** 2.326** 2.534*
(1.963) (2.554) (2.639) (1.920) (1.155) (1.531)
N 91 90 91 91 91 91
Log
likelihood –4.226 –22.431 –20.289 –4.226 14.969 3.651
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; e stands for exponential notation.
*significant at 10% **significant at 5% ***significant at 1%
TABLE 5.3. Regression Results with Fixed Effects
Solid 
SO2 Soot Dust Waste Waste Gas
Variable (2A) (2B) (2C) (2D) (2E)
GDP per capita .000 –.001*** .000 .001*** .0005
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.0002) (.0001)
Growth rate –.003 –.154*** .057 –.015 .060**
(.040) (.059) (.089) (.048) (.029)
Land .477*** –.278 .660*** .758 .295***
(.116) (.177) (.229) (.161) (.082)
Population .573*** –.297* .720*** .729*** .290***
density (.109) (.161) (.214) (.140) (.078)
SOE output 4.60e–06 .000*** –.0005* –.0004** –.00002
share (.0001) (.000) (.000) (.0002) (.00007)
Coal –.247*** –.163 –.180 .089*** –.029***
(.053) (.118) (.171) (.079) (.057)
Personnel 7.699 34.447** 39.488 47.349** 8.872
(9.112) (16.767) (24.060) (15.662) (42.003)
EXPGDP –.001 –0.012** .002 –.015** –.004
(.002) (.006) (.005) (.005) (.003)
FDI –.348*** –.225** –.217* –.359*** –.334***
(.067) (.095) (.132) (.092) (.045)
Weighted –1.05e-07 –9.84e-07** .000 –9.22e-07** –1.19e-06***
export (3.07e-07) (4.82e-07) (.000) (4.71e-07) (2.40e-07)
Weighted FDI 3.26e-09 –4.50e-07*** .000 –3.23e-08*** –2.61e-08
(2.60e-08) (1.43e-07) (.000) (4.55e-08) (3.10e-08)
Coastal dummy .031 1.095** .215 .242* .813
(.098) (.502) (.283) (.137) (.079)
Inland dummy .224* .934* .922** .613** .777***
(.118) (.516) (.398) (.201) (.117)
Central dummy –.557*** 1.001** .217 .238** .475***
(.086) (.488) (.268) (.111) (.079)
Constant .712 12.736*** –4.947 –9.699*** –2.216***
(1.850) (2.760) (4.144) (2.692) (1.357)
N 91 90 91 91 91
Log
likelihood 15.639 –14.716 –38.325 –9.699 28.286
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; e stands for exponential notation.
*significant at 10% **significant at 5% ***significant at 1%
variables, and the relationships are statistically signi‹cant in most model
speci‹cations. Importantly, there is some evidence that export destinations
matter as the weighted export variable is negatively associated with pollution
emission variables, and the relationships are signi‹cant in most model
speci‹cations. The variable representing the bilateral FDI context is in the ex-
pected direction in most model speci‹cations, and the relationships are statis-
tically signi‹cant in Models 1B, 2B, and 2D. While the weighted FDI variable did
not achieve statistical signi‹cance in the rest of the models, its sign is in the ex-
pected direction. This lends support to our hypotheses that it matters as to
where each province is sending its exports and from whom it is receiving the
foreign investment.
Turning to the effects of other variables in the model, it should be noted
that the signs of most control variables are in the expected direction. The share
of state-owned enterprises in a province’s GDP is positively associated with the
emission variables in most model speci‹cations and is statistically signi‹cant in
some. Provincial population density and land area are positively associated
with the pollution variables in most model speci‹cations, and the relationships
are occasionally signi‹cant. The variable representing the share of environ-
mental personnel in a province’s population has demonstrated a positive sign
with the emission variables and has reached statistical signi‹cance in Models
1B, 2B, and 2D. This counterintuitive result may be explained by the ‹nancial
and human resource constraints faced by the local environmental protection
agencies. As local environmental protection agencies face myriad challenges
with regard to funding and monitoring capacity, the number of personnel
charged with environmental protection may not provide a good indication of
the enforcement capacity of the various administrative agencies. Finally, the
per capita GDP and GDP growth rate of a province demonstrate contradictory
signs in the models, making it dif‹cult to draw de‹nite conclusions about the
in›uence of these variables on the environment in China.
discussions
This chapter ‹nds that provinces that send most of their exports to or receive
the bulk of their investment from countries with more rigorous environmental
standards also tend to more actively pursue voluntary environmental standards
certi‹cation. This result is independent of the net effect of aggregate provincial
exports or that of total incoming FDI. It is also consistent with Vogel’s Califor-
nia Effect argument, supporting the view that when developed countries with
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stringent environmental standards absorb the bulk of developing-country ex-
ports, free trade can lead to the ratcheting-up of environmental standards in
developing countries. Such ‹ndings lend further support to the argument that
foreign direct investment can encourage the diffusion of organizational prac-
tices from the home country to the host country. To the extent that there is
cross-national variation in home-country practices, this should result in the di-
vergence of corporate behavior across national borders.
The above discussions have direct implications for the pollution-haven and
race-to-the-bottom arguments. Advocates of the pollution-haven argument
maintain that industries ›ock to areas of lax environmental regulation in the
developing world to reduce business costs. They blame the so-called industrial
›ight on overly stringent regulation in the home country and view relaxations
of domestic regulation as a way of ameliorating the problem.35 In a similar vein,
environmentalists argue that as free trade abets regulatory races, it is necessary
to implement “fair trade” so as to relieve the burdens that stringent domestic
regulations impose on domestic ‹rms.36
Advocates of globalization take a different approach to this issue, arguing
that MNCs often transfer technologies and management practices shaped by
those adopted in the home country in order to streamline production costs in
different locations and maximize ‹rm ef‹ciency. Furthermore, by adopting
corporate practices in line with those of the home country and by adopting en-
vironmentally friendly technologies and practices, MNC subsidiaries should
exhibit superior environmental practices relative to local ‹rms. In addition,
host-country governments, nongovernmental organizations, and other local
stakeholders may exert pressure on MNCs to adopt environmentally friendly
practices, instigating MNCs to maintain green standards in their operations.37
Consequently, if hypothesis 2 is valid, then this should lend further support to
the contentions of globalization optimists about how foreign investment gen-
erates positive environmental spillovers in the host country, especially if such
investment originates from a home country with superior environmental stan-
dards and performance.
In addition to the theoretical contributions, the above ‹ndings have policy
implications for environmental groups dedicated to promoting a greener world.
Importantly, environmental groups argue that international trade creates struc-
tural conditions leading to regulatory races as developing countries’ exporters
exploit their allegedly less stringent environmental standards to capture markets
in developed countries. They believe that governments in developed countries
are likely to come under pressure from their constituents to level the playing
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‹eld by diluting domestic environmental laws. As a result, free trade encourages
races to the bottom in governments’ environmental regulations.
However, if our argument, based on a case study of China, is valid, then a
case can be made that the importing countries are in›uencing the organiza-
tional practices in the exporting countries. As well, actors in developed coun-
tries are able to transfer prevailing corporate practices at home to developing
countries. Consequently, for governments in the developing world, this means
that more attention needs to be paid to the source country of FDI in order to
bring in foreign investment that best serves the nation’s speci‹c needs.
Similarly, while many nongovernmental organizations striving to safeguard
the environment are less than sanguine about FDI growth, this research em-
phasizes the potential environmental bene‹ts that FDI can bring to a host
country. Consequently NGOs may need to consider how to best maximize
MNCs’ potential positive externalities in the host economies by lobbying the
MNCs in their home countries. It is possible that by exerting pressure on
MNCs to require their suppliers in the host economy to adopt environmentally
friendly criteria, NGOs and other actors interested in promoting the environ-
mental cause can better enhance their chances of in›uencing the environmen-
tal standards in the host country and achieve their goal of bringing about a
greener world.




How Do Firms Behave? Survey Evidence 
from Business Executives
This chapter supplements our provincial-level analyses with a survey of Chi-
nese business executives’ attitudes toward environmental protection and the
motivations, costs, and bene‹ts of implementing environmentally sound busi-
ness strategies. The survey results lend substantial support to our key hypothe-
ses about the ratcheting-up effect of trade and FDI on environmental standards
in China. In line with our expectations, we ‹nd that foreign-invested enter-
prises (FIEs), including both wholly foreign-owned ‹rms and joint ventures
(JVs), are more likely to demonstrate a higher level of environmental responsi-
bility in business decision making than wholly domestically owned ‹rms (WD-
OFs). This result also holds for domestic ‹rms that export a signi‹cant propor-
tion of their products to developed countries and those that supply a signi‹cant
proportion of their products to developed-world multinational customers
based in China. These ‹ndings lend additional support to the importance of
developed-world export and supply relationships on ‹rm environmental be-
havior in industrializing countries.
This chapter outlines the speci‹c hypotheses tested in the survey. We derive
these hypotheses from the same body of theoretical literature that informed
our work in previous chapters. We expect that the dynamics that led to the ob-
served cross-provincial variation in environmental performance should also be
re›ected at the level of the ‹rm as ‹rms can be considered as the agents that
drive the processes observed at the provincial level. In this sense, the survey
provides a robustness check on our arguments about ‹rm self-regulation and
environmental technology transfer, showing how a ‹rm’s primary export mar-
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kets and FDI source country affect its environmental awareness, decision mak-
ing, and performance. After laying out our key hypotheses, we describe our re-
search design, including the method of data collection and sampling and the
measurement of key variables, and then present our survey results and a con-
cluding discussion on the implications of our ‹ndings.
hypotheses
In order to analyze the causal mechanisms linking international economic in-
tegration to ‹rm environmental standards and performance, it is necessary not
only to examine observed outcomes but also to go directly to the source, ‹rms
themselves. To do so, we conducted a survey of executives of WDOFs, FIEs, and
JVs operating in China. We use the survey to tap ‹rms’ attitudes about how ex-
port market accessibility, partial or sole foreign ownership, and supplier-devel-
oped world MNC relationships affect ‹rm environmental performance and de-
cision making.
Based on the theoretical and empirical research discussed in earlier chap-
ters, we hypothesize that international economic integration, particularly with
developed-country markets, positively affects ‹rm environmental attitudes and
performance. We analyze international economic integration through two dis-
tinct variables: ‹rm ownership type (i.e., the extent of foreign ownership) and
level of integration into developed-world markets. We measure the latter as the
level of a ‹rm’s exports to developed markets or the level of its supply to FIEs
headquartered in the developed world. We focus on how multinational owner-
ship and international economic integration affect both the environmental
awareness and performance of the ‹rms in our survey analysis.
Prior research suggests that MNCs increasingly engage in self-regulatory
behavior in their worldwide operations by adopting environmental standards
that exceed the mandates of the host government.1 As explained previously,
the pressure for such self-regulation originates from a number of sources, in-
cluding international institutions, customers, and internal cost savings
strategies. First, in addition to responding to the regulatory environment in
the home country, MNCs need to abide by the regulatory requirements of in-
ternational institutions.2 Because the environmental standards in developed-
world MNCs’ home countries often exceed those in developing countries,
and because international institutions such as the International Chamber of
Commerce are devoted to promoting corporate adoption of global environ-
mental standards, developed-country MNCs are often subject to higher ex-
pectations for corporate environmental responsibility than developing-world
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‹rms.3 Second, MNCs’ environmental performance in developing countries
directly affects corporate social responsibility (CSR) reputation. Companies
with a bad CSR reputation are likely to face potential market share loss, as
consumers tend to identify positively with products that are made in an envi-
ronmentally friendly manner.4 Third, there exists internal pressure for self-
regulation, as the use of standardized production technologies across a com-
pany’s facilities worldwide should increase ef‹ciency by reducing production
costs associated with multiple production processes and varying technologi-
cal speci‹cations.5 The above conjectures lead us to expect MNCs to exhibit
a higher level of responsibility toward environmental management and yield
our ‹rst hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1 (H1): In general, enterprises with signi‹cant foreign invest-
ment (including wholly foreign-owned enterprises and JVs) are more en-
vironmentally responsible than wholly domestically owned ‹rms.
While hypothesis 1 focuses on the generic differences in the environmental
behavior of WDOFs and FIEs, hypotheses 2 and 3 tap the impact of developed-
country exports and multinational supply contracts on ‹rm environmental
performance. In order to prevent customers in developed export markets from
erecting protectionist trade barriers against substandard products, developing-
country exporters have incentive to conform to the prevailing environmental
standards in their most stringent export market(s).6 Trade retaliation fears
should lead developing-country exporters toward more environmentally re-
sponsible practices than nonexporters or those that export primarily to other
developing-world markets.
This type of self-regulatory pressure also originates from corporate cus-
tomers, as consumer demands and normative obligations compel ‹rms to
monitor supply chains. Based on this logic, we argue that subsidiaries of devel-
oped-country MNCs are more likely to subject Chinese WDOF suppliers to
rigorous environmental behavioral scrutiny. Indeed, developed-country ‹rms’
desire to avoid negative publicity should lead them to mandate environmental
criteria in supplier selection. In turn, these demands should generate pressure
on both domestic and foreign-invested ‹rms in China to conform to elevated
demands or face signi‹cant sales losses.7 Consequently, we not only expect FIEs
to be more environmental than WDOFs, we also expect Chinese ‹rms with
signi‹cant developed-country foreign investment or supply relationships to be
more environmentally responsible than other Chinese ‹rms without such ties.
These expectations lead us to hypotheses 2 and 3.
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Hypothesis 2 (H2): Firms that export a large proportion of their output
to developed markets tend to make more environmentally responsible
business decisions.
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Firms that sell a large proportion of their output to
developed-world multinational customers tend to make more environ-
mentally responsible business decisions.
It should be noted that hypotheses 2 and 3 focus on the overall effects of de-
veloped-country economic interactions on ‹rm environmental practices. They
do not test the impact of speci‹c export destinations or speci‹c foreign invest-
ment source countries. As the evidence from chapter 5 suggests, Chinese
provinces are likely to alter their level of environmental performance based on
their level of integration with developed markets. If those results are valid, then
we would expect this dynamic to be re›ected in our survey of business execu-
tives as well. In this section we focus on the environmental impact of exporting
to or supplying to corporate customers from speci‹c developed countries and
regions (such as Japan, Europe, the United States, Canada, Australia, or New
Zealand) on ‹rm environmental behavior. We focus on these countries and re-
gions in part because they are the leaders in areas of environmental self-regula-
tory certi‹cation mechanisms such as ISO 14001. For example, according to
worldwide statistical data on ISO 14001 adoption collected by corporate risk
management, Japan, Australia, Canada, and the United States ranked fourth,
seventh, ninth, and twelfth, respectively, in the per capita number of ISO 14001
adoptions as of the end of 2006.8 Major European countries also show up as
leaders of ISO 14001 certi‹cation: Sweden ranks ‹rst, Spain second, and
Switzerland third, in the world for number of ISO certi‹cations, while Italy, the
United Kingdom, Germany, and France rank ‹fth, eighth, tenth and eleventh,
respectively.9 In addition, there is evidence that developed-world ‹rms have
strong concerns about bad publicity following negative environmental audit
reports.10 Consequently, we expect that ‹rms that either export to or supply to
‹rms from Japan, Europe, the United States, Canada, Australia, or New Zealand
should engage in more rigorous environmental practices.
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Chinese ‹rms that export a large proportion of their
output to Japan, Europe, the United States/Canada, and Australia/New
Zealand tend to engage in superior environmental practices relative to
other ‹rms.
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Hypothesis 5 (H5): Chinese ‹rms that sell a large proportion of their
output to multinational customers from Japan, Europe, the United
States/Canada, and Australia/New Zealand tend to engage in superior
environmental practices relative to other ‹rms.
We derive our conclusions about the effects of foreign ownership and vari-
ation in integration levels on ‹rm environmental attitudes based on the “per-
ceived impact” of these variables by Chinese business executives as noted by
their survey responses. In the survey, we attempt to ‹rst gauge knowledge and
awareness of general environmental issues, the legality of polluting in China,
and various pollution-mitigating instruments (such as the ISO 14001) and then
judge this knowledge against opinions of the behavioral effects of ‹rm owner-
ship and economic integration. Our primary goal is to assess executive opinion
regarding the impact (positive, negative, or none) of these variables on ‹rm at-
titudes and practices.
research design
Data Collection and Sampling Method
We conducted the survey through a private third-party survey house based in
China. This ‹rm distributed questionnaires to executives of companies located
in Chinese coastal areas in June 2008. The cities and provinces represented in
the sample include Shanghai, Tianjin, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, and
Guangdong. All respondents are either senior-level management personnel or
chief executive of‹cers. As such, their responses should be highly representative
of the environmental opinions of business executives in a broader context. We
collected responses from ‹fty ‹rms. While the sample size is not large enough
to lend itself to a reliable regression analysis, it is suf‹cient for descriptive sta-
tistics. We attempted to ensure truthful responses by avoiding personal or ‹rm
identity disclosure.
Our survey design enables us to control for many factors that might affect
environmental attitudes and performance. Speci‹cally, we apply sample selec-
tion criteria to ensure that our sample accommodates variation in ownership
(i.e., multinational or not), the industry-level pollution intensity, and level of
developed-country exports or multinational customer supply contracts.
(a) Foreign ownership. Because we posit a difference in the environmental
awareness of executives of FIEs vs. WDOFs, we include both in our sample:
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32 WDOFs (or 62 percent) with no foreign participation (state-owned, collec-
tive, or private enterprises) and 18 FIEs (or 38 percent) with foreign investment
(wholly foreign-owned enterprises or joint ventures).
(b) Industry pollution intensity. To determine whether or not executives of
different sectors evince distinct notions of corporate environmental responsi-
bility, we surveyed companies from industries with varying levels of pollution
intensity, including lightly polluting industries such as transportation equip-
ment and consumer electronics; moderately polluting industries such as tex-
tiles and pharmaceuticals; and highly polluting industries such as iron and
steel, mining, chemicals, and paper and pulp. Our sample is composed of 19, 20,
and 11 companies (or 38, 40, and 22 percent of the total) in lightly, moderately,
and highly polluting industries, respectively. The distribution across sectors
should highlight any potential cross-sectoral differences in business executives’
environmental attitudes.
(c) Multinational customers and exports/supply to developed countries. A
key hypothesis in this project concerns the extent to which environmental reg-
ulatory stringency in major export destinations or MNC corporate customer
home countries in›uences environmental practices and standards of domestic
suppliers and exporting ‹rms. To provide preliminary evidence for this hy-
pothesis, we ensured that roughly half of the domestic companies either export
to developed countries or supply to multinational customers.
Measures
We develop measures of both our dependent and independent variables. While
most of these measures are original, particularly those of the dependent vari-
ables, those that capture the basic ‹rm characteristics (such as multinational
customers, exports to developed countries, and ‹rm size) are adopted from
previous surveys.11
Dependent Variables
To test H1, we developed questions to assess the environmental knowledge and
awareness of business executives and the importance they place on environ-
mental preservation. These questions include the following: “My company is
willing to make a ‹nancial contribution to environmental protection”; “The
government should invest more in environmental protection even if it impedes
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economic growth”; “Compared to economic development, how important is
environmental protection?”; “Supplying to corporate customers from North
America, Europe, or Japan results in enhanced environmental awareness and
greater attention to environmental management practices and corporate con-
duct.” For the last question, respondents were asked to rank their answers on a
scale of 1 to 5, with 1 indicating “strongly disagree” and 5 indicating “strongly
agree.”
To test H2 to H5, we developed questions to tap the environmental perfor-
mance of the respondents and used these measures in the analysis.
ISO 14001 adoption. We developed the following question to measure a
company’s ISO 14001 adoption rate: “Has your company registered for ISO
14001?” Responses to this question are coded as a dichotomous variable, with
“yes” coded as 1 and “no” or “not sure” as 0.
Environmental Management System (EMS) certi‹cation. We also asked
whether a company has registered or applied for any type of environmental
management system or certi‹cation as another measure of its environmental
management performance: “Has your company registered/applied for any type
of environmental management system or certi‹cation other than ISO 14001?”
Positive responses to this question were coded as 1 and negative responses to
this question were coded as 0.
Overall compliance success. A respondent’s self-assessment of a company’s
overall compliance success with local and national environmental laws may
provide another indication of ‹rm environmental performance. Thus we asked
respondents the following question: “In your opinion, how successful is your
company in complying with local and national environmental laws?” We asked
the respondents to rate their answer on a scale of 1 to 10, with 10 being the most
successful.
Overall environmental performance composite index. We created a com-
posite index of a ‹rm’s overall environmental performance by combining a
given company’s responses to the above three questions. The incorporation of
these three variables into a composite index is justi‹able as the three variables
are highly correlated with one another.12 We relied on respondent self-assess-
ments of their environmental performance, as neither the Chinese government
nor any third-party organizations collect or maintain such data. Although self-
assessments may have an upward bias because respondents may overstate ‹rm
environmental performance, it should not pose a problem to our analysis be-
cause this bias should extend across the sample.
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Independent Variables
We developed several measures of a company’s world market ties as our key in-
dependent variables.
Multinational ownership. We asked the respondents to choose one of the
following ownership types that best describes their company: (1) state-owned
enterprise; (2) collective enterprise; (3) private ownership; (4) joint venture;
and (5) wholly foreign-owned enterprise. We then recoded the respondent’s an-
swers: Answers (1) to (3) were recoded as 0, indicating that the respondent’s
company is wholly domestically owned, and answers (4) to (5) were recoded as
1, indicating that the respondent is employed by an FIE. The resulting variable
is dichotomous.
Multinational customers. We asked the respondents the following two
questions: “What percentage of your products is sold in the domestic Chinese
market?” and “Of the products you sell in the domestic market, what percent-
age is sold to joint ventures or wholly foreign-owned ‹rms?”13 We then took the
product of a respondent’s answer to these two questions to create the Multi-
national customers variable.
Exports to developed countries. We asked the respondents to specify the
share of the company’s exports to the following countries and regions in the to-
tal sales volume of the company: Europe, the United States/Canada, Japan, and
Australia/New Zealand.14 The sum of the respondents’ answers to each of these
questions captures this variable.
Supply to developed countries. We also asked the respondents to specify
the share of the company’s supplies to China-based FIEs with home of‹ces in
each of the following countries or regions in the total sales volume of the com-
pany: Japan, Europe, the United States and/or Canada, and Australia and/or
New Zealand. We then followed the same procedure described in the previous
paragraph to create the supply to developed countries variable.
Exports to Europe, Exports to Japan, Exports to U.S./Canada, Exports to Aus-
tralia/New Zealand, Supply to Europe, Supply to Japan, Supply to U.S./Canada,
Supply to Australia/New Zealand are simply the respondents’ answers to indi-
vidual questions about the share of a company’s exports or supply to each of the
above countries or regions proportional to the company’s total sales volume.
These variables are different from Exports to developed countries or Supply to de-
veloped countries in that they measure a company’s exports or supply to speci‹c
countries or regions, whereas the latter tap exports or supply to all developed
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countries and regions named above as a whole. Table 6.1 provides a detailed de-
scription of the measurement of each of these variables.
results
Hypothesis 1
H1 addresses differences in awareness and appreciation for corporate environ-
mental responsibility between executives of WDOFs and FIEs. To assess this hy-
pothesis, we developed several questions to gauge the overall environmental at-
titudes of business executives. Speci‹cally, we asked the respondents questions
regarding the importance of environmental protection relative to economic de-
velopment and their willingness to make a ‹nancial contribution to environ-
mental protection.
The survey results lend support to the hypothesis that executives of WD-
OFs and FIEs demonstrate somewhat different attitudes toward the impor-
tance of environmental protection. For example, when asked to rate the extent
to which they agree with the statement “My company is willing to make a ‹nan-
cial contribution to environmental protection,” on a scale ranging from
“strongly disagree,” “disagree,” “neutral,” “agree,” to “strongly agree,” 16 out of
the 19 executives of FIEs (or 84 percent) answered either “agree” or “strongly
agree,” compared to 23 out of 31 executives of WDOFs (or 75 percent) (see table
6.2). The Pearson correlation between Multinational ownership and the respon-
dent’s answers to this question is .314, which is signi‹cant at the p < 0.05 level
for a 2-tailed test.
Figure 6.1 provides a visual comparison of responses to the above questions
from WDOFs executives versus those of FIEs. In particular, it shows the mean
response score, one standard deviation below the mean, and one standard de-
viation above the mean for each group of respondents. As indicated, FIEs show
up as having higher scores in each of these categories compared to WDOFs.
The mean of FIEs’ response to this question is 4.53, compared to a mean of 3.85
for WDOFs. The one standard deviation below the mean for FIEs is 3.63, com-
pared to 1.93 for WDOFs; and the one standard deviation above the mean for
FIEs is 5.44, compared to 4.93 for WDOFs.
Similarly, when asked to rate the extent to which they agree with the state-
ment “The government should invest more in environmental protection even if
it impedes economic growth,” all of the FIE executives answered “agree” or
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TABLE 6.1. Variable Measurement
Dependent
Variables Measurement
Environmental Awareness  
Variables
“My company is willing to make a financial contribution to environ-
mental protection.” (1) strongly disagree; (2) disagree; (3) neither
agree nor disagree; (4) agree; (5) strongly agree
“The government should invest more in environmental protection
even if it impedes economic growth.” (1) strongly disagree; (2) dis-
agree; (3) neither agree nor disagree; (4) agree; (5) strongly agree
“Compared to economic development, how important is environmen-
tal protection?” (1) not at all important; (2) somewhat less important;
(3) equally important; (4) somewhat more important; (5) much more
important
“Supplying corporate customers from North America, Europe, or
Japan results in enhanced environmental awareness and greater atten-
tion to environmental management practices and corporate conduct.”
(1) strongly disagree; (2) disagree; (3) neither agree nor disagree; (4)
agree; (5) strongly agree
Environmental Practices 
Variables
ISO 14001 “Has your company registered for ISO 14001?”
adoption (1) yes; (2) no; (3) not sure what ISO 14001 is
Answers (2) and (3) were recoded as “0”; answer (1) was coded as “1.”
Environmental “Has your company registered/applied for any type of environmental
Management management system or certification?”
System (EMS) (1) no; (2) yes
certification
Overall “In your opinion, how successful is your company in complying with 
compliance local and national environmental laws? Please rate your answer on
success a scale of 1–10, with ‘10’ being the most successful.”
Overall This variable is created combining a particular company’s responses
environmental to the above three questions about ISO 14001 adoption, EMS
performance certification, and overall compliance success.
index
Independent Variables 
Multinational “Which of the following best describes your business?”
ownership (1) state-owned enterprise; (2) collective enterprise; (3) private
ownership; (4) joint venture; (5) wholly foreign-owned
enterprise
We recoded this variable into a dichotomous variable whereby 
answers (1)–(3) were recoded as “0” and answers (4) and (5) were 
recoded as “1.”
Multinational We asked the respondents two questions:
customers “What percentage of your products is sold in the domestic
Chinese market?”
(1) none; (2) 1–25%; (3) 26–50%; (4) 51–75%; (5) 76–100%
“Of the products you sell in the domestic market, what percentage
is sold to joint ventures or wholly foreign-owned firms?”
(1) none; (2) 1–25%; (3) 26–50%; (4) 51–75%; (5) 76–100%
Multinational customers is the product of a respondent’s answer to 
the above two questions.
Exports to “Which countries and regions does your company export to? Check all
developed that apply and specify the share to particular countries/regions in the
countries total sales volume of your company.”
Country/Region None 1–25% 26–50% 51–75% 76–100%
(1) Europe 0 1 2 3 4
(2) U.S. and/or Canada 0 1 2 3 4
(3) Japan 0 1 2 3 4
(4) Australia and/or 0 1 2 3 4
New Zealand
We took the sum of a respondent’s answers to items (1)–(4) to create
the Exports to developed countries variable.
Supply to “If you supply to joint ventures or wholly foreign-owned enterprises
developed in China, in which country (region) is this company (or are these 
countries companies) based? Please check all that apply and specify the share 
of your supply to these companies in the total sales volume of
your company.”
(1) Europe 0 1 2 3 4
(2) U.S. and/or Canada 0 1 2 3 4
(3) Japan 0 1 2 3 4
(4) Australia and/or 
New Zealand 0 1 2 3 4
We took the sum of a respondent’s answers to items (1)–(4) to create 
the Supply to developed countries variable.
Exports to This variable is measured as the respondent’s answer to the question
Japan about the share of the company’s exports to Japan in the company’s
total sales volume. (For variable measurement, see the Exports to
developed countries variable above.)
Exports to This variable is measured as the respondent’s answer to the question
Europe about the share of the company’s exports to Europe in the company’s
total sales volume. (For variable measurement, see the Exports to
developed countries variable above.)
Supply to This variable is measured as the respondent’s answer to the question
Japan about the share of the company’s supply to Japan in the company’s
total sales volume. (For variable measurement, see the Supply
to developed countries variable above.)
Supply to This variable is measured as the respondent’s answer to the question
Europe about the share of the company’s supply to Europe in the company’s
total sales volume. (For variable measurement, see the Supply to
developed countries variable above.)
“strongly agree” to this question, compared to the 81 percent of executives of
WDOFs who answered positively to this question (see table 6.3). The Pearson
correlation between Multinational ownership and the respondents’ answers to
this statement is 0.341, which is again signi‹cant at the p < 0.05 level for a 2-
tailed test.
Figure 6.2 plots the mean, one standard deviation above, and one standard
deviation below the mean for each group of respondents. Similar to the pattern
observed in ‹gure 6.1, executives of FIEs consistently had higher mean scores on
this question than WDOFs. The one standard deviation above the mean and one
standard deviation below the mean are also higher for FIEs than for WDOFs.
Moreover, compared to executives of FIEs, a much smaller percentage of
the executives of WDOFs consider environmental protection to be of the same
importance as economic development. Speci‹cally, the survey questionnaire
asked the respondents the question “Compared to economic development, how
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TABLE 6.2. Responses of Executives of WDOFs versus FIEs to the Following
Question: “My company is willing to make a financial contribution to environmental
protection”
Strongly Strongly
Count (%) Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Agree Total
WDOFs 1 4 3 14 9 31
(3.23%) (12.90%) (9.68%) (45.16%) (29.03%) (100%)
FIEs 0 1 2 2 14 19
(0.00%) (5.26%) (10.53%) (10.53%) (73.68%) (100%)
Total 1 5 5 16 23 50
(2.00%) (10.00%) (10.00%) (32.00%) (46.00%) (100%)
TABLE 6.3. Responses of Executives of WDOFs versus FIEs to the Following
Question: “The government should invest more in environmental protection even if
it impedes economic growth”
Strongly Strongly
Count (%) Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Agree Total
WDOFs 0 2 4 17 8 31
(.00%) (6.45%) (12.9%) (54.84%) (25.81%) (100%)
FIEs 0 0 0 9 10 19
(.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (47.37%) (52.63%) (100%)
Total 0 2 4 26 18 50
(.00%) (4.00%) (8.00%) (52.00%) (36.00%) (100%)
important is environmental protection?” Respondents were asked to rank their
answers on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 indicating “not important at all” and 5 indi-
cating “much more important.” As table 6.4 shows, 14 out of 19 of the executives
of FIEs considered environmental protection to be “much more important”
than economic development, compared to 6 of 31 executives of WDOFs (see
table 6.4). The Pearson correlation between these variables is .366, which is
signi‹cant at the p < 0.01 level for a 2-tailed test.
Figure 6.3 compares the mean score, one standard deviation above the
mean, and one standard deviation below the mean for WDOFs and FIEs re-
garding this question. Once again, ‹gure 6.3 illustrates that FIEs generally con-
sider environmental protection to be equally, if not more important than eco-
nomic development, as they have consistently achieved higher scores than
executives of WDOFs.
Hypotheses 2–3
In this section we analyze how exporting to or selling to multinational cus-
tomers from developed countries affects ‹rm environmental behavior. As men-
tioned earlier, we created measures of the extent to which a ‹rm exports to de-
veloped countries or supplies to developed-country multinationals. We also
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fig. 6.1. Multinational ownership and ‹rm responses to the following question:
“My company is willing to make a ‹nancial contribution to environmental protection”
created a composite index of ‹rm environmental management performance on
the basis of the ‹rm’s ISO 14001 adoption, EMS certi‹cation, and Overall com-
pliance success. In this section, we draw on this composite index as our key mea-
sure of ‹rm environmental management performance and present correlation
statistics between this variable and each of our key measures of ‹rm interna-
tional economic integration.
Figure 6.4 presents the relationships between Exports to developed countries
and the respondents’ mean environmental performance composite index. The
upward trend of the line in this ‹gure indicates that there is generally a positive
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fig. 6.2. Multinational ownership and mean ‹rm responses to the following question:
“The government should invest more in environmental protection even if it impedes
economic growth”
TABLE 6.4. Responses of Executives of WDOFs vs. FIEs to the Following Question:
“Compared to economic development, how important is environmental protection?”
Not
Count Important Not as As More Much More Number of
(%) at All Important Important Important Important Respondents
WDOFs 1 1 12 11 6 31
(3.23%) (3.23%) (38.71%) (35.48%) (19.35%) (100%)
FIEs 0 1 4 0 14 19
(0.00%) (5.26%) (21.05%) (0.00%) (73.68%) (100%)
Total 1 2 16 11 20 50
(2.00%) (4.00%) (32.00%) (22.00%) (40.00%) (100%)
relationship between these two variables. An increase in a company’s Exports to
developed countries score from 4 to 7 on the x axis is associated with an increase in
its mean environmental performance composite score from 7 to 11.5 on the y axis.
Figure 6.5 tells a similar story. Increasing a company’s Supply to developed
countries score from 7 to 14 on the x axis would result in an increase from 4 to
12.33 in its mean composite index score on the y axis. Overall, ‹gures 6.4 and 6.5
suggest that the more a company exports to or sells to developed-country cus-
tomers, the more likely it is to exhibit more sound environmental practices and
performance.
Table 6.5 presents bivariate correlations among the key independent and
dependent variables. Both Exports to developed countries and Supply to devel-
oped countries are positively associated with each of the three individual indica-
tors of environmental performance, as well as the composite index. The Pear-
son correlations between each of these variables and each of the environmental
performance variables are mostly signi‹cant at the p < 0.01 level for a 2-tailed
test. These results provide strong support to our hypotheses that companies
that either export mainly to developed countries or supply a large portion of
their products to developed-country customers in China are likely to have
stronger environmental performance than those companies with a lower level
of export or supply relationships with developed-country customers.
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fig. 6.3. Multinational ownership and mean ‹rm responses to the question “Compared
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fig. 6.5. Supply to developed countries and the mean environmental performance 
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Hypotheses 4–5
We also found some support for the hypotheses that exporting to or supplying
to multinational customers from Japan or Europe exerts a positive effect on a
‹rm’s environmental performance. Table 6.6 presents the correlation statistics
between Exports to Europe, Exports to Japan, Exports to U.S./Canada, Exports to
Australia/New Zealand, Supply to Europe, Supply to Japan, Supply to
U.S./Canada, Supply to Australia/New Zealand and each of the measures of ‹rm
environmental management performance.
The Supply to Europe variable is positively associated with each of the envi-
ronmental performance variables, and the Pearson correlation among each of
these variables is signi‹cant at the p < 0.01 level for a 2-tailed test. The Supply to
Japan variable is positively signed as well. The Pearson correlation between this
variable and the composite environmental performance index, as well as the
company’s self-assessment of its overall environmental performance, is
signi‹cant at the p < 0.01 level for a 2-tailed test. The Exports to Europe and Ex-
ports to Japan variables mostly have a positive sign and are occasionally
signi‹cant too. While Exports to U.S./Canada and Exports to Australia/New
Zealand do not appear to have strong statistical association with any of the
measures of environmental performance, these variables are mostly positively
signed. Moreover, Supply to U.S./Canada and Supply to Australia/New Zealand
are positively associated with EMS certi‹cation, and the relationship is
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TABLE 6.5. Pearson Correlations between Key Independent Variables and
Alternative Measures of Environmental Performance
Overall
ISO14001 EMS Environmental Composite
Adoption Certification Compliance Index N
MNE .093 .293* .227 .246 50
ownership (.522) (.039) (.113) (.85)
Multinational .001 .114 .215 .184 49
customer (.996) (.434) (.138) (.207)
Exports to .461** .621** .425** .551** 50
developed (.001) (.000) (.002) (.000)
countries
Supply to .351* .436** .333* .421** 50
developed (.012) (.002) (.018) (.002)
countries
*correlation significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
**correlation significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
signi‹cant at the p < 0.05 level for a 2-tailed test. Overall, these results are con-
sistent with our argument about how exporting to or supplying to corporate
customers in speci‹c developed countries with rigorous environmental stan-
dards positively affects a company’s environmental performance. The dispari-
ties among Exports to Europe and Exports to Japan on the one hand, and Exports
to U.S./Canada and Exports to Australia/New Zealand on the other may be par-
tially explained by the fact that individual European countries and Japan tend
to have higher levels of regulatory stringency than their other developed world
counterparts, as indicated by the per capita ISO 14001 adoption rate rankings.
That executives found export and supply relationships with Europe and Japan
particularly consequential also lends support to our decision to use ISO 14001
adoption rates as proxies for regulatory stringency.
In addition, not only did we ‹nd that exporting to developed countries or
supplying to customers from Japan or Europe positively affects a company’s en-
vironmental performance, executives of companies that either export to or sup-
ply to corporate customers from these entities also tend to have a more positive
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TABLE 6.6. Pearson Correlations between Key Independent Variables (Country-
specific) and Alternative Measures of Environmental Performance
Overall
ISO14001 EMS Environmental Composite
Adoption Certification Compliance Index N
Exports to .202 .349* .184 .248 42
Europe (.199) (.024) (.243) (.113)
Exports to -.056 .061 .499** .444** 47
Japan (.725) (.699) (.001) (.003)
Exports to .058 .282 .131 .192 47
U.S./Canada (.713) (.071) (.408) (.224)
Exports to .073 .227 -.124 .087 47
Australia/ (.644) (.147) (.435) (.582)
New Zealand
Supply to .435** .497** .357* .474** 47
Europe (.002) (.000) (.014) (.001)
Supply to .161 .239 .503** .478** 47
Japan (.281) (.106) (.000) (.001)
Supply to .181 .316* .168 .236 47
U.S./Canada (.224) (.031) (.259) (.111)
Supply to .228 .342* -.026 -.138 47
Australia/ (.123) (.018) (.862) (.354)
New Zealand
*correlation significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
**correlation significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
perception of the environmental impact of such practices. Since test results for
the environmental effect of economic interactions with Japanese and European
‹rms are identical, the following discussion draws on the case of Japan to sup-
port our argument.
As mentioned above, we asked the respondents to rate the share of the com-
pany’s exports to Japan in its total sales volume on a scale of 0 to 4, with 0 indi-
cating none, 1 indicating 1–25 percent, and 4 indicating 76–100 percent. We then
asked the respondents their views about whether more stringent product and
process standards of countries and regions such as the United States, Japan, and
Europe may have any impact on the environmental performance of their own
companies. Respondents were asked to rate their responses on a scale of 1 to 5,
with 1 indicating “has no effect,” 2 indicating “makes it signi‹cantly worse,” and
up to 5 indicating “makes it signi‹cantly better.” We then followed up with an-
other question about whether this is true for other exporting ‹rms in their in-
dustry, in order to reduce potential bias in our results due to the respondents’
unwillingness to answer truthfully about their own operations. Finally, we used
the sum of the respondents’ answers to these two questions as a summary index
of their attitudes toward the impact of exporting to developed countries on the
company’s own environmental performance.
What is most noticeable about the results is that companies that export a
large proportion of their products to Japan turned out to have the most posi-
tive views on this issue. Table 6.7 presents the frequency distribution of the re-
sponses to the above question. As we can see, the greater the extent of a com-
pany’s exports to Japan, the more likely it is to have a higher mean response
score on this question. In other words, companies that export a larger portion
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TABLE 6.7. Frequency Distribution of the Responses
to the Following Question: “If you export goods directly
to North America, Europe, or Japan, how do the more
stringent product and/or process standards of the
importing country affect the environmental practices of
your company?”
Exports to Japan Mean N S.D.
1 (1–25%) 3.900 10 1.197
2 (26–50%) 4.438 16 .629
3 (51–75%) 4.546 11 .522
4 (76–100%) 5.000 5 .000
Total 4.405 42 .798
of their products to Japan are more likely to view such practices as having a
positive effect on their own environmental performance.
Figure 6.6 further provides a visual presentation of the relationship be-
tween a company’s exports to Japan and its perception of the environmental
impact of these practices. In ‹gure 6.6, as the share of a company’s exports to
Japan goes up, the mean and the standard deviations of its executive’s percep-
tion of the environmental impact of such practices increase as well. This dy-
namic indicates a positive view of the environmental spillovers of exporting to
the Japanese market. Furthermore, the Pearson correlation between Exports to
Japan and the summary index of executive attitudes toward the environmental
impact of such practices is 0.344, and the relationship is statistically signi‹cant
at the p < 0.05 level for a 2-tailed test. These results suggest that companies that
export a large proportion of their products to Japan tend to have positive views
of the environmental impact of such practices.
We followed a similar procedure in analyzing business executives’ attitudes
toward the impact of supplying to corporate customers from Japan on the
company’s environmental performance. Respondents were ‹rst asked to spec-
ify the share of the products the company supplies to Japanese ‹rms operating
in China in the company’s total sales volume. Then in two separate questions,
we asked the respondents to share their views regarding whether the more
stringent product and process standards of the home country(s) of the MNC
customer(s) have any impact on the environmental performance of their com-














































































Supply to Japan as % of the company's total sales volume 
1 standard deviation 
below the mean 
mean 
1 standard deviation 
above the mean 
fig. 6.6. Exports to Japan and the respondent’s perception of the environmental impact
of such practices
pany and of other companies in their industry. We again combined the respon-
dents’ answers to these two questions to create a summary index. Table 6.8
shows the respondents’ mean response scores to these two questions. Once
again, the greater the share of a company’s supply to Japanese ‹rms in the re-
spondent’s total sales volume, the higher its mean response score on the sum-
mary index. This indicates that the greater the extent of a company’s supply to
Japanese ‹rms, the more likely it is to view the more stringent product and
process standards of Japan as exerting a positive effect on the company’s over-
all environmental practices.
Figure 6.7 plots the relationship between Supply to Japan and the executives’
perception of its environmental impact on the ‹rm. The result again reveals
that companies that supply a large percentage of their products to corporate
customers from Japan tend to have a more positive view of the in›uence of
product and process standards in their clients’ home country on their own en-
vironmental performance. As the share of the company’s supply to Japan in the
company’s total sales volume goes up, the mean and standard deviations gener-
ally also follow an upward trend. The Pearson correlation between the extent of
a company’s supply to Japan and its executive’s attitudes toward the in›uence
of the supply relationship on the company’s environmental performance is
.430, which is signi‹cant at the p < 0.01 level for a 2-tailed test. Overall, these re-
sults suggest that business executives consider the environmental standards of
their corporate customers to positively in›uence their company’s own environ-
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TABLE 6.8. Responses to the Summary Index of the
Following Two Questions
(a) “If you supply goods directly to North America, Europe,
or Japan, how do the more stringent product and/or process
standards of the importing country affect the environmental
practices of your company?” and
(b) “If you supply goods to a foreign company based in North
America, Europe, or Japan, how do the more stringent prod-
uct and process standards of the country you supply affect
the environmental practices of your company?”
Supply to Japan Mean N S.D.
1 (1–25%) 7.375 8 .916
2 (26–50%) 7.333 21 1.278
3 (51–75%) 8.385 13 .870
4 (76–100%) 9.000 3 .000
Total 7.756 45 1.190
mental performance. The results also indicate that the environmental stan-
dards in a company’s main importing country(s) or its main corporate cus-
tomer(s) do exert a ratcheting-up effect on its own environmental standards
and procedures as re›ected in executives’ belief systems. These results lend ad-
ditional support to the ‹ndings presented in chapter 5.
In addition to the strong positive environmental effects of economic inter-
actions with Japanese ‹rms, we found a similar effect for exporting to or sup-
plying to corporate customers from Europe. However, we did not ‹nd the same
strong positive environmental effect for exporting to or supplying to multina-
tional customers from other developed countries such as the United States,
Canada, New Zealand, or Australia. While a priori we do not have a theoretical
expectation for why this may be the case, it is possible that both Europe and
Japan (and their ‹rms) are considered global environmental regulatory leaders,
more likely surpassing the other developed countries (and their ‹rms) cited
above in environmental standards. Again, this claim is substantiated in the nor-
malized ISO 14001 rankings mentioned above. The assumption that Japanese
and European regulators are particularly strong supporters of ISO 14001 adop-
tions is also supported in a study by Prakash.15 Moreover, the United States, es-
pecially under the Bush administration, has not exercised a role in global envi-
ronmental affairs that is commensurate with its status as the world’s dominant
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fig. 6.7. Supply to Japan and the respondent’s perception of the environmental impact
of such practices
economy, failing to ratify agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol, a treaty de-
signed to curb global greenhouse gas emissions; the Stockholm Convention on
Persistent Organic Pollutants; and the Rotterdam Convention, which governs
international trade in banned and restricted pesticides and industrial chemicals
that have been banned or severely restricted for health or environmental rea-
sons.16 While the examples cited above are largely anecdotal, they do point to
the subtle variations that may exist in developed countries’ environmental reg-
ulatory records, which in turn help to explain the variation in the environmen-
tal impact of developed-country MNCs in the developing world.
Preliminary Regression Analyses
In addition to the descriptive statistical analysis detailed above, we carried out
a number of regression analyses. Speci‹cally, we regressed each of the three en-
vironmental performance indicators mentioned above (ISO 14001 adoption,
EMS adoption, and Overall compliance success) on both the key measures of in-
dependent variables and a number of control variables derived from the survey,
including ‹rm age, size (as measured by the number of employees), pro‹tabil-
ity, and total assets. In each of these models, our key independent variables
(such as the extent to which a ‹rm exports to developed-country markets and
supplies to multinational customers) show up as having a positive and statisti-
cally signi‹cant relationship with the environmental performance variables. Of
course, these regression results are rather preliminary given the small sample
size. Future studies could include a larger number of respondents in the sample
to more rigorously investigate the posited causal dynamics.
Sectoral Comparison
To address potential concerns that more heavily polluting industries are less
likely to exhibit sound environmental performance, we ran bivariate correla-
tions between the pollution intensity of the industry and both the individual
and the composite index of environmental performance. We also ran bivariate
correlations between the pollution intensity of the industry and the respon-
dents’ answers to each of the following questions: “When you established your
business operations, were local environmental laws an important factor in
making the decision about where to build your business?” and “To the best of
your knowledge, how important were local environmental laws in others’ deci-
sions about where to build their businesses?” The correlations suggest that the
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pollution intensity of the industry is uncorrelated with the environmental per-
formance and locational decisions of the industry in any way, as none of the
correlation statistics achieved statistical signi‹cance. Of course, given the con-
straints of the sample size and the absence of robust controls, these results are
highly preliminary. More rigorous empirical testing in the future can help us
better address the question as to whether industries with varying levels of pol-
lution intensity behave differently with regard to the race-to-the-bottom and
pollution-haven hypotheses.
Limitations
An obvious criticism of this survey is that Chinese business executives may be
unwilling or reluctant to share unbiased opinions regarding the environmental
performance of their own ‹rms. The fear of negative publicity, government
crackdown, or other such negative reactions may provide a signi‹cant deter-
rent to truthful responses. This, in turn, could lead to an overall bias with two
possible effects. On the one hand, respondents may be inclined to underrepre-
sent the severity of the negative environmental behavior of their own ‹rms.
This might diminish the reported in›uence of the two independent variables
on ‹rm behavior. From their perspective, if their ‹rms are doing nothing
wrong, then there should be no effect one way or the other. On the other hand,
executives might be inclined to overrepresent the effects of the two variables in
order to demonstrate either a conscious effort to reduce environmental pollu-
tion or strong knowledge of mechanisms by which to do this.
Unfortunately, there is no way to completely avoid the potential for bias ei-
ther way. In addition, it is possible that the bias mentioned above could be
larger for WDOFs than for FIEs as the former are under more direct scrutiny of
the Chinese government. However, in an effort to extract truthful answers, the
survey asks questions regarding not only the performance of their own ‹rms
but also the perceived performance of other similar ‹rms within the same in-
dustry. We expect respondents to be more forthcoming with their opinions
when they themselves are not directly implicated. Assurances were made that
no names were attached to the survey. These procedures should help alleviate
concerns about potential sample bias.
discussions
While the previous chapters undertake empirical examinations of the pollu-
tion-haven and race-to-the-bottom arguments through provincial-level data
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available from the China Statistical Yearbook, this chapter supplements these
analyses with ‹rm-level evidence. By tapping the perceptions and opinions of
business executives that directly participate in the process, this chapter presents
strong evidence in support of our arguments about how globalization exerts a
ratcheting-up effect on corporate environmental behavior and pollution out-
comes.
Our results reveal a positive association between multinational ownership
and business executives’ environmental knowledge and awareness (H1). The
sources of ‹rm self-regulation described in earlier chapters can help to explain
the greater sense of environmental responsibility of the executives of foreign-
invested ‹rms. In addition, our results indicate that ‹rms that either export to
developed countries or sell a large portion of their output to multinational cus-
tomers within China operate with a higher level of environmental standards
and operating procedures, as demonstrated by ISO 14001 adoption, environ-
mental management systems certi‹cation, and ‹rm self-assessment of overall
environmental compliance (H2–H5). Speci‹cally, in addition to uncovering the
environmental impact of exporting or selling to multinational customers from
developed countries, our survey analysis yields strong evidence that ‹rms that
either export to or supply to MNCs from Japan or Europe are especially likely
to have strong environmental standards and performance due to fear of envi-
ronmental importing-country tariff retaliation or developed-country corpo-
rate customers’ expectations for environmental product and process standards
that conform to home-country criteria (H4–H5).
These ‹ndings help to explain why our analyses of provincial-level data
failed to uncover pollution-haven and race-to-the-bottom type behavior. They
provide strong support for the argument that while on the one hand the glob-
alization of trade and production provides ‹rms with ample opportunity to ex-
ploit cross-national differences in environmental regulation, on the other hand
it generates competitive and institutional pressures that minimize the gains
from pollution-haven-seeking behavior, and prompts ‹rms to engage in rigor-
ous environmental self-regulation. These ‹ndings suggest that the increases in
China’s total trade volume and inward FDI brought about by the market liber-
alization mandates of the WTO will not necessarily in›ict additional harm on
the country’s environment and may result in positive environmental externali-
ties.
Our ‹ndings relate directly to the literature on the diffusion of environ-
mental policies and practices from MNC-owned and export-oriented ‹rms to
‹rms that are largely domestic in terms of ownership and operating market.
These results are also consistent with those uncovered by Ronie Garcia-John-
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son in her study of the ›ow of environmental values and strategies from U.S.
multinational chemical corporations to companies in Mexico and Brazil. She
‹nds strong support for the notion that environmental policies and procedures
diffuse through corporate supply chains and spill over to investment host
countries.17 While our ‹ndings are preliminary, they do suggest that corporate
norms of environmentalism may not have been internalized by domestically
owned Chinese ‹rms, as executives of WDOFs have not demonstrated the same
level of environmental awareness as FIE executives. Instead, the importation of
corporate voluntary environmentalism seems to be a tactic adopted by ‹rms
with an interest in meeting the demands of overseas markets. As such, it may be
an instrumental goal that may be susceptible to changes in trade and FDI pat-
terns. Future studies could engage in more detailed analysis of the behavior of
domestically owned Chinese ‹rms to see if corporate norms of environmental-
ism have been diffused to China as a whole or remain con‹ned to ‹rms with
substantial exposure to the international market.
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chapter 7
Asia Pulp & Paper: Local Standards,
World Markets, and Environmental Protection 
Through analyses of Chinese provincial-level data and survey data, the previ-
ous chapters suggest that economic integration with developed-world markets
encourages companies to adopt more sustainable business practices. By ensur-
ing further development and innovation of environmental abatement technol-
ogy and by facilitating the transfer of corporate norms of environmental gov-
ernance, integration with the world market has helped to mitigate some of the
worst environmental effects of rapid industrialization.
This chapter further highlights these effects through a case study of Asia
Pulp & Paper (APP), a major manufacturer of pulp and paper formerly based
in Indonesia, now in Singapore. Not only does the company have a reputation
for illegal domestic environmental destruction, it has also attracted consider-
able criticism from both environmental nongovernmental organizations and
the media for illegal logging in southern China. Thus this case helps to illustrate
how the environmental practices of the parent ‹rm in›uence those in its over-
seas subsidiaries. However, our interviews with APP executives and indepen-
dent researchers of the Chinese pulp and paper industry indicate that when ac-
cess to important developed-country markets became threatened by negative
media exposure and criticism by nongovernmental organizations, APP-China
gradually modi‹ed its behavior and introduced more environmentally friendly
policies, procedures, and technologies in its China operations. By illustrating
how the transmission belt effect of its trade relationships produced these unex-
pected outcomes, this case study helps to strengthen our central theoretical ar-
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gument about how trade and, more speci‹cally, developed-country exports can
ratchet up the environmental standards and operating procedures in develop-
ing countries.
Before proceeding, a few words about our case selection are in order. In-
stead of illustrating our argument with a company with a sound reputation for
environmental protection, we choose to focus on APP, which has long been al-
leged to employ destructive forestry practices in Indonesia and elsewhere in the
world. The country-of-origin argument presented in earlier chapters should
lead us to expect that the Indonesia-based APP should be even less environ-
mentally responsible than a Chinese ‹rm. However, the evidence presented be-
low suggests that APP has demonstrated subtle changes in its environmental
behavior in China. We conjecture, in line with our previous arguments, that the
behavioral change results from an attempt to maintain continued developed-
world export market access. APP represents a hard case where one should ‹nd
the least support for our argument, and yet we found con‹rming evidence for
our contentions. Compared to a case study based on analyses of a “good” cor-
porate citizen, our strategy allows us to provide stronger evidence about how
linkages with the international market can compel changes in a company’s en-
vironmental practices.
The causal mechanisms illustrated in this chapter highlight the importance
of several key dimensions of economic integration on the Chinese environ-
ment at the ‹rm level, demonstrating in particular the importance of country
of origin and export destinations to those interactions. Drawing on ‹rm-level
evidence from the paper and pulp industry, an industry considered to be highly
polluting and energy and waste intensive, this chapter sheds light on both the
process through which the environmental practices of the parent ‹rm affect
those of its subsidiaries and the process through which pressure emanating
from export markets can ratchet up a ‹rm’s environmental policies, standards,
and procedures, even when it is considered a heavy polluter.
In the next section, we address the rationale for our case selection in greater
detail and issues related to data and methodology. The chapter then turns to an
overview of the Chinese pulp and paper industry, followed by detailed analysis
of our industry case. We also discuss alternative explanations for the subtle al-
terations in APP’s behavior, noting that each of these explanations alone does
not account for the observed behavior. The chapter concludes by relating our
‹ndings to the key contentions of this project and discussing their theoretical
and policy implications.
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case selection, data sources, and methodology
Case studies are useful in the context of this book because they allow us to re-
inforce our prior ‹ndings with evidence derived from the ‹rm level. Our case
study draws on the process-tracing procedure, which places the process leading
to the observed policy outcomes at the center of the investigation, to support
our key theoretical contentions. By focusing on the motivations, behavior, and
responses of the key actors involved in the process, our research strategy allows
us to test our central theoretical propositions to see if the FDI country of origin
and the export destination(s) of the ‹rm do indeed affect its environmental
policies and procedures through the posited causal mechanisms.
Our case study focuses on the Chinese pulp and paper industry. Our pri-
mary corporate case is APP, a subsidiary of the Sinar Mas conglomerate for-
merly of Indonesia and now based in Singapore. APP is currently one of the
world’s largest paper manufacturers with extensive operations in China and
across the globe. In choosing our individual corporate case study, we sought a
foreign invested ‹rm that not only provides an empirical backdrop to our
process illustration but was also representative of the industry at large. Rather
than stacking the deck with an MNC that is an exemplar of corporate environ-
mental responsibility and had never been identi‹ed with a scandalous or nega-
tive exploit, we sought a ‹rm that is truly representative of the paper industry.
While it had at one point been faulted with its destructive forestry practices, APP
has demonstrated signs of improved conduct due to concerns about loss of
overseas market shares brought about by negative NGO campaign and media
exposure. Such subtle yet perceptible changes in APP’s behavior toward greater
environmental responsibility lend support to both legs of our argument.
We draw upon a number of different sources in this analysis in order to
provide the most comprehensive evidence of the processes driving the patterns
demonstrated by the data in previous chapters. First, interviews were con-
ducted with representatives from both the corporate headquarters and an APP
subsidiary. These interviews were designed to generate insight into the behav-
ior of speci‹c ‹rms operating within the industry. Although our arguments
about the outcomes of ‹rm behavior are all external to the ‹rm itself, these in-
terviews provide us with insight into the internal processes that lead to these
outcomes. We supplemented these interviews with a thorough review of avail-
able corporate literature, ‹nancial statements, shareholder reports, capital ex-
penditures on environmental policy directives, and environmental budget allo-
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cations to determine the extent of corporate monetary emphasis on environ-
mental sustainability.
Second, in order to account for the possibility that ‹rms may be less than
forthcoming with disclosures of unscrupulous environmental behavior or that
‹rm emphasis on environmental sustainability was mere window dressing, we
conducted interviews with the Forest Stewardship Council, an industry-
speci‹c international environmental nongovernmental organization operating
in China. The organization provides supervision of the corporate actions of
APP and similar ‹rms, and lends additional validation to the data collected
from APP. We also conducted interviews with researchers in the Research Insti-
tute of Forestry Policy & Information at the Chinese Academy of Forestry and
a professional private pulp and paper industry market research ‹rm, Brian
Stafford and Associates, both of which analyze the Chinese pulp and paper in-
dustry and speci‹c pulp and paper ‹rms. By pursuing a variety of sources we
attempt to check both the statements provided by the mills themselves and the
environmental NGOs monitoring them, as the two have been known to be
quite antagonistic toward one another.
Finally, we relied heavily on both English and Chinese language news
sources to provide evidence of environmentally destructive corporate activity
not mentioned by the ‹rms or environmental NGOs and to substantiate or
contradict the information they did provide.
the pulp and paper industry
In many ways the pulp and paper industry proves to be an ideal candidate for
an analysis of corporate environmental behavior. The pulp and paper industry,
both in China and globally, has been the focus of worldwide attention for envi-
ronmental pollution. In the past few decades regulatory authorities and the
global public have applied pressure on the industry to reduce sulfur dioxide
emission, eliminate chlorine in pulp and paper manufacturing, and cut back on
the production of dioxin, a highly toxic chemical, in wastewater streams. In
Southeast Asia, the pulp and paper industry underwent signi‹cant technologi-
cal and material modernization in the 1980s and 1990s as a result of pressure
from government, environmental groups, and global and regional institutions,
as well as technological innovation in both public and private sectors. However,
while the industry has made considerable strides toward ecological moderniza-
tion, it remains highly dependent on raw materials from the developing world.
Moreover, many older and less technologically developed small and medium-
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sized enterprises in Southeast Asia’s pulp and paper industry remain heavily
polluting.1
Dating back to antiquity, the craft of paper manufacturing has a long his-
tory in China.2 Unfortunately after a couple of millennia or so papermaking
has not yet reached an environmentally sustainable equilibrium as the paper
and pulp industry’s environmental impact encompasses not only water and air
pollution but also forest extraction, habitat destruction, and deserti‹cation.3 In
China, paper and paperboard manufacturing has been cited as the source of 16
percent of China’s wastewater emissions (second only to chemical manufactur-
ing), 33 percent of its chemical oxygen demand (COD), and the largest source
of rural pollution.4 In real terms, that amounts to somewhere in the neighbor-
hood of 3.18 billion tons of wastewater and 1.48 million tons of COD per year
and growing. Despite industrial technological advances such as elemental chlo-
rine-free bleach (ECFB), many of the smaller and less advanced mills still in op-
eration use pollutants such as chlorine dioxide, sulfur, and various alkalis in the
pulp preparation and bleaching process, much of which is discharged directly
into adjacent bodies of water.5 The relatively recent development of environ-
mentally ameliorative technology and its relatively widespread use in paper
mills in industrialized countries belie the destruction that outdated technology
and poor managerial skill have brought to developing-country environments.
At the beginning of the Chinese reform period, government-owned mills
were largely wood- or reed-based and equipped with secondhand recondi-
tioned machines that had become uncompetitive in the West. This “old indus-
try” was composed of literally thousands of small mills that had no chemical re-
covery, and all solid ef›uent was vented to river systems, resulting in high levels
of pollution. Though technological developments are increasing the sustain-
ability of this industry, papermaking in China still has a long way to go to reach
a sustainable equilibrium.
The Chinese government closed many of the old mills in the past decade to
mitigate the environmental impact of paper production and to increase indus-
try productivity and ef‹ciency.6 The pulp and paper industry in China today
has been diversi‹ed to include mills owned by the Chinese government, some
of which have been privatized, and mills established by private entrepreneurs,
notably foreign-invested mills such as APP, April Fine Paper China, Interna-
tional Paper, Stora Enso, UPM Kymenne, and Norske Skog. During the restruc-
turing process the Chinese government offered incentives to both domestic and
foreign investors to provide capital to accommodate restructuring, ensure ade-
quate ‹ber supply growth, and sustain booming domestic demand.
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In 2002, the National Development and Planning Commission (NDPC)
gave a rating of “encouraged” to several paper industry subsectors in which it
sought foreign investment, including wood base development for pulp and pa-
per processing, large-scale chemical and mechanical pulping, and high-grade
paper and paperboard (excluding newsprint).7 The NDPC also conferred
signi‹cant authority to provincial of‹cials over the foreign investment ap-
proval process in an effort to diminish bureaucratic impediments and enable
fast-track approval for integrated pulp-paper projects, or those that couple
fast-growing plantations with pulp and paper production. To enhance the at-
tractiveness of the industry to foreign investors, provincial of‹cials were given
the ability to offer tax rate subsidies, tax holidays, and fee waivers.8 These poli-
cies have created a favorable investment environment for foreign investors. And
investors have taken note. Between 2001 and 2005 the number of foreign in-
vested ‹rms in paper and paperboard manufacturing jumped from 740 to
1,296, while the overall industry grew from 5,027 to 8,376 ‹rms.9
Unfortunately, along with creating a fertile climate for investment, devolu-
tion of authority from the central to the provincial level, combined with a cen-
tral mandate to increase investment in this industrial sector, has increased the
opportunity for provincial of‹cials to relax environmental regulations to at-
tract investors. In this sector, perhaps more so than in many others, a provincial
relaxation of environmental enforcement mechanisms may be a signi‹cant at-
traction for unscrupulous manufacturers. Though a loosening of ef›uent dis-
charge standards would likely have an appeal to many pulp and paper manu-
facturers, as these mills produce tremendous amounts of wastewater, a very
signi‹cant (and visible) attraction exists for integrated pulp and paper manu-
facturers who must rely on wood-based pulp for their industrial output rather
than recycled wastepaper or straw-based ‹ber supply. Mills of this sort produce
pulp for paper that requires the longer and stronger ‹bers found in virgin tim-
ber, for example, high-grade printing paper, art paper, and writing paper. Be-
cause virgin timber has such high water content, long distance timber trans-
portation is less cost effective than local sourcing and in general not a feasible
long-term supply strategy. As such, pulp mill sites are heavily dependent on
proximity to existing local timber supplies or the opportunity to develop tree
plantations for future use. For these manufacturers, the ability to harvest exist-
ing sites and/or develop new ones is not only signi‹cant; it is an industrial ne-
cessity. This opens the door for the possibility of race-to-the-bottom and pol-
lution-haven-seeking behavior to occur between local and provincial of‹cials
and pulp and paper manufacturers. Environmental protection in this sector de-
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pends heavily on the desire of local administrators to enforce the law and the
enthusiasm of pulp and paper manufacturers to follow it. Indeed, the evidence
suggests that there are large behavioral disparities among ‹rms with respect to
their willingness to abide by host-country environmental laws. Our ‹ndings
imply that these disparities are rooted in the core ‹rm values and operating
standards cultivated from home-country environmental laws and norms and
the different characteristics of global export destinations. This chapter demon-
strates that the effects of economic integration on host-country environments
and the likelihood of ‹rm pollution-haven-seeking behavior depend heavily on
the national origin of multinational ‹rms, and the markets in which they do
business.
asia pulp & paper 
A subsidiary of the Indonesian Sinar Mas Group, APP is a major international
company specializing in pulp and paper production. APP ‹rst established its
presence in China in 1994. Since then, APP’s illegal logging practices in both
China and Indonesia have caught the attention of the international media and
environmental NGOs. The negative media exposure of APP’s forestry practices,
coupled with poor ‹nancial performance that resulted in a major default on its
loans, sent APP’s shares tumbling and caused it to be delisted from the New
York Stock Exchange in early 2001. However, at a time when APP’s global busi-
nesses seemed to be in trouble, its China operations underwent a surprising ex-
pansion to include almost 20 pulp and paper enterprises and more than 20
plantation sites. By 2008, APP-China’s annual production capacity reached over
5 million tons and its total assets were valued at about RMB 56 billion.10
Forest Practices under Fire: The In›uence of Parent Firm’s 
Environmental Policies
This section reviews APP’s dubious green credentials in Indonesia and else-
where. In particular, by discussing APPs’ problematic natural forest practices in
Hainan and Yunnan provinces in China and linking such practices to the com-
pany’s alleged history of illegal logging in its home country, Indonesia, this sec-
tion sets the context for the following discussion about the impact of country
of origin and export destinations on APP’s behavior. We argue that APPs’ envi-
ronmental misconduct in China, speci‹cally with regard to illegal logging in
Hainan and Yunnan provinces, can be explained by the fact that APP originated
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in a country that has minimal environmental regulatory enforcement and
therefore failed to develop and follow an adequate corporate code of conduct.
APP and its parent ‹rm, Sinar Mas, have long been charged with extensive
Indonesian deforestation.11 Sinar Mas’s sustainable ‹ber supply practices ‹rst
ascended to the media spotlight in 2000. In November 2000, a study of the In-
donesian pulp and paper industry released by the Center for International
Forestry Research (CIFOR) pointed to APP’s problematic ‹ber sourcing prac-
tices, charging that it would likely clear large new areas of natural forest to meet
its raw material demands because of the low probability of securing sustainable
‹ber supplies from existing plantations.12 In addition, throughout the summer
of 2001, the British daily The Guardian published a series of articles detailing
the destructive impact of pulp and paper manufacturing on Indonesia’s
forests,13 leading one of Britain’s major paper suppliers, Robert Horne Group,
to temporarily suspend purchases from APP in August 2001. Interestingly, such
media and NGO attacks against APP took place at a time when the company
was also confronted with major ‹nancial troubles. The combination of these
problems caused share prices to tumble, leading APP to default on its debt in
March and to be delisted from the New York Stock Exchange in July. APP and
Sinar Mas Group’s ‹nancial weaknesses alerted ‹nancial analysts, paper buyers,
and other concerned parties to its unsustainable wood supply strategy and en-
abled environmental activists to drive home the point that tremendous pres-
sure on forest resources exerted by Indonesia’s pulp and paper industries en-
tailed considerable environmental as well as ‹nancial risks.
Evidence of APP and Sinar Mas Group’s destructive forestry practices con-
tinued to surface in the following years. For example, a 2003 report released by
Human Rights Watch highlighted the group’s destructive behavior in Riau and
Jambi provinces in Indonesia. The report pointed out that while APP and Sinar
Mas group held concessions for 500,000 hectares in those two provinces, the
rapid increase in ‹ber demand necessary to meet expanding production capac-
ity meant that even such a large area would be insuf‹cient. Moreover, as APP
claimed that only 50 percent of the above concession could be converted to
plantation due to land claims and “other problems,” it had plans to double the
area of plantation in the next few years by forming joint ventures with com-
munity cooperatives and companies with existing permits.14
The Sinar Mas Group’s problematic forestry practices in Indonesia help to
explain why APP has received such wide public criticism about its logging prac-
tices in Yunnan and Hainan provinces. As its parent company was headquar-
tered in a country with lax environmental regulations and plagued by its own
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environmental woes, it is not surprising that APP-China’s environmental prac-
tices are in›uenced by Sinar Mas’s groupwide policies and re›ect certain conti-
nuities with the latter’s long-standing practices. Indeed, in both Hainan and
Yunnan provinces, APP’s forestry policies have drawn considerable public
scrutiny. The following sections brie›y survey evidence of such problematic
practices.
Case 1: APP’s Hainan Operations
APP’s forestry practices in Hainan province in southern China have been the
focus of much media and NGO criticism. APP started to develop its Hainan
operations in 1995. In 1997, APP established the Jinhai Forestry Co., Ltd. This
subsidiary introduced a fast-growing high-yielding eucalyptus program. In
March 2005, the Jinhai Pulp and Paper Plant went into production. According
to Greenpeace, poor management and the commencement of Jinhai’s opera-
tions exerted tremendous pressure on Hainan’s deteriorating forests and bio-
diversity. For example, Greenpeace charged that APP failed to plant enough
trees in Hainan to meet its commitment to regenerate forest cover, as the actual
area of forest cultivation, 64,666 hectares, was 70 percent below the original
plan. Furthermore, experts from Hainan estimated that the pulp-yielding euca-
lyptus timber area only accounted for a quarter of the total eucalyptus area men-
tioned above, falling far short of Jinhai Pulp Mill’s desired pulp production ca-
pacity of 1 million tons per year. According to Greenpeace, the huge supply gap
in raw materials subsequently led APP to exploit the natural forest resources in
Hainan under the guise of “reforestation.” In the spring of 2004 Greenpeace
published its investigative report of APP’s Hainan practices, presenting substan-
tial evidence that APP was destroying Hainan’s natural forests.15 An investigative
report released by Caijing magazine went even further, claiming that APP’s ‹rst
illegal logging in Hainan took place much earlier than this case.
Case 2: APP’s Yunnan Operations
APP’s logging practices in the southwestern Yunnan province have attracted an
even greater amount of media coverage and public outcry than did its actions
in Hainan. In August 2002, APP signed an agreement with the Yunnan provin-
cial government to develop a eucalyptus forest-pulp-paper integration pro-
gram, covering almost two million hectares in the province. According to me-
dia reports, while the project was pending approval by the central government,
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APP started to fell trees without any permits in order to clear land for its 1.83
million hectares forest-pulp plantation. Several environmental groups coun-
tered APP’s argument that the project would be undertaken on barren waste-
land, pointing out that most of the project actually took place on primary
forestland. Following six months of ‹eld investigations, Greenpeace released
The Investigative Report on APP’s Forest Destruction in Yunnan in November
2004, disclosing APP’s practice of clearing forests for plantations in Yunnan,
similar to its conduct in Indonesia. A case study by Greenpeace reported that
APP had planned to set up a eucalyptus pulp base covering over 800,000
hectares of “barren land” in Simao prefecture, in Yunnan province. However, as
the region only had 186,666 hectares of nonforest land in total, this meant that
APP had planned to clear out 613,333 hectares of Simao’s forest to plant fast-
growing high-yielding eucalyptus trees for its expanding pulp production.16 In
the same year, the State Forestry Administration (SFA) released two investiga-
tive reports, in April and December, respectively, presenting evidence of APP’s
improper conduct in implementing the integration program. The SFA further
demanded APP to address the problem.
APP’s forestry practices in southern China have also attracted the attention
of other environmental groups and activists. For example, the Institute of Pub-
lic and Environmental Affairs, established by high-pro‹le Chinese environ-
mental activist Jun Ma, has blacklisted APP-China on its Green Responsibility
List of Chinese Enterprises.17 The World Wildlife Federation (WWF) has simi-
larly accused APP of illegal logging in the Simao region of Yunnan.
Perhaps the most damning indication of APP’s negative practices is the de-
cision by the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), an international nonpro‹t or-
ganization dedicated to promoting responsible global forest management
through standard setting, independent certi‹cation, and labeling of forest
products, to take away APP’s right to use the FSC logo in November 2007.
In August 2008, due to concerns about APP’s poor environmental record,
Greenpeace China and other environmental groups launched yet another ma-
jor initiative to prevent Gold East Paper from listing its shares on the Shanghai
stock market. Greenpeace and other environmental NGOs accused another
APP subsidiary, Hainan Jinhai Pulp & Paper Co., of long discharging polluting
gases and wastewater in excess of legal limits.18 Moreover, on June 10, 2008,
Suzhou City Environmental Protection Bureau found that Gold Hua Sheng Pa-
per had also exceeded legal pollution limits.19 The media and NGO reports
cited above provide strong indications of APP’s problematic environmental
conduct in China and its (once) home country of Indonesia.
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The Impact of Exports on Firm Environmental Practices
Much of APP’s poor forestry practices can be explained by the country-of-ori-
gin argument, which states that the environmental behavior of the parent ‹rm
of a company bears directly on that of its subsidiaries. However, after APP’s in-
vestment and establishment in China, the real judgment that needs to be made
is whether pressure emanating from customers and other sources (such as
NGOs) has led to any perceptible change in environmental behavior. Our
analysis suggests that developed-world trade relationships have mitigated some
of the negative effects of the parent ‹rm’s poor environmental practices. Our
detailed study of APP’s environmental management system indicates that the
company gradually changed its behavior when it became clear that developed-
world export relationships and corporate contracts were threatened by the ex-
posure of its negative environmental activities in China. Thus APP is a case
where one would not expect to see our argument work, but where we actually
do because of the in›uence of developed-world trade relationships. While
NGO activism and negative media coverage certainly acted as an intervening
variable by bringing APP’s forestry practices under close public scrutiny, it was
concern about how such negative publicity may affect corporate sales and ex-
ports that ultimately precipitated a reorientation of corporate environmental
strategy. The reoriented strategy eventually compelled APP subsidiaries to in-
troduce incremental modi‹cations to their environmental management sys-
tems, engage in regular environmental audits and assessments, and introduce
more environmentally friendly technology, in the process reducing pollution
emissions and mitigating the negative environmental impact of production.
APP-China exports to about sixty-‹ve countries around the world. Its main
export destinations include Europe, the United States, and Japan. Gold East Pa-
per, a major APP operation in Jiangsu province, sells about 30 percent of its art
paper in the world market and the remaining 70 percent in the domestic mar-
ket, with developed-world markets such as the United States, Canada, Europe,
and Japan making up the bulk of Gold East Paper’s total exports. Negative ex-
posure by nongovernmental environmental organizations and poor environ-
mental practices threatened APP’s access to its major export markets. For ex-
ample, due to negative media coverage of APP’s logging practices in southern
China, the Japanese company Ricoh, the German company Metro, and some
retail stores in the United States such as Of‹ce Depot and Wal-Mart have
stopped purchasing APP products. In early 2008, Staples Inc., the largest U.S.
of‹ce supply retailer, which historically purchased about 5 percent of its paper
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products from APP, announced that it would sever its business ties due to envi-
ronmental concerns.20 In August 2007, an Australian-owned New Zealand su-
permarket chain, Woolworths, pulled more than 10,000 rolls and packets of pa-
per products off the market in response to claims by environmentalists that the
Select brand of paper products it carried was made from illegally logged rain
forests in Indonesia by APP.21 In August 2008, under relentless pressure from
the Wake Up Woolworths campaign spearheaded by Woolworth’s shareholders,
and unable to provide independent veri‹cation that the products were sourced
in a sustainable manner, Woolworths terminated its contract with APP for the
supply of the company’s Select paper products.22
There is evidence that with its access to the export market in jeopardy, APP
has been gradually mending its course by implementing more environmentally
friendly management systems and technology in its China operations. As a
matter of fact, both the APP headquarters in Shanghai and Gold East Paper
have been remarkably forthcoming with our interview requests and have sup-
plied detailed information about the company’s environmental operations.
As one of the world’s largest, vertically integrated pulp and paper companies,
APP-China recognizes that sustainable development is the foundation for long-
term business success. In addition to this commitment, the concerns of stake-
holders and customers from around the world are also an important factor in
implementing [the company’s] environmental management strategies.23
Interviews with independent researchers of the Chinese forestry industry
con‹rm this impression. For example, an independent researcher at the Re-
search Institute of Forestry Policy and Information under the Chinese Acad-
emy of Forestry suggests that the problems of APP are often not as severe as re-
ported. Nor is the APP the only company with such problems in China.
According to this source, as APP plans to expand in China on a long-term basis
and establish itself as one of the largest paper manufacturers in the world, it still
needs to demonstrate the sustainability of its operations to retain consumer
con‹dence and to maintain positive brand image.24 With its access to export
markets threatened by negative publicity, APP-China has gradually introduced
measures to strengthen its environmental management system and introduce
more advanced technology to reduce ef›uent discharge and ameliorate the
negative environmental impact of its China operations. APP-China’s strategic
reorientation lends further support to our argument about how developed-
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world customer relations can compel subtle changes in a company’s behavior
toward more sustainable environmental practices.
Changes in APP’s Environmental Behavior: Evidence from Fieldwork
We conducted interviews with the sustainability departments at both APP-
China’s headquarters in Shanghai and in one of APP’s subsidiaries—Gold East
Paper, located in the city of Zhenjiang in Jiangsu province. Gold East Paper,
which bills itself as the “single largest art paper mill in the world,”25 was origi-
nally formed as a joint venture with a branch company of the Zhenjiang Light
Industry Bureau—Jin Da Industrials Trade Co. We asked questions regarding
the company’s overall environmental management strategy, environmental
management system, motivations for the development of advanced technol-
ogy, the impact of local Chinese environmental regulations on the company’s
environmental practices, the implementation of either internal or external en-
vironmental audits, and the company’s overall record in emission reduction.
This section provides a summary of APP’s and Gold East’s responses to each of
the above sets of questions. In doing so, it also tries to provide external valida-
tion of our corporate interview data by supplementing it with interview data
from independent researchers of the forestry industry and other secondary
sources.
Environmental Management Strategy
APP-China develops its environmental management strategy in consultation
with key stakeholders, outside environmental experts, and assessment organiza-
tions. According to our interviews with the APP headquarters in China, APP has
come to the realization that the long-term development and even the survival of
the enterprise go hand in hand with environmental care. Consequently the com-
pany’s environmental strategy, from forest to mill, draws on international best
practices and advanced technology to minimize the negative environmental
spillovers of its production. To achieve this goal, the company seeks to promote
sustainable plantation development and biodiversity conservation and employ
advanced technology in managing forests and production facilities.26
With regard to its forestry strategy, APP ‹rst began implementing the for-
est-pulp-paper project in 1994. It has made it a company policy to adhere to its
environmental commitment of “using one tree after planting six.”27 According
to secondary sources, the company’s forest plantation practices follow a set of
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standard guidelines. First, it strives to select seeds of diversi‹ed species well
suited to local geographical conditions in order to avoid genetic narrowing.
Second, on the basis of remote sensing data and investigation, APP sources
wasteland, barren mountains, abandoned farmland, and ecologically degraded
scrub forests in areas permitted by the government. Such practices presumably
allow APP to stay away from natural forests with a canopy density of above 0.2,
thus ensuring wood supply volume and carbon sequestration provision. Third,
APP-China’s plantations use fast-growing acacia and eucalyptus varieties that
grow to maturity and are harvested in six years. In doing so, the ‹rm has
adopted a recycling operation model in which planting and logging are under-
taken in batches according to logging rotation cycles. For example, APP fells
about only one-sixth of the trees that grow to their full size in six years and
leaves the remaining trees intact.28 According to company reports, since its ini-
tial operations in China, APP has planted trees on 3 million mu (200,000
hectares) of land, which has helped to absorb carbon dioxide and prevent soil
erosion in areas once known for severe soil erosion and deserti‹cation such as
the Mahuang Mountain Range and West Forest Farm in Dongfangdao, both lo-
cated in Hainan province.29
With regard to pulp and paper production, APP considers it important to
have each step of the production strictly conform to the standards of its envi-
ronmental management system. Overall, it has sought to follow the resource re-
cycling usage policy and to achieve the long-term development of natural re-
sources by integrating forest planting, pulp production, and papermaking into
the so-called plantation-pulp-paper green cycle. APP claimed that, as of De-
cember 2006, it has invested over US$400 million (or RMB 3 billion) in more
than 300,000 hectares of fast-growing, high-yield eucalyptus plantations in ten
provinces and autonomous regions in China and has carried out forestation ef-
forts with the help of its village partners.30 Since 2006, the company has also re-
portedly invested RMB 4.38 million in plantation and biodiversity protection
research.31
As part of its environmental strategy and commitment, APP-China hosted
the “Sustainable Future of China’s Paper Industry—Paper Contract with
China” forum in partnership with the National Plantation Products Industry of
China and the Forest and Paper Association in Hainan in 2008. The “Paper
Contract with China” that resulted from this conference spelled out 22 com-
mitments with detailed sustainability action plans the company planned to un-
dertake in ‹ve key areas: sustainable forestry; clean production; energy conser-
vation and emissions reduction; corporate social responsibility initiatives; and
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assistance to local community development. Under these guidelines, APP-
China has obligated itself to engage in sustainable forestry practices in places
where the company does business, strongly promote energy-saving and waste-
reduction policies, strengthen education of environmental protection, reduce
carbon footprint throughout the business, and actively contribute to economic
and community development by creating employment opportunities, investing
in infrastructure construction in rural areas, building more schools, and offer-
ing training courses to local residents.32 Since the signing of this contract, APP-
China has issued quarterly updates on progress made with regard to the above
commitments. In order to meet these commitments, it has also set clear targets
for water consumption for paper/pulp per ton, wastewater emissions for pa-
per/pulp per ton, and COD emissions. Overall, the “Paper Contract with
China” signals the company’s commitment to expand its operations on a sus-
tainable basis in an attempt to counter NGO accusations of environmental
standard violation.
Environmental Management System
According to our interviews with APP-China and Gold East, APP-China has a
groupwide team in charge of environmental issues that supervises the work of
environmental departments in each APP subsidiary. Speci‹cally, the Business
Enhancement Team, housed in the APP headquarters, assumes overall responsi-
bility for managing and monitoring the implementation of the company’s sus-
tainability initiatives and for coordinating company-wide sustainability initia-
tives. This team, headed by one of APP-China’s vice presidents and consisting of
representative members from each mill’s environmental protection department,
holds the APP group environmental protection meetings every three months. In
addition, each mill has its own environmental protection and sustainability re-
search department in charge of implementing sustainability initiatives, promot-
ing the development of new technology and production methods, and monitor-
ing the company’s environmental performance to ensure that the mill’s ef›uents
meet stated environmental targets. Furthermore, APP-Indonesia has a depart-
ment of sustainability and stakeholder engagement, whose director reports di-
rectly to the company’s CEO and participates in the development and imple-
mentation of APP-China’s environmental sustainability initiatives.
With regard to environmental ‹nancial planning, each mill makes yearly
environmental protection budgets and forecasts for the following year’s budget
on the basis of its own fresh water input, wastewater output, power and chem-
ical consumption, and so forth.
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Environmental Technology
APP-China has sought to use modern equipment and production technologies
in its production lines. While the equipment used by APP subsidiaries in their
papermaking and pulping processes varies in quality, it is differentiated pri-
marily by the age of the speci‹c mill under consideration, as the newer ones are
generally better equipped and use more modern technology. At the same time,
the company increasingly emphasizes environmentally friendly production
procedures to lower cost, conserve energy, and reduce the amount of ef›uent
and exhaust discharge. Each mill purchases its technology on the world market
and undertakes some minor modi‹cations to adapt the equipment and tech-
nology to the special requirements of local production. In addition, APP takes
into account environmental protection in its new research and development
projects as well as in the future expansion of the mills.33 According to our in-
terviews and company reports, key motivations for the development and im-
plementation of advanced technology relate to considerations about industry
competitiveness. An executive at APP-China’s headquarters put it this way.
Technology provides the only way to achieve sustainable development of the
forestry industry in China. . . . In terms of our processing facilities, we are com-
mitted to using state-of-the-art technology to improve ef‹ciency and to de-
crease environmental impact. We are strongly committed to the philosophy of
continuous improvement and the use of best available technologies with the
long-term goal of producing carbon neutral paper. One of our main motiva-
tions in developing and using new technology is to increase production and im-
prove energy ef‹ciency and fuel mix.34
Guided by this philosophy, company executives interviewed suggested that
APP-China’s plantation forest areas in Guangxi, Hainan, and Guangdong
provinces have been applying technologically advanced machinery and meth-
ods for breeding, trimming, cutting, and peeling since the late 1990s in an at-
tempt to enhance forest and plantation ef‹ciency. In addition, as a result of its
commitment to continuous technological development in its processing facili-
ties, the technology employed by APP-China compares favorably with other
foreign-funded enterprises in many areas.35
Environmental considerations are a signi‹cant factor in APP’s technologi-
cal development. To counter accusations by environmental NGOs, APP-China
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argued that Gold East Paper and its six subsidiaries have invested as much as
RMB 4.4 billion in the development of environmentally friendly production fa-
cilities to ensure that their emission levels meet and exceed national and indus-
try standards.36 It has also made a combined investment of RMB 1.7 billion to
develop advanced alkali recycling systems in its Jinhai Pulp Factory.37
According to a China Daily article, APP has put in a good amount of in-
vestment in the development of an alkali recycling system that both cuts down
on the cost of production and is friendly to the environment. The system not
only recycles all the “black ›uid” produced during pulping but also makes use
of the heat produced from burning such ›uids to generate electricity. This re-
cycling system also uses waste such as bark and chips as fuel for boilers. The
white clay created by the alkali recycling system is in turn sent to a lime kiln to
be recycled.38
According to APP-China, the emphasis on the utilization of advanced tech-
nology has allowed it to increase the ef‹ciency of its production, improve the
quality of its pulp and paper products, and reduce water and energy consump-
tion and ef›uent discharge. For example, in 2006, to generate one ton of paper,
APP-China used 16.7 percent less coal and 4.3 percent less electricity compared
to the amount used in 2005. The surplus energy was supplied to the local grid.39
Moreover, the executives of Gold East Paper interviewed suggest that the com-
pany uses environmentally friendly equipment for its power plant. In addition
to reducing temperature inside the boiler to restrain the generation of nitrous
oxide, Gold East feeds a large quantity of production waste into boiler coal to
attain desulfurization by calcium carbonate.40
With regard to technological cooperation, Gold East Paper Mill has an in-
dependent R&D center, which also cooperates with Beijing University on paper
quality and calcium carbonate ‹ller research projects. APP-China has plans to
construct an APP R&D center on its Gold Hua Sheng mill site within the next
three years.41
As a result of its commitment to environmentally friendly operations, Gold
East Paper received the “National Environmentally Friendly Enterprises” award
in June 2004 from the Ministry of Environmental Protection, which, according
to the company, was the country’s highest environmental honor. In 2005,
Ningbo Zhonghua received the same award. In 2006, Jinhai Pulp and Paper re-
ceived the “Environment-Friendly Project” award, also issued by the Ministry
of Environmental Protection. In 2007, Gold East Paper became the ‹rst
demonstration base of industrial tourism in China’s papermaking industry.42
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The Impact of Chinese Environmental Regulations on APP-China’s
Environmental Practices
According to APP-China, APP subsidiaries not only abide by local environ-
mental regulations but also frequently exceed those regulations. At a minimum,
APP mills strive to follow the Chinese government environmental protection
regulations in production design, mill installation, and customer service. Even
in areas where government regulations are the most stringent, such as in the
Yangtze river and Tai lake areas, where considerations about the protection of
the natural ecology and local fauna have resulted in government regulations re-
stricting or limiting the scope of paper manufacturing, APP subsidiaries have
made a good-faith effort to strictly abide by those regulations. An APP-China
executive described their practices in an interview.
APP abides by all local Chinese environmental regulations, and all other laws
and regulations. In many cases this does not impact our environmental prac-
tices because our policies already require a degree of environmental considera-
tion at or above the regulations. However, in some cases regulations have cre-
ated the need to adjust our practices.43
According to the same source, in some cases, APP mills’ performance even
exceeded local mandates. For example, in Hainan province, where APP’s Jinhai
pulp mill subsidiary is located, there is no speci‹c local COD standard for pulp
manufacturing. Instead, the Hainan government has a common COD standard
of 100 parts per million (ppm) for pulp production, which is more stringent
than the central government’s COD standard for pulp production of 400 ppm.
Jinhai mill not only met the local standards, it also exceeded those standards to
be “one of the ‹rst pulp mills in China to achieve a COD standard of less than
100 ppm.”44
When assessing the environmental performance of its subsidiaries, APP-
China uses standards set by APP headquarters, local environmental and legal
regulations, international standards, and independent third-party veri‹cation
and assessment. Examples of third-party assessment include Program for the
Endorsement of Forest Certi‹cation (PEFC) and ISO certi‹cations. More re-
cently, APP-China is undergoing a carbon footprint assessment of eight of its
mills in China in partnership with ESD Sinosphere, a major company provid-
ing environmental, social, and carbon management consulting services in
China. According to our interviews with APP, as a result of such a conscious at-
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tempt to adhere to strict environmental standards, each of the APP mill’s
ef›uents exceeds the local environmental regulatory standards. In part due to
its commitment to sustainable environmental operations, APP-China has been
recognized by the China Paper Association and the China Technical Associa-
tion of Paper Industry for its contributions to the development of the paper in-
dustry in China.45
Environmental Audits and Assessments
Whether a company conducts regular environmental audits and assessments is
another indication of environmental policy rigor. APP-China seems to hold up
well to this criterion. APP has an Environmental Protection and Industrial
Safety Division to ensure that each mill achieves the environmental protection
targets. This division holds a competition for mills in China and checks the Key
Performance Index (KPI) of each mill to identify the best- and worst-perform-
ing mill to encourage environmental protection. Every three months, this divi-
sion holds a meeting to exchange ideas about environmental protection and so-
licit suggestions about how to improve environmental technology. In addition
to internal audits, all APP-China’s factories are regularly monitored by local en-
vironmental protection departments, which not only record all emissions data
on a regular basis but also carry out random inspections from time to time.
Such inspections are often formal and conducted without prior notice. Mills
whose ef›uent discharge exceeds the local standards receive serious penalties.46
Another indication of APP-China’s commitment to sustainable environ-
mental practices is ISO 14001 certi‹cation. While ISO 14001 certi‹cation does
not set requirements for environmental performance or provide veri‹cation of
the achievement of these internal objectives, it does serve to certify the estab-
lishment of an internal environmental management system to identify, mea-
sure, and monitor the environmental impacts of the organization to ensure
continual improvement of those impacts. Judging by this criterion, APP-China
seems to have performed well. As of this writing, 14 of APP’s subsidiaries en-
gaged in pulp and paper manufacturing have received ISO certi‹cation. Each of
the remaining APP mills sets its own targeted time frame to achieve ISO 14001
certi‹cation. Ningbo Zhonghua was the ‹rst Chinese papermaking company to
receive ISO 14001 certi‹cation. Gold East Paper received ISO 14001 certi‹cation
in 2000, and an audit team has been conducting annual checks of the ‹rm since
that time. According to APP-China, the motivation for obtaining ISO 14001 and
other certi‹cations stems from APP’s “desire to operate according to interna-
tional standards and to have outside and independent veri‹cation of its envi-
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ronmental operating standards.”47 Table 7.1 presents detailed information
about APP subsidiaries that have achieved ISO 14001 certi‹cation.
APP-China subsidiaries have also undergone other external environmental
audits. As mentioned above, the company is undergoing a carbon footprint as-
sessment of eight mills in China in partnership with ESD Sinosphere, part of
the Camco Group, a global leader in engineering and environmental services
based in the United Kingdom. Also, the Jinhua Forestry Company of APP-
China’s Forestry Department has a professional academic organization moni-
toring the effectiveness of the company’s environmental operations. According
to company executives, APP-China receives reports from the organization peri-
odically and uses these reports as a reference in corporate decision making.
Several APP pulp and paper companies, including Gold East (Jiangsu),
Gold Huasheng Paper, Ningbo Zhonghua Paper, and Ningbo Asia Pulp & Pa-
per, have received certi‹cation from the PEFC, an independent, nongovern-
mental and nonpro‹t organization that promotes sustainable forest manage-
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TABLE 7.1. ISO 14001 Certification of APP-China Subsidiaries
Date of Certifying 
APP-China Subsidiary Certification Agency
Ningbo Zhonghua Paper Industry Co., Ltd. March 1999 SGS
Asia Paper (Shanghai) Co., Ltd. December 1999 DNV Shanghai
Center for EMS
Jin Yu (Qing Yuan) Tissue Paper July 2000 DNV
Industry Co., Ltd.
Jinxin (Qing Yuan) Paper Industry July 2000 DNV
Co., Ltd.
Gold Hai Paper Products (Kunshan) October 2000 SGS
Co., Ltd.
Yalong Paper Products (Kunshan) December 2000 DNV
Co., Ltd.
Gold East Paper (Jiangsu) Co., Ltd. December 2000 SGS
Ningbo Paper Converting Co., Ltd. March 2001 CQC
Ningbo Asia Paper Tube & Carton March 2001 CQC
Box Co., Ltd.
Ningbo Asia Unpolluted Paper March 2001 CQC
Products Co., Ltd.
Gold Huasheng Paper (Suzhou January 2002 CQC
Industrial Park) Co., Ltd.
Gold Hong Ye Paper (Suzhou Industrial February 2002 CQC
Park) Co., Ltd.
Jinhai Pulp & Paper Co., Ltd. May 2006 EIC
Ningbo Asia Paper Co., Ltd. August 2006 CQC
Source: APP-China corporate headquarters.
ment through independent third-party certi‹cation.48 From the point of view
of APP, having each pulp and paper mill receive this certi‹cation signals the
company’s commitment to environmentally friendly practices.
Ef›uent Treatment and Emission Reduction
An important criterion for judging the effectiveness of a company’s environ-
mental management is the actual level of emissions. This section draws pri-
marily on the example of Gold East to illustrate how growing attention to en-
vironmental protection has led the company to deliver emissions outcomes
that compare favorably with China’s industry benchmark. As a result of more
rigorous enforcement of environmental guidelines, the active promotion of
clean production, and increased paper recycling, Gold East has achieved con-
siderable progress in its ef›uent treatment and emission reduction targets. For
example, in 2005, Gold East added an ef›uent treatment line with a daily treat-
ment capacity of 25,000 tons, in addition to its (then) capacity of 50,000 tons.
Further, as of 2008, each of its pollutant discharge indices was performing
above global benchmarks.49
Gas Emission Reduction. In 2007, Gold East Paper’s production capacity
increased by 8 percent and boiler load rate increased by 5 percent. One particu-
lar challenge to clean production was the dif‹culty of procuring low sulfur
coal, which led the average sulfur content of boiler-in›aming coal to increase
from 0.5 to 1 percent. In order to ensure that gas emission reached the national
standards, Gold East invested RMB 2.8 million to reconstruct the boiler lime-
stone conveying system and to increase the uploading capacity from 5 tons per
hour to 45 tons per hour. As a result of this initiative, in 2007 the total produc-
tion of SO2 was 4,350 tons and reclaimed gas for producing calcium carbonate
reached 0.5 billion normal meter cubed (Nm3). Accordingly the company was
able to reduce the amount of SO2 emission by 302 tons after neutralization
treatment.
Gold East has also engaged in various energy-saving activities to reduce
coal consumption and thereby reduce CO2 generation. In 2007, reconstruction
projects allowed the company to reduce total coal consumption by 5,965 tons,
which resulted in a 9,126-ton reduction in CO2 emission. At the same time the
company increased the comprehensive utilization and consumption of gas. In
2007, the PCC plant used limestone with CO2 from power plant gas to synthe-
size coating color and paper ‹ller, thus reducing CO2 emissions by 89,525 tons
from the previous year. Gold East used discharged carbon dioxide directly to
produce calcium carbonate ‹ller for the papermaking process.
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Wastewater Treatment. Gold East Paper has also sought to promote
cleaner production and recyclable material usage. By optimizing the produc-
tion process through technological improvements, the mill has been able to re-
duce its whitewater concentration and increase the amount of ef›uents recy-
cled through the system. Gold East’s papermaking whitewater recovery rate is
90 percent. In 2007, the water consumption of the mill was reduced to below 
7.5 m3 of water for producing one ton of paper, a level well below the interna-
tional benchmark. The company uses recycled water for removing dust, clean-
ing roads, and irrigation. Due to its effective wastewater treatment, the waste-
water discharge of Gold East was only 13.7 percent of the national standard, and
its COD discharge amounted to only 7.31 percent of the national standard in
2004 (see table 7.2; see also table 7.3 for Gold East’s latest water emissions and
consumption data).
Wastepaper Recycling. Another APP subsidiary, Ningbo Zhonghua Paper
Co., Ltd., one of the largest manufacturers of white paperboard in China, has
developed signi‹cant paper recycling experience. Ningbo Zhonghua collects
discarded newsprint, of‹ce paper, and magazines from residential and business
communities, and reuses them as raw materials for paper production. Eighty-
‹ve percent of the raw material it uses for pulp production originates from
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TABLE 7.2. Comparison of Gold East Drainage and
COD Discharge Standards
Gold East National German
Standard Standard Standard
Drainage (m3/t) 8.19 60 11.2
COD (kg/t) 0.439 6 3
Source: “Environmental Revolution of the Paper Industry—APP’s
Development in China,” China Daily, May 17, 2005.
TABLE 7.3. Latest Emissions and Consumption Data for APP-China
Proposed Data in Domestic International
Item Unit Target August 2008 Standard Standard
Water consumption per ton of paper ton 10 9.46 — 12–18
Wastewater emitted per ton of paper ton 9 8.65 60 —
COD emitted per ton of paper kg 0.61 0.61 6 —
Water consumption per ton of pulp ton 28 29.3 — 35–41
Wastewater emitted per ton of pulp ton 17 21.3 220 27
Source: APP-China headquarters in Shanghai.
Note: — = no standard presently exists.
wastepaper. Based on these recycling techniques, Ningbo Zhonghua was able to
recently implement a paperboard production line with world-leading tech-
nologies, and it consistently meets China’s national paper whiteness stan-
dards.50 Through the above practices, Ningbo Zhonghua has also been able to
implement a new process of producing art board from recycled pulp.
Solid Waste Reduction. Gold East has sought to control the production
process in order to reduce the level of solid waste. To avoid pollution, the solid
waste is transformed into recyclable materials through internal and external
channels. In 2007 the overall recycling rate of generated solid waste was 99.8
percent. In order to reduce the amount of residue discharge, the mill reengi-
neered the power station’s fuel transition system in 2002 so that residue from
the production lines could be used as fuel for power generation. Sewage blocks
and marble residue were used as fuel along with coal. This helped to reduce the
solid waste discharge, facilitate the desulfurization of the emission, and reduce
the cost of limestone procurement.
alternative explanations
In this section, we address several alternative explanations that could affect the
validity of our argument. Above all, it is important to note that our APP case
study introduces an important agent pushing for corporate environmental re-
sponsibility that so far has not received extensive treatment in this project: en-
vironmental NGOs. The following discussion about APP’s alleged illegal
forestry practices in Indonesia and China reveals that environmental NGOs
were indeed instrumental in exposing the company’s problematic environmen-
tal policies. However, while recognizing their important role in raising public
awareness of APP’s environmental record and in in›icting reputation harm on
the company, NGO activism did not constitute the only source of pressure on
APP to adopt more sustainable business practices. Indeed, our detailed case
study suggests that considerations about how such negative media and NGO
exposure might jeopardize the company’s key overseas markets and threaten
the long-term viability of its China operations ‹gured importantly in APP’s
calculations to improve its environmental conduct. Pressure from environ-
mental NGOs, while important, did not by itself lead to changes in APP’s be-
havior. Rather, we contend that it was the combined pressure from environ-
mental NGOs and customers in key export markets that helped to shape the
observed outcome.
Another potential explanation for the alterations in APP’s behavior is that
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the Chinese government has gradually tightened its oversight of the paper in-
dustry and sought to crack down on illegal logging and other polluting behav-
ior by the pulp and paper manufacturers. Indeed, in the past decade, the Chi-
nese government, acknowledging the need both to decrease the environmental
impact of its former state-owned enterprises and to restructure the industry to
support economic modernization and export growth, has gone to great lengths
to support industrial reform. For example, since 1996 the Chinese State Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency has succeeded in closing down thousands of
small-scale paper mills,51 considered by most to be the worst offenders.52 As an-
other, perhaps more dramatic example of governmental intervention, in 1998
the Chinese government enacted a complete ban on logging in thirteen
provinces and autonomous regions after devastating ›oods on the upper
Yangtze, made worse by logging-facilitated soil erosion, cost thousands of lives
and billions of dollars in damage, affecting over 250 million people.53 Since
then China’s government has succeeded in reforesting approximately 20 mil-
lion hectares of land, around a third of which are to be processed by timber-
based paper mills in the future.
Still another possible explanation for APP’s gradual change in behavior is
that in the early part of the decade, APP received a line of credit from the Chi-
nese government to bail it out of ‹nancial trouble. In late 2000, APP experi-
enced a period of ‹nancial meltdown as the maturation of several of the
group’s long-term ‹nancial obligations came at a time when it was also carry-
ing substantial short-term debts. Such a drastic deterioration in APP’s ‹nancial
position increased the risk exposure of Chinese ‹nancial institutions, because
about half of the US$3.6 billion debt that the company incurred through Chi-
nese expansion was owed to four large state-owned banks. Consequently in
March 2001, these four banks, headed by the Bank of China, entered into a col-
lective debt restructuring agreement with APP to ensure loan repayment that
included suspension of APP’s debt payments for six months and provision of
letters of credit to enable the company to engage in foreign trade and raw ma-
terial purchase.54 It has also been estimated that since then the state-owned
banks in China have forgiven at least US$660 million in loans extended to APP.
Given that APP has received substantial credit and loan forgiveness from
the Chinese government, it is conceivable that such ‹nancial assistance could
have been used as a carrot to stop APP from illegally logging natural forests.
However, we argue that the risk exposure for Chinese banks, along with the fact
that APP accounted for 29 percent of China’s paper industry (valued at US$24
billion a year in 2004),55 reduced the leverage of the Chinese government vis-à-
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vis APP over environmental protection. The need to ensure both debt repay-
ment and the continued viability of the paper industry likely meant that the
Chinese government, motivated by ‹nancial interests, turned a blind eye to
APP’s environmental record, even though it was trying to enforce more rigor-
ous oversight over the industry at the same time.
Finally, one could argue that the changes in APP’s environmental behavior
detailed above could be explained by the change in the company’s ownership
from Indonesian to Singaporean. As the latter country is presumably more en-
vironmental than the former, this could have helped to account for the reori-
entation of the company’s environment strategies. However, although the com-
pany’s headquarters moved to Singapore, it continued to rely on access to
low-cost timber concessions in Sumatra for much of its competitive advantage.
Between 1992 and 1998, Sinar Mas group developed APP into a major contender
for market share and revenue in the world pulp and paper industry. To ensure
the rapid expansion of APP, Sinar Mas moved its headquarters to Singapore.
The move was viewed as an attempt to reduce the company’s perceived risk
premiums by investors and maximize its credibility in North America and Eu-
rope by “dressing it up like a multinational” and listing it on the New York Stock
Exchange.56 To the extent that low-cost timber supplies from Indonesia contin-
ued to be critical to the company’s long-term development, APP’s green cre-
dentials remained dubious even after the change in ownership location.
In short, the above discussion suggests that an explanation focusing on the
role of environmental NGOs in enhancing APP’s awareness of the importance
of environmental protection, while important, does not by itself account for
the gradual changes in APP’s behavior. Moreover, there are weaknesses associ-
ated with arguments emphasizing the Chinese government’s crackdown on the
paper industry, APP’s ‹nancial dependence on the Chinese government, or the
change in the company’s ownership location. This reinforces our ‹nding about
the importance of consumer pressure in export markets on APP’s sustainabil-
ity practices.
conclusion: the overall impact of foreign
investment on the chinese paper and pulp industry
The APP case detailed above lends support to our argument about both the
in›uence of the environmental standards in the home country of investment
and that of world market linkages. On the one hand, APP-China has received a
considerable amount of negative publicity regarding illegal logging in southern
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China.57 Such negative media exposure is consistent with much of the criticism
that APP’s parent company, the Indonesia-based Sinar Mas Group, has received
from environmental NGOs and activists over the years. It is also consistent with
the country-of-origin argument regarding the environmental impact of FDI, as
APP’s questionable forestry practices in southern China can be explained by
Sinar Mas Group’s long-standing forestry practices in Indonesia, lax regulation
on the part of Chinese of‹cials, and APP’s ‹nancial troubles that pushed it to
meet production goals in the ‹rst few years of the operation’s establishment.
On the other hand, however, our interviews and secondary research indi-
cate that even for a company such as APP that has been in the international
spotlight for alleged illegal forestry practices, pressure from customers in key
export markets has served as a corrective to the company’s environmental prac-
tices. Reinforced by negative campaigning by environmental NGOs and ac-
tivists, such pressure emanating from the international marketplace has pro-
pelled the company to devote more attention and resources to environmental
protection and to ameliorate the negative environmental impact of its China
operations. While such changes in APP’s environmental policies are ongoing
and preliminary, they point to the potential for reputational and economic
considerations to produce subtle yet incremental changes in ‹rm behavior.
To be sure, the transformation in APP’s behavior is far from complete. To the
extent that APP’s environmental record still leaves much room for improvement
and to the extent that environmental NGOs will remain vigilant watchdogs of
corporate behavior, continued NGO criticism of APP’s environmental policies
and performance is to be expected. However, the key point of our contention is
that international trade linkages are generating subtle changes in APP’s conduct
as re›ected in both APP executives’ statements and in the company’s emissions
data. While discrepancies between the rhetoric and actual behavior of APP are
likely to remain for some time, the fact that the company’s overall policies and
strategies toward environmental protection point in the right direction suggests
the possibility of ongoing behavioral adaptation.
Importantly, our case study suggests that while negative media and NGO
campaigns no doubt played a major role in precipitating such a change in be-
havior by exposing APP’s illegal practices to public scrutiny, concern about bad
reputation leading to potential loss of sales and shares in export markets was
equally critical in APP’s recent initiatives to strengthen environmental manage-
ment and to improve its reputation as an environmentally responsible company.
In addition, it is important to note that while our case study does not pro-
vide direct evidence of the local diffusion of environmental technologies and
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management systems, it seems that foreign investment in the Chinese pulp and
paper industries did result in heightened competition for Chinese ‹rms. In
light of such competitive pressure from foreign ‹rms, domestic companies in-
creasingly had to innovate and to improve their management systems with re-
gard to production, quality control, customer service, ‹nancial, personnel, and
technological capacities in order to successfully meet the challenge in the Chi-
nese market. The introduction of advanced technology, in particular, has
helped domestic mills to become more ef‹cient and less polluting. Interviews
with independent researchers of the forest industry both in China and abroad
lend credence to this argument. For example, Brian Stafford, an independent
researcher and consultant in the pulp and paper industry in Australia and Asia,
suggested that if the Chinese had been left to make do with their old industry,
they would have had a lot more pollution than they now have. With foreign in-
vestment the industry has tripled in size. It has been transformed from the old
vegetable-pulp-based sector to one that is based on wood or imported market
pulp and has become a lot less polluting.58 While some foreign-invested ‹rms
may do better than others, in general they have exerted upward pressure on do-
mestic Chinese ‹rms to improve their environmental practices.
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chapter 8
Implications, Caveats, and Future 
Research Questions
This project examines the impact of trade and foreign investment on the envi-
ronment in China, a country that is undergoing both rapid industrialization and
unprecedented environmental degradation. Our empirical analyses provide a
strong critique of the race-to-the-bottom and pollution-haven arguments.
Rather than leading to further environmental damage, China’s economic inte-
gration has elevated domestic environmental standards by facilitating environ-
mental norm diffusion, technology and management practices transfer, and
through increased ‹rm accountability to environmental product and process
standards in developed markets. The ‹ndings in this analysis question the legit-
imacy of claims that cast globalization as necessarily environmentally degrad-
ing. This chapter discusses both the theoretical and policy implications of our
‹ndings and identi‹es questions for future research.1
theoretical implications
The ‹ndings of this project have implications both for the literature dealing
with the overall impact of globalization on the environment and for studies of
China’s participation in the international economy. This section discusses the
theoretical implications of our analyses.
Implications for the Literature on the Impact of Globalization 
on the Environment
The statistical analyses presented in the previous chapters suggest that interna-
tional economic integration has elevated environmental standards in China.
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First, foreign investors are not driven by a desire to seek out pollution havens in
their choice of an investment location, as provinces that attract large amounts
of FDI tend to engage in more rigorous environmental regulation. This result is
buttressed by survey analyses of business executives of international and do-
mestic ‹rms. The survey evidence demonstrates that foreign-invested compa-
nies in China are more likely to engage in self-regulation, go beyond compli-
ance in their own production facilities, and adopt green supply-chain policies
that serve as a source of upward pressure on the environmental practices of do-
mestic commercial partners. Consequently, they exert a private authority effect
that helps to strengthen the implementation of China’s environmental laws and
regulations in the public sphere.
A key reason that trade and FDI exert a positive environmental impact is
that business leaders view it as increasingly necessary to engage in behavior that
harmonizes corporate environmental standards across jurisdictions to stream-
line operational ef‹ciency, maintain brand legitimacy, and hedge against accu-
sations of environmentally destructive conduct. The development of strong en-
vironmental credentials is increasingly considered by business executives to be
an important component of business administration. Our survey analysis indi-
cates that executives of foreign-invested companies operating in China attach
considerable importance to the adoption of environmentally friendly produc-
tion methods and management systems. These ‹ndings are buttressed by our
macrolevel analysis of the impact of trade and FDI on the environmental per-
formance of Chinese provinces. The fact that provinces more deeply embedded
in global trade and production networks tend to exhibit superior environmen-
tal performance lends substantial support to Vogel’s trading-up and Prakash
and Potoski’s investing-up arguments, indicating that these phenomena can
take place outside of the developed world.
Second, our ‹ndings suggest that rather than engaging in deregulatory
competition (or racing to the bottom), Chinese provincial of‹cials are more
concerned with ensuring the sustainability of export markets and increasing
competitiveness of local ‹rms by facilitating technology transfer and develop-
ment through investment attraction. Further, these results suggest that supply-
chain and ‹rm self-regulatory pressure reduce the demands of foreign and do-
mestic ‹rms on provincial governments for environmental deregulation. In
other words, demands from the private sector for deregulation are simply not
loud enough, nor exit threats great enough, to compel of‹cials to comply by
supplying pollution havens. Because provincial of‹cials have strong incentive
to produce breakneck economic growth within their provinces, were exit
Implications, Caveats, and Future Research Questions / 171
threats and investment demands great enough, it is not unreasonable to expect
local of‹cial compliance to follow. The fact that this type of of‹cial behavior is
not observable and that China is still economically expanding by leaps and
bounds suggests that market mechanisms might be equally responsible for mit-
igating poor ‹rm environmental practices.
Third, we ‹nd that export destinations matter. Provinces that export mostly
to countries with stringent environmental regulations exhibit more sound en-
vironmental performance. We also found evidence supporting the country-of-
origin argument with regard to FDI, a result that is further buttressed by our
survey and research into the Chinese paper industry. While on average foreign
‹rms tend to abide by China’s environmental laws and display environmental
behavior superior to domestic ‹rms, the environmental standards in the in-
vestment source country similarly make a difference. Compared to investment
from a country with lax local regulatory standards, MNCs originating from a
country with rigorous standards are more likely to be constrained by such stan-
dards in their China operations. In other words, FDI serves to ratchet up the
environmental standards in the host economy primarily when the home coun-
try itself has stringent environmental laws and regulations. This result lends
support to the view that globalization leads ‹rms to replicate the diverse home-
country practices in their host operations, thus promoting cross-country di-
vergence in corporate practices.2
Implications for Studies of China’s Behavior in the International System
In addition to explicating the theoretical linkages between trade, FDI, and the
environment, this study has implications for the study of China’s behavior in
the international system. China scholars have increasingly devoted attention to
the in›uence of international forces on Chinese politics.3 For example, David
Zweig shows how Chinese leaders have gradually revised the national educa-
tion policy to favor study abroad in an attempt to secure greater access to for-
eign educational resources.4 Other studies have explored how international fac-
tors can affect the making and implementation of Chinese government policies
in issue areas as diverse as intellectual property rights, human rights, and infor-
mation technology.5 In addition, scholars have increasingly sought to under-
stand the in›uence of factors at the international level such as international
regimes or foreign investment on China’s environment.6 However, the path-
ways through which international factors can in›uence China’s environmental
governance are only beginning to be understood.
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An important study in this respect is Phillip Stalley’s research on the impact
of foreign investment on China’s environmental policy. Through ‹eld studies
of the environmental behavior of foreign ‹rms, Stalley concludes that “integra-
tion with the international market does not inevitably lead to a ratcheting up of
environmental standards nor does it unleash a race to the bottom.”7 He ‹nds
that while multinational corporations go “beyond compliance” in their own
manufacturing facilities and adopt green supply-chain policies, the greening ef-
fect of foreign operations is not universal. Stalley maintains that while both for-
eign trade and FDI can exert upward pressure on environmental governance in
China, they serve as a double-edged sword, as poorer Chinese localities that
face a distinct disadvantage in attracting foreign capital tend to more frequently
›out environmental regulation. As well, his survey analysis fails to yield a sta-
tistically signi‹cant relationship between ‹rms’ ties to foreign ‹rms via sales
and supply chains and environmental practices.8 On the whole, Stalley’s study
reveals the bifurcated effect of the impact of trade and FDI on environmental
practices in China.
The ‹ndings of this project, drawn from statistical analyses, ‹rm-level sur-
vey analysis, and a case study, are more upbeat than those in the above work.
Both our provincial-level statistical analyses and survey results lend strong sup-
port to arguments about the positive linkage between trade, FDI, and the envi-
ronment. This project therefore represents an alternative account of the impact
of globalization on the environment in China.
policy implications
Our research has shown that market mechanisms should not bear the brunt of
the blame for the depressing condition of the Chinese environment. In many
respects China’s trade and investment liberalization and economic integration
have contributed to stronger environmental governance. In light of the Chinese
experience, it is necessary to ask what, if anything, international actors with a
stake in sustainable development can do to allow developing countries to enjoy
the bene‹ts of FDI while preventing and minimizing the associated negative
environmental externalities.
First, our ‹ndings have important implications for NGOs in their search
for effective solutions to global environmental problems. Speci‹cally, our cri-
tique of the race-to-the-bottom argument challenges the view that free trade
abets regulatory races, leading exporters in developing countries to exert pres-
sure on their governments to relax environmental regulations to secure greater
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access to export markets. This suggests that environmentalists and non-
governmental actors may need to revisit arguments about the negative impact
of free trade on the environment. Recognizing that free trade can positively
contribute to environmental protection, and that importing countries are able
to in›uence the environmental standards in exporting countries, NGOs striv-
ing to safeguard the global environment may want to devote more attention to
the restructuring of export patterns in developing countries to encourage
greater trading linkages with countries with stringent environmental stan-
dards. This isn’t to suggest that China shouldn’t trade with, or receive invest-
ment from, the developing world; only that if it does, it should take great care
to maintain stringent product and process standards on imports, and monitor
and regulate the environmental performance of developing-world ‹rms in-
vested in China.
Moreover, NGOs should devote greater resources to exerting pressure on
MNCs to stipulate environmentally friendly criteria in their supplier selections.
By directly lobbying MNCs at home, NGOs may enhance the prospect of
in›uencing the behavior of MNCs in the host countries. Likewise, developing-
country governments may want to be more selective regarding the home coun-
try of potential investors. Care needs to be taken in screening foreign invest-
ment projects to minimize the negative environmental consequences of FDI.
Second, at the international level, the ‹ndings of this project reinforce the
need for a global initiative to increase corporate accountability for foreign en-
vironmental practices. While corporations are increasingly engaging in self-
regulation and transmission of environmental standards, international corpo-
rate environmentalism initiatives could act as additional external checks on
corporate behavior. These initiatives could further instigate MNCs to adopt
sound environmental practices that bene‹t developing countries.
Third, our ‹ndings underscore the need to broaden existing voluntary, self-
regulatory initiatives to better involve developing countries in programs de-
signed to promote sustainable corporate behavior. If the ‹ndings of this proj-
ect are valid, then the greatest challenge to the environmental governance of
developing countries may not reside in developed-world MNCs but in those
originating from the developing world. It is thus imperative to strengthen ex-
isting initiatives to regulate corporate behavior in order to subject corporations
from the developing world to more stringent operating standards and criteria.
As most global programs guiding corporate behavior are primarily aimed at
multinational corporations from the developed world, shifting the focus of
these programs to developing countries may be the most effective and practical
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way to in›uence corporate behavior and to tackle the negative consequences of
foreign investment on the environment.
caveats
Before proceeding, a few caveats are in order. First, as this project is based on a
China case study, critics may question its relevance to the broader race-to-the-
bottom literature. How generalizable are these ‹ndings? In response, we argue
that to the extent that China represents the largest developing country in the
world, with one of the world’s fastest-growing economies and an enormous
(and growing) ability to affect the global ecology, ‹ndings from this study
should provide crucial country-level evidence that casts doubt on the race-to-
the-bottom hypothesis. If multinational companies do not ›ock to areas of lax
environmental regulation in their search for low labor and other production
costs in China, and if the presence of foreign capital tends to ratchet up, instead
of pulling down, Chinese environmental performance, then it also should sub-
stantiate arguments about the positive environmental spillovers of the eco-
nomic globalization process elsewhere.
Second, how relevant is this cross-provincial analysis to cross-national vari-
ation in environmental standards? The pollution-haven hypothesis addresses
the question of whether foreign ‹rms locate production to developing coun-
tries largely based on comparisons across countries. Critics may therefore ques-
tion how much foreign ‹rms’ locational choices within China are independent
of their choice to locate plants in China over other world regions. However,
while this project does not speci‹cally examine whether considerations about
host-country environmental regulatory stringency drive foreign ‹rms’ decision
to locate production in China over other countries, it takes the decision to lo-
cate plants in China as given and asks the following question: What accounts
for foreign ‹rms’ locational choice across Chinese provinces? In light of the
substantial cross-provincial variation in FDI in›ows and environmental regu-
latory stringency, such an approach is justi‹ed. The fact that provincial of‹cials
have such strong incentives to promote economic growth in their provinces,
and that they have the ability to adjust their enforcement of environmental reg-
ulations from the central government, suggests that if one were to witness the
RTB and PH arguments in effect, China would be a plausible place to do it.
Third, the province as a unit of analysis does not accommodate the poten-
tial for environmental pollution in one province to spill over into neighboring
provinces. However, the fact that the emissions data we used are recorded at the
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‹rm site, and that ‹rms pay levies based on these emissions, indicates that in-
terprovincial pollution spillovers, while important, likely do not impact ‹rm
locational choices. Were pollution-intensive ‹rms to site production facilities
on or near provincial borders, emissions would still be recorded, and levies
paid, at emission points-of-origin. Further, cross-border pollution spillovers
are possible at every level of analysis, from subnational to country levels.
questions for future research
This research focuses on the impact of economic integration on the Chinese
environment. However, it does not address a number of questions that may be
important to understanding China’s role in in›uencing the global ecology. This
section lays out several questions that merit greater scholarly scrutiny.
Further Explorations of the Sources of China’s Environmental Plight
This project has highlighted the positive role of trade and foreign investment in
improving environmental quality in China. For that reason, it has left out the
following question: if trade and foreign direct investment do indeed have the
ratcheting-up effect as posited, then why is China’s environment in such a de-
plorable condition? There are two potentially useful avenues of tackling this
question: one is to consider the potential for the scale effect of globalization to
overwhelm the technique effect, and the other is the possibility that the root
causes of China’s environmental woes are linked to domestic politics.
First, it is necessary to take into consideration the scale, technique, and in-
come effects of free trade in order to fully understand the impact of trade on
the global environment. Our study of how trade and FDI affect the spatial dis-
tribution of pollution in China suggests that trade and investment can create
demand for cleaner production processes, management systems, and environ-
mentally friendly technologies in a way that is consistent with the conjectures
of the technique effect. However, this does not preclude the technique effect
from being overwhelmed by the sheer scale of China’s economic activities.
While the improvement in China’s environmental management systems and
production processes and technologies represents an important dimension of
the country’s growing participation in the global economy, it is after all just one
of the many dimensions of its global economic engagement.
Second, in discussing the impact of globalization on the Chinese environ-
ment, this research has adopted a “second-image reversed” approach, by look-
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ing at how the forces of economic globalization, which are exogenous to the
state, drive policy outcomes within the state. While the domestic sources of
China’s environmental problems are not the focus of this project, it would be
interesting to examine how forces endogenous to China, such as interest
groups, institutions, and nongovernmental organizations, shape policy out-
comes. Such an approach may allow us to better assess the contributing factors
to China’s current environmental plight.
For example, this research does not address the impact of nongovernmen-
tal organizations on the Chinese environment. Nevertheless, environmental
NGOs are increasingly in›uencing the debate over environmental policy for-
mulation and implementation, and shaping China’s strategy toward global en-
vironmental management.9
Similarly, political institutions have great power to shape Chinese environ-
mental policy. Previous studies have examined how con›icts among political
actors, refracted through political institutions, in›uence policy outcomes in is-
sue areas such as intellectual property rights or dam building.10 For example, in
examining the politics of intellectual property rights in China, Mertha argues
that even though external pressure for enhanced IPR protection has prompted
the Chinese government to sign on to IPR agreements that are on a par with in-
ternational standards, the substantial variation in the implementation of such
agreements across issue areas (e.g., copyrights vs. patents) cannot be under-
stood without taking into consideration the political tussles that take place
among various bureaucratic actors in China. Therefore, it is possible that fac-
tors within China such as bureaucratic politics, interest group lobbying, and
NGO activism that are not addressed in this book similarly in›uence the vari-
ation in environmental policy outcomes. Future studies could undertake the
“second image” approach and examine how domestic politics in China affects
environmental policy and performance.
In short, there remains a need to extend the focus of analysis from the cen-
tral government in Beijing to regional, bureaucratic, and societal actors. Instead
of treating China as a unitary actor, future studies could extend the focus of
analysis beyond Beijing to probe how various domestic actors interact with ex-
ternal factors to in›uence policy implementation on the ground.
China’s Involvement in Global Environmental Regimes
Another potential research avenue concerns China’s activities in global envi-
ronmental regimes and the effectiveness of that involvement.11 Recently China
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has become more active in international environmental diplomacy. For exam-
ple, China has been playing a proactive international role in some technical ar-
eas such as biodiversity and has taken a strong initiative toward water conser-
vation and wildlife protection.12 In addition, it has played a leading role in
proposals to establish a green GDP, to include environmental performance as
one of the criteria for evaluating staff performance and promotion, and to pro-
mote the use of hotlines for reporting environmental offenses.13
It would therefore be worthwhile to take an inside-out approach to exam-
ine how domestic politics in China affects the country’s environmental man-
agement and, by extension, its role in global environmental regimes. For exam-
ple, on several key issues affecting the global environment, China’s stance
promises to be critical. While Chinese leaders have indicated a willingness to
participate in talks to curb global warming, they insist that developed countries
should take a leadership role in addressing pollution and are ‹rmly against pro-
posals to impose mandatory quotas of reductions in greenhouse gas emissions
on any country.14 As China remains one of the world’s principal emitters,
whether or not it will cooperate with the United States on this issue to reach a
compromise on a new protocol beyond 2012 has strong implications for the ef-
fectiveness of global environmental governance. The degree to which China
can engage in such a cooperative endeavor is in turn likely to be affected by the
preferences and resources of domestic Chinese actors.
Is There a Race to the Bottom in Issue Areas Besides the Environment?
While there is a burgeoning body of literature examining the domestic impli-
cations of China’s growing participation in world markets, the social and eco-
nomic consequences of this phenomenon warrant further analysis. For exam-
ple, in his examination of the impact of FDI on human rights in China, Michael
Santoro argues that multinational corporations engaging in a market-building
as opposed to a cost-minimizing strategy in China are likely to exert a positive
impact on human rights in that country as they tend to operate with enhanced
transparency, adhere to meritocratic principles, and engage in other practices
that enhance the power of employees within the ‹rm.15 In highlighting how
such processes lay the social and economic bases for democratic transitions,
Santoro provides a favorable account of the social impact of FDI in China.
Doug Guthrie examines the impact of FDI on the corporate practices of
Chinese domestic ‹rms, ‹nding that inward FDI leads to the convergence of
178 / greening china
Chinese ‹rm behavior with global best practices. Drawing on extensive ‹eld-
work in Chinese domestic ‹rms in Shanghai, he argues that as these ‹rms en-
gage in a process of imitation, they increasingly shy away from practices char-
acteristic of traditional Chinese ‹rms such as the use of informal agreements
and personal connections (guanxi) to embrace the more rational managerial
strategies that characterize ‹rms in the West.16
Similarly, Thomas Moore analyzes China’s participation in global regulatory
regimes, focusing in particular on the impact of the Multi‹ber Arrangement
(MFA) on Chinese ‹rms.17 He argues that as the MFA contains provisions that
discriminate against developing-country exporters, it has exerted upward pres-
sure on Chinese exporters to improve the quality of their products, thus align-
ing the practices of Chinese ‹rms closer to prevailing global market standards.
However, while the above-cited works posit that FDI can lead to economic
and social convergence between China and the developed world, other scholars
have reached different conclusions. For example, Yasheng Huang argues that as
FDI has served to substitute, rather than complement, domestic entrepreneur-
ship, it has set back the Chinese private sector development.18 Mary Gallagher as-
sesses the impact of FDI on Chinese democratization prospects.19 While ac-
knowledging that the competitive pressure exerted by FDI has forced China’s
state-owned enterprises to increase their ef‹ciency and improve their labor stan-
dards, she contends that because FDI has fragmented labor and limited labor’s
ability to challenge the central government, it has delayed democratic reforms.
In short, scholars are of different opinions about the social and economic im-
pact of FDI in China. It is important that there are relatively few works directly
engaging the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis to examine the impact of FDI on
such issues as labor standards or human rights. Consequently, it would be inter-
esting to subject the race-to-the-bottom argument to empirical testing in other
areas. For example, research questions similar to those motivating this project
could be posed for the issue of labor standards. One could ask questions such as
whether foreign investors are attracted to areas of lax labor standards and
whether provinces that have received more FDI also tend to provide better labor
rights protection or have fewer labor disputes. Questions could also be asked
about whether foreign investors from developed countries offer better labor
rights protection, and if there exists sectoral variation in labor rights protection.
Indeed, there is anecdotal evidence that solely foreign-owned ‹rms and
joint ventures established with Western capital tend to treat their workers bet-
ter than their counterparts established with capital from Hong Kong, Taiwan,
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or South Korea.20 Such discrepancies in the labor practices of Western versus
Asian ‹rms have sometimes been attributed to the institutional culture of in-
dustry, including the institutional practices pertaining to the treatment of
workers, in the ‹rms’ respective home countries. Martin King Whyte, for in-
stance, noted that the smaller and more labor-intensive ‹rms established with
capital from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea come from societies with
few constraints from either organized trade unions or the state on the treat-
ment of workers.21 Motivated by a desire to save on labor costs, these ‹rms tend
to enforce a complex set of rules and detailed ‹nes regarding worker behavior.22
Consequently, reports abound in Chinese government and trade union presses
about cases of abuse by such ‹rms. Such evidence provides tentative support to
the investing-up argument as it relates to labor standards, suggesting that MNC
subsidiaries tend to replicate the prevailing institutions and practices in their
home country in the LDC host. Future studies could more systematically test
such a hypothesis.
The Environmental Implications of China’s International Environmental
Initiatives and Growing Outbound Foreign Investment
Alternatively, one could ask questions about how China’s international environ-
mental initiatives affect domestic environmental governance. By 2006 China had
signed bilateral environmental cooperation agreements with forty-two coun-
tries.23 While on the one hand, through its participation in global environmental
governance, the Chinese government promotes the view that developing coun-
tries should be accorded differential treatment in complying with international
standards due to their need for rapid industrial catch-up; on the other hand, Bei-
jing seems to expect that it may be able to leverage international environmental
agreements to pressure domestic manufacturers and other vested interests to
take initiatives to combat pollution. If, as Falkner’s case study of China’s experi-
ence with genetically modi‹ed food suggests, China’s participation in interna-
tional organizations and treaties serves to induce domestic policy change by ex-
erting a socializing and learning effect on Chinese actors,24 then China’s growing
participation in global environmental regimes may indeed affect Chinese envi-
ronmental politics. Future studies could engage in more detailed analysis of this
issue to delineate the pathways through which participation in international en-
vironmental regimes in›uences the Chinese environment.
Furthermore, the impact of China’s foreign investment in other developing
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countries or regions on their environmental governance is worthy of further
investigation.25 For example, Chinese investment in Latin America and Africa
has seen a steady increase in recent years.26 If our argument about how envi-
ronmental regulatory enforcement in the home country of FDI in›uences en-
vironmental standards and performance in the host country is valid, and if the
diffusion of corporate environmentalism has yet to be extended to most Chi-
nese ‹rms, as the survey data in chapter 6 suggests, then one would expect that
FDI originating from developing countries may lead to further neglect of envi-
ronmental protection. Whether such a dynamic is at work and whether the in-
vesting-up argument extends to Chinese FDI in regions such as Latin America
or Africa therefore warrant further examination.
The Impact of the Global Economic Recession on China’s 
Environmental Commitment
Since mid-2008, the global economy has been mired in the worst economic
downturn since the Great Depression, prompting questions about the impact
of the global economic recession on the commitment of both Chinese and
Western ‹rms to sound environmental standards. At ‹rst blush, it appears that
the belt-tightening necessitated by the global economic crisis could have cre-
ated incentives for corporations to look for ways to cut back on expenditures,
thus generating downward pressure on the environment. However, a closer
analysis would suggest that the picture might be far more complicated, as com-
panies that have been able to successfully weather the ‹nancial crisis storm
seem to be holding up their commitment to responsible corporate behavior.
Wal-Mart, for example, has been able to maintain its market share and has con-
tinued to exert pressure on its suppliers to meet environmental and labor stan-
dards. For example, in July 2009, in the heart of the economic recession, Wal-
Mart released its “Sustainability Index” initiative to map the sustainability of its
products worldwide. This is a bold step for any corporation, but especially one
as large as Wal-Mart in the midst of an economic recovery.27 Instead of gener-
ating downward pressure on the environment across the board, the crisis may
have led those who were able to come out of it relatively unscathed to continue
to abide by stricter standards while leading those struggling to cope with the
economic downturn to scale back their environmental commitments. The un-
folding of the crisis in the future could help us reach more de‹nitive conclu-
sions on this issue.
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conclusion
In conclusion, this book adopts multiple methodologies to critically assess the
pollution-haven and race-to-the-bottom hypotheses. The empirical evidence
presented in previous chapters suggests that foreign investors are not driven by
emission cost savings in their investment decisions. Nor are provincial govern-
ments in China motivated by the competitive dynamics of business attraction to
engage in environmental deregulation. Indeed, not only can trade serve to trans-
fer the more stringent environmental product and process standards prevalent
in environmentally regulated countries to their primary exporters, FDI can ex-
ert a similar effect due to self-regulation by multinational corporations, the
transfer of pollution abatement technology, and the transfer of corporate envi-
ronmental norms, thus facilitating convergence with home-country practices.
While the empirical ‹ndings generated by a case study of China are country
speci‹c, they do have implications for other countries at similar developmental
stages. In addition, as China represents one-‹fth of the world population and a
signi‹cant proportion of the world’s manufacturing and production activities, it
is an important case to test competing theories of the environmental impact of
globalization. Our ‹ndings could thus potentially be generalized to other devel-
oping countries. Future studies could extend this approach to other developing
countries to both assess the validity of the theories presented in this research and
identify new dimensions of the globalization-environment linkage.
It should be noted that while this project emphasizes the positive environ-
mental spillovers of trade and market liberalization, it does not suggest that en-
hanced public surveillance of corporate environmental conduct and global ini-
tiatives to promote corporate responsibility are unnecessary. Indeed, while in
general multinational corporations can contribute to stronger environmental
governance, the establishment of global environmental governance programs
would act as a useful external check on corporate behavior.
Moreover, while there are many voluntary, self-regulating environmental
initiatives, most of these initiatives have targeted multinational corporations
from the developed world. However, our study suggests that businesses from
developing countries with lax environmental regulations may pose the greatest
threat to Chinese environmental governance. Consequently, it may be neces-
sary to involve developing countries more closely in voluntary environmental
initiatives to ameliorate the negative environmental impact of their outward
foreign investment.
If trade and FDI are not to blame for China’s environmental woes, then it
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may be necessary to strengthen domestic environmental governance in China
by expanding the participation of public and private actors in the environmen-
tal policy process. For example, our case study of the APP indicates that the me-
dia and environmental NGOs are increasingly serving as corporate watchdogs
by exerting pressure on highly polluting ‹rms to modify their behavior. Orga-
nizations such as the Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs directed by
the Chinese environmentalist Jun Ma have developed the ‹rst public database
of Chinese water pollution. These data have exposed to public scrutiny compa-
nies that have excessively polluted China’s waterways.28 While there are limits to
the extent of civil society participation in China’s political system, the gradual
expansion of such public participation should generate incremental changes in
the long term.
Likewise, the central government in Beijing should play a more forceful role
in enforcing environmental regulation. In addition to increasing governmental
investment in environmental protection, Beijing should develop stronger mech-
anisms to supervise and regulate the behavior of local governments and to penal-
ize local behavior that either directly or indirectly challenges central injunctions.
In addition, enhancing the role of the private sector in China’s environ-
mental governance could generate fruitful results. Our survey chapter indicates
that despite China’s growing economic integration, there remains a consider-
able gap between wholly domestically owned ‹rms and foreign-invested ‹rms
in terms of environmental management systems and operating procedures.
Consequently, it may be necessary to develop mechanisms of information shar-
ing between domestic and foreign ‹rms. Stalley suggests that both Chinese and
foreign governments could play an important role in this process by sponsor-
ing forums that allow ‹rms to share environmental management best prac-
tices.29 Such mechanisms may provide valuable opportunities for domestic
‹rms with limited knowledge of environmental management systems to close
the gap with foreign ‹rms, thus helping to foster the development of corporate
environmental norms within China.
While trade and market liberalization have made positive contributions to
environmental governance in China, they are far from panaceas for the coun-
try’s environmental problems. In light of the ongoing environmental chal-
lenges in China, improvement in governmental oversight of corporate environ-
mental behavior and the harnessing of private sector participation in the policy
process remain daunting tasks. Both are likely necessary to avoid the unfortu-
nate trade-off between industrialization and environmental degradation and
to ensure the long-run sustainability of the Chinese economy.
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